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ABSTRACT 
 
“IS NOT THE PAST ALL SHADOW?”: 
 
HISTORY AND VISION IN BYRON, THE SHELLEYS, AND KEATS 
 
By 
 
Timothy Ruppert 
 
March 2008 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Professor Daniel P. Watkins 
 
238 pages 
 
 
     Throughout the British Romantic period, poets and prose writers shared a keen interest  
 
in the imaginative possibilities conferred by the national legacy of literary prophecy.  The  
 
subversive and transformative elements of the vatic tradition in England, particularly as 
established by John Milton’s aesthetically and politically radical work, appealed to both 
older and younger Romantic writers who sought not simply to describe their times but to 
remake them.  To such minds, prophecy offered a historically authoritative genre 
equipped with unique aesthetic principles and a seemingly timely interventionist ethic, 
whether turned to the renovation of individual men and women or of whole communities.   
     After the Battle of Waterloo decisively concluded the Napoleonic Wars, however, 
Romantic literary prophecy in England underwent a significant transformation.  This 
study addresses how four major British postwar authors—namely, Byron, the Shelleys, 
and Keats—engage and challenge the ideas and ideals of visionary poetics and so  
iv 
 
assert new perspectives on literary prophecy in contradistinction to the first wave 
Romantics’ aesthetic values and tenets.  Over the course of this discussion, I look closely 
at Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, Byron’s The Vision of Judgment, Mary Shelley’s The 
Last Man, and select lyrical pieces from Keats.  Although Shelley in part carries forward 
the visionary spirit of Blake and the Lake Poets, Byron, Mary Shelley, and Keats actively 
question that spirit and its expression in literary art.  Consequently, these second wave 
Romantics facilitate the discontinuation of what the twentieth-century scholar Joseph 
Anthony Wittreich, Jr., calls the English line of vision, that is, an artistic genealogy 
stretching from the Romantics to Milton, Spenser, Sidney, and Chaucer (and, ultimately, 
to the prophets of Judeo-Christian scripture).  This study, then, presents an evaluation of 
why the younger Romantics countervail the British visionary poetics tradition and how 
this important change in the general artistic imagination reflects both the hopes and the 
disenchantments of the British post-Napoleonic moment. 
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 Introduction 
 
“The case is, that the word prophet, to which later times have affixed a new idea, was the 
Bible word for poet, and the word prophesying meant the art of making poetry.  It also 
meant the art of playing poetry to a tune upon any instrument of music.” 
—Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, First Part (1794)1 
 
     This study examines British Romantic literary prophecy in the later Regency period, 
that is, in the years after the Seventh Coalition—an international alliance that included 
the United Kingdom—decisively defeated Napoleon Bonaparte and the First French 
Empire at Waterloo, Belgium, on 18 June 1815.  The English Regency period 
encompassed the nine years between 1811, when the Prince Regent became acting 
sovereign in place of his father, King George III, and 1820, when the Prince Regent 
acceded to the throne following his father’s death.  The period of hostilities with France, 
however, began in 1793 and continued almost without interruption until 1815.  The 
British victory at Waterloo thus concluded nearly twenty-two years of war with France, at 
first a Revolutionary and finally an imperial state.  My focus, then, is on the changes in 
Romantic visionary literature during England’s postwar years, a period that includes and 
extends somewhat beyond the English Regency timeframe. 
     Throughout the British Romantic period (very roughly, 1789 to 1832), poets and prose 
writers shared a keen interest in the imaginative possibilities conferred by the national 
legacy of literary prophecy.  The subversive and transformative elements of the vatic  
1 
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tradition in England, particularly as established by John Milton’s aesthetically and 
politically radical work, appealed to both older and younger Romantic writers who 
sought not simply to describe their times but to remake them.  To such minds, prophecy 
offered a historically authoritative genre equipped with unique aesthetic principles and a 
seemingly timely interventionist ethic, whether turned to the renovation of individual 
men and women or of whole communities.  Literary prophecy, as epitomized by Milton’s 
highly influential oeuvre, represented a way for art to come to terms with both personal 
and public conflicts in an age of serious historical crisis. 
     In a general sense, this shared interest in Milton’s art and prophetic persona unites the 
British Romantic writers of both the wartime and postwar generations.2   The Miltonic 
legacy provides a helpful framework for the scholar who seeks to interpret the Romantic 
period as a whole or wishes to consider the relationships between first generation 
Romantics, such as William Blake, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, and William Wordsworth, 
and their postwar heirs.  The principal theorist of this legacy is Joseph Anthony 
Wittreich, Jr.  In a remarkable succession of publications appearing throughout the 1970s, 
Wittreich breaks significant theoretical ground in both the study of visionary literature as 
a historical phenomenon and in the critical understanding of prophecy as an English 
literary genre.  With respect to the former, he posits the idea of a trans-generational line 
of vision, that is, a literary tradition stretching from the Middle Ages to the present that 
takes scripture as its beginning and Milton as its apex.  With respect to the latter, he 
asserts that prophecy establishes aesthetic values, a recognizable methodology for literary 
production, and a measure for an artist’s self-identification.  His work on visionary  
3 
poetics thus presents an explicative model for a certain authorial temperament and 
provides a continuity theory that helps to clarify how poetic influence functions, as in the 
cases of Chaucer’s influence on Spenser, Spenser’s influence on Milton, or Milton’s 
influence on Blake, the Lake Poets, and the younger Romantics.3         
     Wittreich offers both a critical narrative of English literary relations and a cogent 
description of an aesthetic especially popular with first-generation British Romantic 
poets.  At the same time, he tends not to distinguish between the older and younger 
Romantics; consequently, he overlooks the distinctiveness of the two Romantic 
generations and their respective historical moments.  Although neither cavalier nor self-
defeating, this homogenization of the Romantic poets creates interpretative problems in 
light of certain critical assertions.  William Kerrigan, for example, contends that “after 
the English Revolution,” the poet-prophet role changes because “the political and 
religious division of the nation inevitably meant a divided national literature” (81).  As 
this remark suggests, the stability of the Miltonic inheritance is undermined from the 
outset by the lasting cultural effects of the mid-seventeenth century English Civil Wars 
that replaced Stuart monarchy with the Commonwealth.  And although the early 
Romantics faced revolution abroad and Pittite repression at home, as well as many years 
of bloody war, we may note, with Christina M. Root, that “the post-Napoleonic period 
raised new questions about how lasting change could come about and demanded a more 
skeptical and self-conscious approach to both poetry and politics” (164).  By blending the 
older and younger Romantics into a single class of poets, Wittreich simplifies a complex 
era and marginalizes cultural in favor of purely literary history.     
4                
     With Wittreich’s theoretical work in mind, I seek in this study to show that the 
postwar Romantics significantly and lastingly transform the English visionary tradition.  
Over the course of this essay, I discuss the unique responses of four important late-
Regency writers—namely, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Lord Byron, Mary Shelley, and John 
Keats—to the art of poetic prophecy.  Although I treat each separately, in largely self-
contained chapters, these individual authors bear collective relevance to the assertion that 
the Romantic visionary line falls apart within eleven years after the Battle of Waterloo.  
While it is true that Shelley carries forward much of the spirit of the Lake Poets in his 
lyrical drama, Prometheus Unbound (1820), his contemporaries, for varying reasons and 
to differing extents, challenge and with time undermine the visionary poetics 
promulgated by the first wave Romantics.4    Shelley’s belief in the transformative power 
of prophecy, although provisionally validated by Byron in The Vision of Judgment 
(1822), inspires Mary Shelley’s sophisticated repudiation of English visionary poetics in 
her 1826 novel, The Last Man.5  And although appearing late in the Romantic period, the 
book in fact shares a great deal with John Keats’s skeptical, materialist critique of 
Romantic prophecy, a critique that Keats first offers at a much earlier moment in the 
English Regency.          
     This study, then, presents a critical narrative of the second wave Romantics in relation 
to the English tradition of poetic prophecy as Wittreich describes it.  To facilitate this 
presentation, my first chapter sketches out Wittreich’s theories in detail, thereby 
providing a context for the study as a whole.  This initial chapter comprises four 
interrelated sections.  The first section describes Wittreich’s line of vision and visionary 
5 
poetics theories, both of which arise out of an original idea of Milton’s poetic influence.  
The second section traces Wittreich’s own influence on a generation of scholars, 
including Jackie DiSalvo, Leslie Tannenbaum, Terence Allan Hoagwood, and George 
Anthony Rosso, who, during the 1980s, conducted new investigations of Romantic 
literary prophecy.  After providing these two descriptive sections, I examine in greater 
depth two of my contentions with Wittreich:  first, that he creates a Milton who is too 
decisive, who varies little from author to author and age to age; and second, that he 
renders the post-Waterloo moment too indistinctly, thereby fostering an inaccurate 
identification of the younger Romantics with their older counterparts.  Accordingly, in 
section three I discuss Milton as an unsettled and markedly indecisive presence in British 
literary history, while in section four I offer a historical survey of the postwar Regency 
period in order to highlight its considerable distinctiveness. 
     My second chapter presents a reading of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as a vision of 
human perfectibility and social renovation that reflects the poet’s engagement with 
intellectuals such as William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet.  I devote special 
attention in this reading to Shelley’s idea of Love as a vital principle through which all 
life is joined.  To a certain type of mind, such a principle possesses a clear appeal, 
particularly at a time of intellectual disenchantment and political authoritarianism (the 
postwar years, of course, saw the restoration of monarchies throughout Europe and the 
reinforcement of the Hanoverian regime in England).  Despite its verbal beauty, the piece 
is idiosyncratic and at times nebulous; consequently, I interpret the work through a close 
reading methodology that I believe best casts light on a crucial but often trying work.   
6 
Because I believe it appropriate to the analysis, I adopt this approach provisionally in 
chapter two and organize its six sections accordingly.  Sections two through five present 
individual readings of acts one through four of Shelley’s lyrical drama; section five, 
however, focuses less on Shelley’s fourth act (which has almost no recognizable plot) 
than on an important question that it raises, specifically, whether the act presents a world 
reformed through Love as a decidedly utopian social vision.  The concluding section 
addresses the relationship between Shelley and Byron, who, in The Vision of Judgment, 
responds at least in part to his contemporary’s visionary idealism. 
     In chapter three, I suggest an unusual interpretation of Byron’s 1822 poem, a work 
written to countervail Robert Southey’s sycophantic, manifestly royalist A Vision of 
Judgment (1821). Traditionally, Romanticists have viewed The Vision of Judgment as a 
merciless and mortal blow against the Lake Poet, whose disdain for Byron was both open 
and intense.  The poem, however, provides adequate evidence for one to call this 
customary reading into question.  In this chapter, I argue that Byron, partly influenced by 
Shelley’s visionary idealism, ridicules Southey—the former Jacobin radical who later 
became England’s Poet Laureate—without damning him.  Rather, Byron shows clemency 
to his adversary (as well as to the late British monarch) by asserting a vision of 
compassion that develops subtly over the course of the piece.  To demonstrate this 
atypical claim, I first recount the complex relationship between Byron and Southey; I 
then discuss how the intersection of vision and satire in the poem creates a unique textual 
opportunity for the young Romantic to explore the possibility of forgiveness; and, finally, 
I trace the pattern of tolerance and compassion established in the work by characters such  
7 
as the Archangel Michael, Sathan (Byron’s spelling), John Wilkes, and the enigmatic 
political critic, Junius.  Through these three related analyses, I seek to establish that 
Byron, who was neither an idealist nor a disciple of the older Romantic seer-poets, 
engaged the visionary idiom seriously and resourcefully, as The Vision of Judgment 
shows. 
     In my fourth chapter, I consider Mary Shelley’s novel of biological apocalypse, The 
Last Man, and argue that the book offers a subversive critique of the poetical tenets that 
Percy Shelley and Byron espoused during the late Regency period.  The novel indicts 
both poets by redrawing them as two politically powerful characters, namely the 
benevolent Adrian (Shelley) and the haughty Raymond (Byron).  At first glance, such 
characterizations perhaps suggest that Shelley wishes to render a critique of Romantic 
radical ideology rather than of Romantic visionary aesthetics.  A closer inspection of her 
experimental narrative, however, reveals that Shelley pointedly assails the latter by 
offering a sophisticated counterexample to the vatic works of her contemporaries.  
Although her protagonist, Lionel Verney, presents his plague-chronicle as a history rather 
than a vision, this record of what befalls humankind in the late twenty-first century 
assumes prophetic force by virtue of the fact that it is recovered by a Regency-era 
Englishwoman while visiting the Cave of the Sibyl in 1818 Italy.  By privileging the 
sibylline prophetic tradition over the Judeo-Christian legacy in the frame narrative, Mary 
Shelley creates an expressly female visionary poetics that challenges many of the biases 
inherent in Shelley and Byron’s work.  In chapter four, I expatiate on this assertion first 
by discussing her experiments with linear time and chronology and then by elaborating   
8 
how and why she replaces patriarchal scriptural and British referents with the 
matriarchal, pagan sibyl.  I conclude by exploring the question of whether Shelley, by 
way of her daringly innovative novel, establishes the grounds for a specifically female 
line of vision. 
     My fifth and last chapter focuses on John Keats, who almost from the first brings a 
materialist, non-Christian perspective to bear on his engagements with visionary art.  
Because he distrusts the transcendent idealism implicit within the English vatic tradition, 
Keats offers a skeptical valuation of Romantic visionary poetics and its metaphysical 
undercurrents.  This valuation amounts to a critique that takes shape over several poems 
and letters and reflects the maturation of Keats’s thinking with respect to both art and 
politics.  Although he writes many of these pieces before the Shelleys and Byron publish 
their most important visionary works, Keats in fact anticipates the less than favorable 
Victorian response to the English visionary tradition.  In this sense, Keats’s insistent 
realism and secularism bridge late Romantic poetry with the social reformist literature of 
the 1830s and 1840s.  If the early Victorians write to renovate individuals and 
communities, they do so without directly invoking either the program for change or the 
aesthetic code standardized by the English prophetic tradition.  To cast light on this 
contention, I discuss poems such as the well-known Ode to a Nightingale (1820) and the 
far less familiar “Before he went to live with owls and bats” (c. 1817) before presenting 
my analysis of Keats’s influence on the post-Romantic generation of British writers.  My 
objective here is to show that Keats begins what Mary Shelley in essence finishes five 
years after Keats’s death, namely, the breaking of the Romantic visionary line. 
9 
     The four younger British Romantics with whom I am concerned in this study differ 
significantly on several counts, as evinced by their divergent responses to the visionary 
mode established by the first generation Romantics.  At the same time, what distinguishes 
these authors may be most advantageously understood in relation to what unites them.  
Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats share both a deep interest in history and an intellectual 
faith in the power of literature either to effect change or to articulate the need for change.  
Taken together, this interest and faith suggest why visionary poetics elicits so many 
profound if varied responses from the younger Romantics.  These authors collectively 
intuit that literary prophecy—the legacy of Chaucer, Sidney, Spenser, and Milton—
signifies much more than “ecstatic, mantic, oracular, [and] shamanic utterance and 
performance” (Leavitt 2).  The poet-prophet’s art may involve elements of rhapsody or 
invoke the idea of divine afflatus; but poetic prophecy is primarily a way of writing about 
human beings in the here-and-now world.  The poet thus offers to his times a reanalysis 
of the past, thereby facilitating change in the present and creating new possibilities for the 
future.   
     British literary prophecy, accordingly, has little to do with sacred inspiration and bears 
even less relation to the simple foretelling of things to come.  Rather, the art espouses an 
interventionist purpose that draws its authority from the nation’s poets and their works.  
For the second wave Romantics, the principal representative of this authority was Milton, 
a radical artist with whom they shared a love of intellectual liberty and a hatred of kings.  
These feelings join Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats, even if aesthetics often divide them.  
By reconsidering these authors in light of the unique conditions of the post-Napoleonic 
10 
moment, we may better appreciate how the younger Romantics carry forward Milton’s 
revolutionary spirit at a time when disaffection and bloodshed intensified the need for 
new visions of human freedom and community.                                                                         
              
                           
       
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
Visionary Poetics and Regency Romanticism 
 
     Building his argument partly on older studies such as Rupert Taylor’s The Political 
Prophecy in England (1911) and Raymond Dexter Havens’s The Influence of Milton on 
English Poetry (1922), Joseph Anthony Wittreich, in several works published in the 
1970s, posited a theory of poetic tradition and continuity designed to counter the idea of 
literary relations that Harold Bloom presents in The Anxiety of Influence (1973).  By 
way of his response to Bloom, Wittreich also engages, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
critics such as Marjorie Reeves, Walter Jackson Bate, Angus Fletcher, Murray Roston, 
Peter F. Fisher, Iain H. Murray, Northrop Frye, and, in later pieces, William Kerrigan.1 
With these scholars as well as Bloom in mind, Wittreich offers a theory of poetic 
influence that yields a fresh understanding of British literary history and the aesthetic 
considerations which distinguish artists who write within one or the other of the two main 
currents constituting that history.   
     Wittreich asserts that English literary history comprises two principal intellectual 
genealogies, namely, the line of wit and the line of vision.  Accordingly, most major 
British authors belong to one or the other tradition; a writer’s aesthetic concerns and 
practices determine whether he or she is a wit or a visionary (this second type of artist 
may also be called a poet-prophet, seer-poet, or vates).  Unlike Bloom, who reads literary 
history as the sum of anxiety-driven conflicts across generations, Wittreich identifies two 
classes or communities of authors who share a sense of affinity with their historical  
11 
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predecessors.  Wittreich thus countervails Bloom by replacing Bloom’s picture of 
disaffected authors locked in Oedipal struggle with an image of the same artists joined in 
literary coalitions across time. 
     Wittreich’s critical interests lie principally in the visionary tradition and the class of 
writers engendered by that legacy.  The line of vision, as Wittreich formulates it, has its 
provenance in Christian scriptural precedents and takes John Milton as its focal point.  
With Milton as its central figure, this tradition interconnects writers such as Geoffrey 
Chaucer, Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, and the greater part of the major Romantics, 
especially William Blake, William Wordsworth, and Percy Bysshe Shelley (Milton and 
the Line of Vision xiv).2   Additionally, this genealogy accommodates Modernists such as 
William Butler Yeats, James Joyce, and Wallace Stevens.3   And, to take Wittreich’s 
theory a step further, we may count post-colonial authors such as Salman Rushdie and 
Doris Lessing among those whose work places them within the tradition of English vatic 
literature.4  Sharing aesthetic values, compositional techniques, and an idea of authorial 
identity, these writers, among others, constitute a trans-generational community that 
Wittreich positions against the competing line of wit tradition.  
     The line of wit, conversely, comprises writers such as Ben Jonson, John Donne, John 
Dryden, Samuel Johnson, Alexander Pope, and Robert Browning, all of whom show less 
interest in biblical prophecy and Milton’s radical art than in classical sources and the 
aesthetic principles codified by those sources.  Generally, the Elizabethan dramatists, the 
Metaphysical and neoclassical poets, and the Victorians belong to this historical 
countercurrent.  John T. Shawcross, in John Milton and Influence (1991), clarifies the 
13 
distinctions between the two traditions in terms of their individual emphases on either 
classical or scriptural precedents: 
          While most attention has been paid to an “Aristotelian” principle of imitation 
          that develops the line of wit, methodizing but praising variation as well, an 
          unstinted undercurrent of “Platonic” “truth” persists to establish a line of vision. 
          The “Platonic” poet becomes a copyist (a quite different concept from that of 
          being an imitator) of the poet’s own vision.  The employment of the Bible is a 
          clear demarcation between these antithetic poets, the one reproducing, for example, 
          event or character, the other interpreting the revelation in the event or character. 
          Such revelation becomes archetypal and is fundamental to prophecy, an act of  
          little interest to a Pope or a Johnson.  (71) 
Shawcross’s description encompasses a crucial point:  while artists working in the wit 
tradition seek interrelatedness with classical authors, texts, and tenets, visionary writers 
look rather to align themselves and their art with the biblical seers of the Old and New 
Testaments.  Of course, the two lines at times intersect, as in the case of Pope’s Windsor 
Forest (1713) (MLV xiv).  For the most part, though, the traditions seldom coalesce or 
hybridize because the two lines have radically different provenances in the literature of 
the past.5  
     For writers composing in the vatic tradition, the Bible generally, and the Book of 
Revelation particularly, provide sophisticated and lastingly powerful models of influence. 
Wittreich contends that visionary poets, through a selective and purposeful program of 
study that mirrors scriptural precedents, strive for erudition in their respective literary 
14 
inheritances: 
          The interconnectedness of the tradition requires that the poet-prophet give to his 
          precursors the same diligent study that Daniel gave to Jeremiah and that John of 
          Patmos gave to Daniel.  The involvement of these biblical prophets with one 
          another is replicated by the relationship Spenser strikes with Chaucer, Milton with 
          Spenser (and Sidney), Blake and the other Romantics with Milton, and Yeats or 
          Stevens, as well as many other moderns, with both Milton and Blake.  Moreover, 
          the interrelationships, often noted, between the Book of Revelation and other 
          prophecy (especially Daniel’s) are archetypal for those that exist between The 
          Canterbury Tales and The Faerie Queene, between The Faerie Queene and 
          Paradise Lost, between Milton’s epics and those of Blake, and between Blake’s 
          epics and the lyric-epic vision of Yeats or the epical novels of Joyce.  (MLV xv) 
By adopting the interpretative and compositional methods of the Hebrew prophets (and, 
for the Romantics, doing so according to Milton’s example), the visionary engages the 
literary and cultural pasts dynamically, revivifying and revising older prophecies as a 
way to facilitate new possibilities for the human future.  Through this depiction of the 
British visionary author, Wittreich both counterstrikes Bloom and answers M. H. 
Abrams, who, in Natural Supernaturalism (1971), chastises Romanticists who neglect to 
acknowledge that “Wordsworth and his English contemporaries reflect not only the 
language and rhythms but also the design, the imagery, and many of the central moral 
values of the Bible, as well as Milton, the great poet of Biblical history and prophecy” 
(32). 
15 
     In his theory of an English line of vision, Wittreich crystallizes an especially cogent 
set of ideas regarding literary continuity in counterpoint to Bloom’s notion of the anxiety 
of poetic influence.  Furthermore, his assertion that the visionary tradition has scriptural 
origins correlatively establishes prophecy as a literary genre.  Like tragedy, comedy, 
satire, or epic—the hallmark genres of the wit tradition—prophecy employs conventional 
devices and techniques.  Consequently, this “composite medium,” as George Anthony 
Rosso writes, “develops a set of generic signals and expectations, including a visionary 
idiom, intertextual or allusive contexts, narrative disjunctions, multiple perspectives, a 
typological code, and a liberatory social ethic,” all of which features serve to create “a 
living drama of contending voices” (Blake’s Prophetic Workshop 12).  Because prophecy 
is an assimilative genre, visionary artists often integrate elements of other major genres 
into their work.  Thus the Bible’s importance to the English visionary is at least twofold:  
first, the scriptural prophets provide a model (one that in Christian England would be 
culturally sanctioned) for the writer’s public identity and historical relevance; second, 
scripture establishes a type and a set of conventions for a style of literary production that 
in most instances is distinctly radical in terms of both artistic technique and political 
perspective. 
     Clearly, the Bible bears special paradigmatic significance for the English visionary 
line.  At the same time, visionary authors engage scripture principally through other 
visionaries; that is to say, the English poet-prophet is less interested in the literature of 
divine revelation than in the imaginative writing that seeks to interpret, reframe, and 
humanize what we may provisionally refer to as the revealed truth of sacred texts.  For  
      16 
example, Spenser, through his reading of the literary past, places foremost emphasis on 
the ways in which Chaucer, a fellow countryman and poet-prophet, adopts scriptural 
content and the vatic stance.  Chaucer both mediates the Bible and acts as a positive 
influence through whom Spenser learns to transform the structures, themes, and language 
of biblical prophecy into original English art.6     
     For the British Romantic poets with whom I am concerned in this study, the great 
mediator of the vatic tradition is Milton, and his body of work epitomizes the 
revolutionary potential of vision as a method of literary production.  In theorizing the 
relationship of Milton to the Romantics, Wittreich posits a guiding image rather than a 
sinister presence (thereby recasting Bloom’s idea of Milton as a historical force whom 
the poet must overcome).  Although individual responses vary, often considerably so, 
Milton and his provocative oeuvre influence all the major English Romantics.  With 
respect to his contentions in favor of Milton as a benevolent and crucial influence, 
Wittreich is not alone; Robert M. Ryan, for one, claims that the Romantics’ interest in 
Milton defines British Romantic literature in toto, particularly after the French Reign of 
Terror unfolded in 1794:  “In Britain after 1795 prophetic reformation became a more 
practicable agenda, and for poets a more appropriate one, than political agitation.  Here, 
as in so much else, John Milton provided a model, his achievement offering consolation 
for the thwarted liberal aspirations of a post-revolutionary era” (5).  For Ryan, English 
Romantic literature fundamentally reflects Milton’s life and work as these establish an 
archetype of the inspired national artist who creates in times of profound historical 
crises.7  Thus one finds in Wittreich, as well as in more recent Romanticist studies, an 
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archetypal image of Milton that contrasts sharply with Bloom’s sketch of a Great 
Inhibitor who must be slain in the struggle between tradition and the individual talent. 
     Importantly, Wittreich presents Milton as a beneficent rather than a menacing 
influence.  At the same time, Wittreich’s portrayal of Milton is much more than a pointed 
counterexample to Bloom’s depiction of the Puritan poet.  Wittreich sees Milton as a 
guide to the British writers who come after him; but he also counts Milton a radical, an 
iconoclast, and a revolutionary in both art and politics.  To this point, Wittreich asserts: 
          Like Spenser, Milton joined epic to prophecy; but what was important [. . .] was 
          that Milton took a radical stance against all traditions—poetical and intellectual. 
          Poets like Spenser, Herbert, and Milton transmuted the forms they inherited, but 
          what distinguished Milton from other poets was the fact that he used his newly 
          created forms to undermine rather than to uphold the reigning orthodoxies.   
          Spenser and Herbert took their values from the audiences they addressed, but  
          Milton [. . .] rejected the prevailing values in order to create new ones.  (“Seals” 
          26) 
By virtue of these qualifying statements, we see that Wittreich’s theorization of Milton 
and his artistic legacy relies on a foregrounding of the poet’s anti-authoritarian views 
regarding culture, governance, and literature.  This picture of Milton as “an architect of 
new forms, a generator of values nobler than those his culture already possessed, a maker 
of new myths rather than a recorder of old ones” (“Seals” 26) allows Wittreich to 
advance two significant claims: first, that prophecy is a transformative genre designed “to 
alter [. . .] the collective ideology of the culture producing it” (Visionary Poetics 50);  
18 
and second, that the poet-prophet is not only an innovator but also an interventionist, an 
agent for change in his or her own time as well as for the future.8   These two contentions, 
founded upon a specific conceptualization of Milton as the arch-radical British poet, 
structure Wittreich’s analysis of the major Romantics and their visionary works.  
     Milton’s life and art thus clarify both the role of the English literary vates and the 
function of written prophecy, particularly as these become manifest in the Romantic era.  
The Miltonic visionary poet, as a student of literary and cultural history, learns through 
knowledge of the past to discern historical patterns as these develop in the present.  Based 
on his or her insights into the historical dynamics of the moment, the visionary strives 
through literary art to disrupt those patterns mainly by subverting the cultural and 
intellectual institutions that perpetuate them.  For Stephen C. Behrendt, the visionary 
plays this double role of historian and activist “in an effort to let historical phenomena 
speak their own counsel within works intended to expand and significantly shape the 
social, political, and moral conscience” (16).9   Behrendt’s claim accords with Wittreich’s 
view that “vision, unless it inspires action, is nothing” (VP 34).  The poet-prophets who 
follow Milton’s example base their ameliorative programs on deep understandings of 
how the past recurs in the present:  “Like the epic poet, the prophet may recount history; 
but his purpose is less to record it then to bring it to an apotheosis.  Historical patterns are 
drawn not for their own sake but to find a release from them” (Wittreich, VP 34).  
Accordingly, such artists recognize “the renovation of history” as their principal aim 
(Wittreich, VP 36). 
     In this light, we see that the visionary poet is not a clairvoyant and that literary  
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prophecy is not intended to be predictive.  The visionary, “often thought to foretell the 
future, more exactly attempts to fashion it” (Wittreich VP 34).  Poet-seers are not 
soothsayers, such as the one who cautions Shakespeare’s Caesar to “beware the Ides of 
March”; correlatively, prophecy is not supernaturally prescient, as is the Weird Sisters’ 
“prophetic greeting” (1.3.78) to Macbeth and Banquo on the heath outside Forres.10   Nor 
is the visionary a contemporary version of the Anglo-Saxon scop:  music and history are 
crucial to the public performances of both artists, but the visionary is a reformer rather 
than a court-bard.  The scene in Milton most representative of prophetic reformation 
takes place within the two closing books of Paradise Lost, in which the angel Michael 
reveals postlapsarian history to Adam after healing Adam’s bodily eyes on Eden’s most 
prominent height.11   As Barbara Kiefer Lewalski notes in Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric 
of Literary Forms (1985), Michael delivers his prophecy with two principal goals in 
mind:  first, the angel seeks “the cure of Adam’s moral blindness” (256); second, he 
strives “to develop and exercise Adam’s faith, leading him to comprehend the typological 
pattern of history” (257).  Michael’s prophetic intervention, willed by God and enacted 
according to these two objectives, facilitates the renewal of Adam and Eve, a spiritual 
and intellectual renovation brought about by Michael’s presentation of history in 
visionary form.12   On the whole, this episode establishes that the visionary generally—
and the Miltonic visionary especially—intercedes in the present, unsettling it in order to 
liberate humankind and generate new possibilities for the future.13
  
 
     We may say, in sum, that Wittreich’s theoretical work provides an incisive reading of 
English literary history and a cogent interpretation of poetic influence that bears special 
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relevance to the study of British Romanticism.  The line of vision theory presents an 
attractively flexible explanation of literary affinity that, despite Lucy Newlyn’s claim to 
the contrary in Paradise Lost and the Romantic Reader (1993), offers critics a model of 
influence adaptable to reconfigurations of the Romantic canon.14   As a way of framing 
the Romantics’ relationship with the literary past, the theory accommodates both 
canonical authors, like Blake or the Lake Poets, and non-canonical writers such as Lucy 
Aikin, whose Epistles on Women (1810) sets forth her claim that she is “a daughter of 
Milton,” as Jane Spencer has recently argued (4).  Furthermore, Wittreich’s description of 
visionary aesthetics casts light on what the English Romantics share in terms of style, 
technique, and purpose; in this sense, Wittreich’s ideas possess both the liveliness and the 
scope to elucidate not only familiar Romantic authors but less well-known poets such as 
Anne Bannerman and Louisa Costello as well.15      
     Whether the generative potential of Wittreich’s theories has been fully realized in 
Romanticism studies to date is a principal concern of the present discussion.  Indeed, 
Wittreich’s work broke ground for several important studies of Romanticism published in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, including pieces by Jackie DiSalvo, Leslie Tannenbaum, 
Terence Allan Hoagwood, and Rosso.  All four of these authors have contributed 
significantly to the scholarly conversation regarding Romanticism’s vatic aspects.  At the 
same time, these critics focus their analyses of the visionary tradition almost exclusively 
on Blake, his aesthetics, and his relationship with Milton (save in part Hoagwood, who 
writes on Shelley as well as Blake).  Although providing helpful access to Blake and his 
prophetic art, this body of work tends to restrict rather than amplify Wittreich’s theories.  
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Before asserting my own contention with Wittreich’s ideas on Romantic vision, I want in 
the forthcoming section to survey the work of DiSalvo and her colleagues, thereby 
clarifying the exact terms of this contention.16
  
 
* * *  
     That Wittreich’s theoretical approach provides a unique and persuasive critical 
framework through which to interpret British Romantic literature is evinced by the work 
of DiSalvo, Tannenbaum, Hoagwood, and Rosso, all former Wittreich students who build 
on their teacher’s ideas in their respective studies of Blake’s verse-prophecies.  These 
scholars (hereafter referred to collectively as the DiSalvo generation) participate in a 
vivacious dialogue with Wittreich; to note this fact, however, is not to insinuate that they 
simply parrot their instructor’s insights in a shallow criticism by rote.  Quite the contrary:  
just as Blake—Milton’s finest student—revises his teacher in order to renew his 
teachings, so these critics rethink their instructor’s arguments in novel and generative 
ways.   
     DiSalvo, for example, recasts Wittreich’s theory of poetic influence in a historical 
materialist context and thus portrays the Blake-Milton relationship as a trans-generational 
class struggle: 
          Milton becomes the key to all human history and human consciousness because it  
          was the seventeenth-century English bourgeoisie that first wrapped history in a 
          ball and rolled it toward the overwhelming questions of human development.   
          There is no society in the world today that is not defined by its relation to the 
          values and institutions of Milton’s England.  As a spokesman of the Puritan 
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          revolution, Milton articulated the values that enabled mankind to liberate itself 
          from the shackles of feudalism, creating at the same time new fetters in their 
          stead.  Blake turns to Milton for his espousal of freedom but also for his expression 
          of its bourgeois limitations.  (“Blake Encountering Milton” 144-45) 
With the British historian Christopher Hill in mind, DiSalvo redraws Wittreich’s theories 
from an expressly Marxist perspective.  DiSalvo’s use of Hill is understandable, given 
that Hill, in sketching the picture of seventeenth-century England, devotes considerable 
attention to the subject of prophecy and the figure of Milton.17  With respect to the 
former, Hill writes that “the Reformation [. . .] stimulated the spirit of prophecy” by 
removing illegitimate intermediaries between the Lord and the individual, “and God,” 
Hill notes, “was no respecter of persons:  he spoke to John Knox rather than to Mary 
Queen of Scots” (The World Turned Upside Down 91).  And so “the common man,” Hill 
maintains, “could remake history if kings and princes did not” (World 91).18    Hill’s 
argument in favor of the egalitarianism of seventeenth-century English prophecy has an 
obvious appeal for DiSalvo, who reads the Blake-Milton relationship through a Marxist 
lens:  “Blake’s struggle to transform society,” she asserts, “take[s] the form of a struggle 
to transform Milton’s myth” as it is constituted in works such as Paradise Lost (“Blake” 
145). 
     What DiSalvo traces out in her essay, “Blake Encountering Milton:  Politics and the 
Family in Paradise Lost and The Four Zoas” (1975), she develops at length in her War of 
Titans:  Blake’s Critique of Milton and the Politics of Religion (1983), a book in which 
she further explores the seventeenth-century social historical referents for Blake’s vision- 
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ary poetics.  DiSalvo argues that, “during the revolutionary decades” in England, the 
Book of Revelation was “studied not only by scholars like [David] Pareus, [Joseph] 
Mede, and Milton, but also by artisans and vagrants who, suddenly propelled into public 
life, turned to the Bible as the only tool they had” (War of Titans 37).  Scripture helped 
England’s alienated classes to create a countervailing voice against the privileged and 
“saintly elite of a reforming middle class”—Milton’s class, to be precise (War 37).  
DiSalvo has in mind Hill’s suggestion that “ordinary Bible-readers in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries wanted to democratize” scriptural mysteries and exegesis:  such 
readers “believed, on good protestant authority, that anyone could understand God’s 
Word if he studied it carefully enough, and if the grace of God was in him.  And then the 
Bible could be made to reveal the key to events of his own time” (World 93).  Radicals 
such as the Fifth Monarchists, the Ranters, and the Society of Friends (that is, the 
Quakers) found that “the Bible, if properly understood, really would liberate men from 
destiny, from pre-destination.  By understanding and cooperating with God’s purposes 
men believed they could escape from the blind forces which seemed to rule their world, 
from time itself; they could become free” (Hill, World 92).  For DiSalvo and Hill alike, 
scriptural prophecy, immensely popular with all of England’s social classes during the 
revolutionary period, offered a reliable source of authority for new perspectives and 
ideas.19        
     In War of Titans, DiSalvo adopts elements of both Hill and Wittreich in order to craft 
her analysis of the Blake-Milton relationship.  DiSalvo contends that Blake knew enough 
of London’s radical climate in the late eighteenth century—including the Muggletonians,  
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the London Corresponding Society, and Joseph Johnson’s circle—to see the value in 
asserting parallels between 1790s England and the age of Milton (War 35).  Furthermore, 
and perhaps more importantly, Blake discerned that Milton’s poetic achievements, if 
freed from their class-specific doctrines, could improve life for England’s marginalized 
laborers—her prostitutes, her chimney sweepers, her factory workers.20   Taking his 
ideological cue from “such lower-class radicals as the Levellers and Diggers,” groups 
who were his “real antecedents” (War 42), Blake forged a prophetic art unwaveringly 
hostile to the bourgeois non sequiturs and class-based hypocrisies given form and force, 
even if inadvertently, by Milton’s work.  Accordingly, Blake—who finds in Milton a help 
for the present and a pledge for the future—strives to liberate “the principles of Miltonic 
liberty” (War 42) from Milton’s own bourgeois world view, thus recovering Milton as a 
type of the English radical and his writing as a support for social and political reform in 
the years following the onset of the French Revolution.   
     Like DiSalvo, Leslie Tannenbaum argues that Blake understood Milton to be a 
continuingly relevant emblem of the English anti-authoritarian tradition.  Tannenbaum, 
however, situates his discussion of Blake and Milton within the history of scriptural 
exegesis.  In Biblical Traditions in Blake’s Early Prophecies:  The Great Code of Art 
(1982), he states that Blake, “like Milton [. . .] drew upon biblical tradition to assert in 
theory and practice the superiority of an aesthetic based upon the Bible, but then—true to 
the essentially revolutionary aesthetic that he and Milton shared—he transformed the 
traditions he inherited, including the Miltonic tradition” (24).  By surveying the principal 
currents of pre-Blakean biblical hermeneutics, Tannenbaum notes that confluences be- 
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tween competing interpretations allowed Blake considerable freedom in reading both the 
Bible and Milton through multiple perspectives.  Blake thus created a biblical art that 
registers and at times blends myriad interpretations of scripture; this eclecticism, in turn, 
frames Blake’s understanding and use of Milton. 
     Tannenbaum finds special significance in the late eighteenth-century’s “mingling of 
learned and popular culture” (11), particularly as such synthesis informs 1790s pamphlets 
and tracts—circulated, as Tannenbaum specifies, by groups such as the Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge (10-11)—“that searched the Scriptures for prophecies of 
the French Revolution” (11).  Such pamphlet writing reflected popular religious thinking 
not attributable solely to radical chiliast sources.  Rather, groups like the Evangelicals 
and Dissenters drew on scholars of prophecy, including Thomas Brightman, Sir Isaac 
Newton, David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, and of course Milton, in order to compose 
pamphlets on scripture’s applicability to the contemporary political and social milieus at 
home and abroad (Tannenbaum 11). 
     Blake thus learned to refine his biblical art partly through both his direct and implicit 
familiarity with the various takes on scriptural prophecy written into the tracts and 
pamphlets available to Londoners in the early 1790s.  Yet Blake’s idea of an art founded 
upon the Bible is complexly assimilative, as Tannenbaum suggests:  any one 
consideration, such as the pamphlets’ influence, cannot account wholly for Blake’s 
recourse to and revision of Christian scripture in his poetry, as in the case of the Lambeth 
prophecies.21    For Tannenbaum, the Lambeth books “constitute Blake’s initial attempt 
to write a Bible of Hell, an imaginative re-creation of Scripture” that aims to coalesce “a  
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number of disparate books into a coherent and unified vision of human life from the 
Creation to the Apocalypse” (7).22   Tannenbaum thus redraws Wittreich’s line of vision, 
dispossessing Milton and Paradise Lost in favor of the biblical authors and sacred 
literature; consequently, the question of Blake’s literary influences may be approached 
through a new context that significantly complicates Wittreich’s schema.  For Blake, 
Milton’s influence is mediated by a body of scholarly and popular biblical commentary 
that Blake receives, studies, and reconfigures.  Milton thus articulates a single perspective 
in the history of scriptural interpretation, a fact that requires Blake to reconsider, through 
others’ eyes, Milton’s reading of the Bible.  As a result, Blake’s early prophecies are 
informed not only by Milton but also by radical antinomians (Tannenbaum 16), by 
Voltaire, Thomas Paine, and David Hume (Tannenbaum 13), and by philosophers, 
historians, and biblical exegetes such as Robert Lowth, Sir William Jones, Hugh Blair, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, and Johann Gottfried von Herder 
(Tannenbaum 21-22). 
     While DiSalvo modifies Wittreich’s theories to conduct a political analysis of the 
Blake-Milton relationship and Tannenbaum recasts that affinity in terms of what Blake 
knew of European scholarship on the Bible, Terence Allan Hoagwood addresses the 
question of Romantic prophecy in light of the philosophical traditions available at the 
time of the French Revolution.  In Prophecy and the Philosophy of Mind:  Traditions of 
Blake and Shelley (1985), Hoagwood looks at Romantic prophecy as an intersection 
between ways of understanding human history and ways of understanding human 
knowledge.  By doing so, Hoagwood, like DiSalvo and Tannenbaum before him, offers  
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an original analysis of Romantic poetics anchored in Wittreich’s work on the English 
visionary tradition. 
     Hoagwood begins by surveying philosophers such as John Locke, Newton, George 
Berkeley, and Hume, all of whom respond to René Descartes (11); with these figures and 
this intellectual conflict in mind, Hoagwood argues that the English philosophical 
tradition establishes principles and a bank of metaphors on which both Blake and Shelley 
draw.23   Moreover, this tradition clarifies the subversive methods and aims of Romantic 
seer-poets like Blake and Shelley who wish “to penetrate to the process of vision itself, 
shaking the very foundations of thought” (56).  With the Anglophone philosophical 
legacy as a principal context, Hoagwood assays Wittreich’s theory of influence by 
approaching Blake’s Jerusalem and Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound through Newton’s 
Opticks (1704) and Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), as well as 
through Milton’s art. 
     In his study, Hoagwood frames prophecy as both intellectually and politically radical.  
Visionary poetics, he asserts, “is concerned with spirit, a synonym for mind; its final 
cause is intellectual revolution, and this revolution, like God, shall become manifest in 
history” (58).  Prophecy thus facilitates “a revolution whose historical equivalent is the 
political liberation of mankind” (58).  The revolutionary politics of prophecy, Hoagwood 
maintains, distinguishes the Romantics from Augustan wits such as Dryden and Pope, 
whose conservative art sustains the very order—in England, characterized by monarchy, 
primogeniture, patriarchy, and the like—that the visionary writes to undermine (46).  
British philosophy, in Hoagwood’s view, provides Romantic poets like Blake and Shelley  
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with a basic discourse through which to understand how visionary poetics may both 
speak to the human mind and realize its revolutionary goals in human history.  
     Although his consideration of the English philosophical tradition helps Hoagwood to 
frame the part which vatic art plays in human history, the relationship between vision and 
history is more thoroughly investigated by George Anthony Rosso in his book, Blake’s 
Prophetic Workshop:  A Study of The Four Zoas (1993).  Rosso writes not simply to 
place Blake’s work within the contexts of British and world history but to clarify Blake’s 
notion of history as a product of art and a basis of human community.  Rosso argues that 
Blake, in The Four Zoas (and elsewhere), universalizes history; the poet “replays ancient 
‘events’ in the contemporary moment to activate the present meaning of the past” (109).  
He elaborates that, “for Blake, historical events lie partly within the poet’s mind; but they 
must be put into a shared form and re-enacted within the present if readers are to convert 
to a prophetic view of history that transforms the world” (109).   
     If Blake indeed reasons through the question of history as Rosso describes, then any 
past incident or series of incidents—for example, the Civil Wars, the French Revolution, 
or an April morning in Felpham—may be recreated through art.  Such recreation benefits 
both individuals and communities by putting the conflicts of history in imaginative terms, 
thereby allowing those conflicts to be resolved through intellection rather than through 
physical violence.  In this way, Blake aspires to effect social transformation through a 
visionary poetry that preserves “the special bond between ethics and history,” between 
the sacred and the secular (108).  Blake’s interventionist art, as Rosso describes it, relies 
for its social efficacy on the fact that he “does not seek to bind his readers to a specific  
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doctrinal or religious project, but rather attempts to inculcate the visionary habit of mind 
that can enable them to refigure their ways of seeing and being” (108).  This prophetic 
technique—which in part recalls Blake’s antinomianism—allows human communities to 
remake the present by re-imagining the past, and battles in blood may be re-fought and 
finally resolved at the level of mental engagement. 
     Taken together, DiSalvo, Tannenbaum, Hoagwood, and Rosso find in Wittreich’s 
theoretical work a source of intellectual creativity and critical energy.  The DiSalvo 
generation’s output encourages the reader who comes to Wittreich’s theories in the early 
twenty-first century to see those theories as especially generative critical resources.  
Furthermore, the DiSalvo generation demonstrates the interdisciplinary relevance of their 
teacher’s driving insights; the line of vision and visionary poetics theories, as we have 
seen, underlie important examinations of Romanticism that span several topics, including 
politics (DiSalvo), biblical exegesis (Tannenbaum), philosophy (Hoagwood), and history 
(Rosso).  In this respect, the DiSalvo generation shows the adaptability of Wittreich’s 
1970s work on the Milton, the Romantics, and the English visionary tradition. 
     At the same time, the body of work produced by these critics suggests certain 
limitations in the application of Wittreich’s critical framework.  The most conspicuous of 
these limitations, as we encounter them in the DiSalvo generation’s work, involves the 
use of Blake as a subject of analysis.  Although the DiSalvo generation’s investigations 
of Blake’s art, ideas, and relationship with Milton are illuminating, the general focus on a 
single Romantic poet (save in Hoagwood, who also studies Shelley) creates the 
impression that Wittreich’s theoretical models, even when rethought and reapplied, can- 
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not account for other Romantic writers who compose in the prophetic vein.  Such an 
impression works against the claim for the elasticity of both the line of vision and 
visionary poetics theories.  Certainly, we cannot indict critics for their scholarly interests.  
Nevertheless, Wittreich’s theories, which of course contribute to the DiSalvo generation’s 
work on Romantic prophecy, advance the idea that the vatic mode creates trans-
generational literary communities.  The DiSalvo generation’s collective focus on Blake, 
in effect, countervails that idea by marginalizing the Romantic literary community in 
favor of a single representative.  Consequently, the line of vision idea seems to elucidate 
little beyond Blake’s interconnectedness with Milton, and visionary poetics—that is, the 
aesthetic code transmitted through Milton’s art—appears in reality to pertain almost 
solely to Blake’s stance, techniques, and aims.   
     The fact that the DiSalvo generation’s Blake studies foster such impressions owes, in 
part, to two problems inherent in Wittreich’s foundational work:  first, Wittreich 
represents Milton flatly, thus imparting a sense that all the major Romantics see him as 
Blake appears to do; second, Wittreich relies on an exceptionally broad understanding of 
history, both in terms of what it is and how it functions in visionary literature.  These two 
problems arise from Wittreich’s tendency in his 1970s work to privilege generalized 
continuity to critical nuance.  If Wittreich’s theories are, as I contend, uniquely 
appropriate to the study of less familiar Romantic authors such as Aikin, Bannerman, and 
Costello, then we must reconsider those theories in light of the problems I have identified 
in order to test the accommodative quality of the visionary line and the accuracy of the 
visionary poetics theory of literary aesthetics. 
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* * * 
     In a recent essay on the Restoration-era poet Elizabeth Singer Rowe, whose 
“ambition to sing for the Protestant king” (65) William III reflected her belief in 
William’s “internationalist, militant Protestant vision” (66), Sharon Achinstein asserts 
that “the Miltonic ‘style’ bore contradictory political or ideological meanings, 
serviceable to a variety of occasions and interests, even as his political identity 
remained clearly antimonarchical” during Rowe’s lifetime (65).  Achinstein argues 
that Milton’s writing, by virtue of its stylistic distinctiveness, proved especially 
attractive to authors like Rowe after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (in which year, 
as Achinstein notes, Jacob Tonson’s folio edition of Milton appeared) (68-9):  “The 
reign of William III was a boon era for Milton rehabilitation, as the poet was 
transformed from republican to Whig and then became something of a splintered 
mirror in splintered Whig polemic, refracting different political and religious partisan 
views” in the wake of the so-called Bloodless Revolution (69).  Although Milton’s 
poetic style was “instantly recognizable” (87) to poets such as Rowe, Milton himself, 
almost from the moment of his death in 1674, appeared protean:   
          John Dryden had long recognized his stature, but the process of avoiding 
          Milton the defender of king-killing in favor of Milton the great poet was a 
          complex one.  His works were revived in both a Whig political agenda as well 
          as in a Tory backlash.  He was an inspiration both for those advocating a neo- 
          classical aesthetics, as did Joseph Addison, as well as for those claiming a di- 
          vine poetics, as did John Dennis, Isaac Watts and Elizabeth Singer Rowe.  (87) 
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“For Rowe,” Achinstein claims, “Milton could serve as both sublimely inspired poet 
of affective description as well as the stern moralizer, not only a defender of political 
liberty, but a prophetic voice against religious persecution” (87). 
     Achinstein’s discussion of Rowe’s life, art, and admiration for Milton illustrates 
the flexibility of Milton as a literary and cultural influence.  The ardor Rowe felt for 
Milton, as Achinstein points out, is reflected in both her public works and personal 
affairs.  Rowe composed, for example, “A Pastoral on the Nativity of our Saviour” 
and “A Description of Hell.  In Imitation of Milton” (Achinstein 66); moreover, “she 
cited [Milton] to greet the morning” and employed her alternate name, “Philomela” (a 
reference to Il Penseroso), “in John Dunton’s Athenian Mercury in the 1690s as well 
as in her romantic correspondence with her husband” (Achinstein 68).  Yet Rowe—
known as “William III’s laureate” (Achinstein 67)—shares little with Milton in terms 
of political feeling.  To the Romanticist, Rowe suggests a closer resemblance to the 
Scottish poet Anne Grant (whose conservative poem Eighteen Hundred and Thirteen 
opens with an epigraph drawn from Samson Agonistes) than to Mary Wollstonecraft, 
Mary Hays, Ann Yearsley, or Anna Letitia Barbauld. 
     If Milton, as a historical authority for art, political thought, and even ethics, proves 
more indecisive than Wittreich’s 1970s portrayal of him allows, that indecisiveness is 
partly attributable to Milton’s own varying representations of himself.  Lewalski 
notes that the poet adopts an “unprecedented [. . .] number of cultural roles.  In his 
poems and polemic tracts, he varies the mix of roles as genre and rhetorical purpose 
dictate:  sacred priest, learned scholar, humanist critic, cosmopolitan man of letters,  
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rhetorician, engaged patriot, satirist, reformist poet, epic hero, teacher, prophet, and 
bard” (“Milton’s Idea of Authorship” 74).  For Lewalski, Milton aligns himself 
selectively with secular and scriptural persons and legacies.  Accordingly, the Milton 
we find in Of Reformation and Animadversions—“a bard celebrating and helping to 
perfect the reformed society that will herald Christ’s millennial kingdom” (“Idea” 
74)—differs from Milton either as an Isaiah-like “prophet-teacher” in The Reason of 
Church-Government (“Idea” 74) or as “an English Jeremiah who combines fierce 
invective and tragic vision with a bitter, prophetic lament for the imminent 
Restoration” in The Readie and Easie Way (“Idea” 75).   
     In their respective analyses, Achinstein and Lewalski elucidate how Milton 
changes—partly through his own authorial initiative—from period to period, from 
reader to reader, and from text to text.  These critics share a sense of Milton as an 
unsettled, flexible figure, both in terms of how he is received by other writers (such as 
Rowe) and how he creates and recreates his own authorial identity.  This protean 
image of the poet clashes with Wittreich’s portrait of Milton as an arch-revolutionary 
and a prophet throughout his career.  Wittreich casts Milton into these roles 
purposefully; to distinguish the liberationist visionary line from the conservative line 
of wit, Wittreich asserts both the decisiveness of Milton’s stance and the cohesiveness 
of his work:  “The canon of the conservative poet is often a collection of disconnected 
poems—a series of unrelated imaginative moments; but the canon of the 
revolutionary artist is composed of an aggregate of poems inextricably involved with 
one another” (Angel of Apocalypse 161).  For Wittreich, “the canon, not the poem,  
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represents the radical unity of revolutionary art” (Angel 161), and “Milton strove for 
this kind of unity” (Angel 161).  Contrary to Achinstein and Lewalski, Wittreich 
supposes a lifelong coherence in Milton’s character and art, thereby arguing for a 
Milton who, to his Romantic readers, closed the revolutionary seer-poet he begun. 
     As early as in his book The Romantics on Milton:  Formal Essays and Critical 
Asides (1970), Wittreich asserts that, during the Romantic period, Milton was 
preferred to Shakespeare as a poetic influence because the latter seemed “too much of 
a chameleon” (13), whereas the former “cut across and subsumed all areas of human 
experience; he was the quintessence of everything the Romantics most admired” (11).  
Wittreich recounts that Byron, for one, saw in Milton’s “constancy” (11) an important 
counterexample to the Lake Poets’ eventual renunciation of their early 1790s 
radicalism.  The point in itself is not poorly taken:  in the 1819 “Dedication” to Don 
Juan, Byron references Milton to provide a contrast to the directly addressed (and 
mercilessly mocked) Robert Southey: 
          Thinks’t thou, could he, the blind Old Man, arise 
            Like Samuel from the grave, to freeze once more 
          The blood of monarchs with his prophecies,  
            Or be alive again—again all hoar 
          With time and trials, and those helpless eyes 
            And heartless daughters, worn, and pale, and poor, 
          Would he adore a sultan? he obey 
           The intellectual eunuch Castlereagh?  (11.81-88)24   
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     Byron here celebrates Milton as a long-suffering defender of human liberties, a 
prophet whose brave creativity equaled his hatred of kings.  In this respect, Byron’s 
image of Milton appears to bear out Wittreich’s contention that the Romantics saw 
him not only as a great man and “ideal poet” (RM 12) but also as a lifelong radical 
and revolutionary who, “like Gerrard Winstanley, never weakened in his opposition 
to monarchy,” to borrow one of Hill’s assertions (Milton and the English Revolution 
173).  But in the “Dedication,” Byron lauds Milton to loathe Southey; that is, the 
young lord ridicules England’s Poet Laureate through contradistinction, setting 
Milton’s steadfast anti-monarchism and republican values against the royalist stance 
which Southey struck later in life.  Byron thus purposefully constructs Milton as a 
visionary if unfortunate freethinker whose comparative integrity and perseverance 
trivialize Southey particularly and the Lake Poets generally.   As Lewalski’s remarks 
help us to recognize, such an evocation of Milton, for all its rhetorical success, 
engages only one of his several authorial roles. 
     Byron’s “Dedication” provides an analogue for Wittreich’s representation of 
Milton as a stable, fixed influence in the visionary tradition.  Wittreich, like Byron, 
gives us a fiery vates who fought illegitimate forms of power and strove to bring forth 
a New Jerusalem.  Yet this image presents the Puritan poet incompletely; Lucy 
Newlyn, for one, argues that Wittreich offers an “inflexibly sublime Milton, a Milton 
for whom there is no such thing as ambiguity or indeterminacy, and who is therefore 
a model of univocal authority” (16).  Newlyn deems this simplification of Milton’s 
complicated identity especially pernicious because it presents “a monochrome picture  
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of the prophetic tradition” (16) and renders “a passive model for the [Romantics’] 
reception of Milton’s ideas” (16).  Newlyn, whose sympathies clearly are with 
Bloom, indicts Wittreich for his “historically inaccurate” (17) notions of poetic 
influence; the Milton-centered visionary line, for Newlyn, portrays the Romantic poet 
as “a vehicle for transcendent truth” (16) who articulates “a body of values which are 
communally shared” (16).25  Wittreich’s theory, “in some respects inviting” (Newlyn 
16), nevertheless “seriously misrepresents the cultural climate which fostered 
Romanticism, and which made the ownership of ideas—‘originality’—a matter for 
concern” (Newlyn 16).  In Newlyn’s view, Wittreich’s argument encourages the 
misperception that all the Romantics share a single, collective perspective on Milton.  
During the period, major and minor authors alike imitated, revised, and challenged 
Milton and his legacy, as A. D. Harvey has recently discussed; yet very few writers 
did so in the same way or for the same reasons.26   Wittreich blurs this fact by 
presenting Milton’s influence on the Romantics as monolithic; as Newlyn suggests, 
the great poet comes to embody values and aesthetics that function identically for all 
of the Romantics, whether those who came to prominence after the Napoleonic Wars 
or those who wrote in the years immediately following the French Revolution’s 
outbreak. 
     In light of these comments, we may ask if Wittreich’s portrait of the Romantics’ 
Milton is entirely precise.  To be sure, the Romantics valued the seriousness and 
sincerity of the poet’s involvement in the mid-seventeenth century republican cause, 
as well as the relationship between Milton’s writings and the English Revolutionary  
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moment.  Furthermore, Milton’s works and aesthetics, for many of the major 
Romantics, “encouraged the hope that poetry still had new, historically important 
work to do” in a similarly conflicted and violent age, as Ryan notes (37).  Beyond 
these points, however, the Romantic consensus on Milton falls apart.  If later 
Romantics such as Byron and Shelley could exalt Milton as an intellectual regicide, 
other Romantic authors, like Wordsworth and Coleridge, could invoke both his 
republicanism and his poetry to justify their reactionary stances, as Peter J. Kitson 
suggests:  “The radicalism of their youth and the conservatism of their later years 
could both find precedents in Milton” (470).27   
     Although neither poet acquiesced quite so far in royalist ideology as Southey 
eventually did, both Wordsworth and Coleridge came to express chauvinistic visions 
of England and her cultural, political, and social institutions.  Accordingly, these 
poets cast Milton as a true English patriot rather than as a disruptor of the status quo.     
Simon Bainbridge, in Napoleon and English Romanticism (1995), describes how 
Wordsworth, shortly after the Peace of Amiens failed in 1803, “adopted the sonnet 
form of Milton, as well as his tones and ethos, to unite the English at a time of 
national crisis” (109).  Wordsworth also idealizes Milton’s republicanism in The 
Convention of Cintra (1809), a loyalist piece favoring the war with Napoleonic 
France:  “Throughout the tract, as in the well-known sonnet ‘London 1802’, 
Wordsworth associates Milton with the glorious republican past of England during 
the Commonwealth.  [. . .]  It is this glorious past and inheritance that has been 
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shamed by the generals who ratified the Convention” with the French forces after the 
British decisively won the Battle of Vimeiro in August, 1808 (Bainbridge 109). For 
Wordsworth, Milton emblematizes all that is best in the British spirit; moreover, 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, the great Englishman’s greatest work, yields “a Satanic 
iconography for Napoleon” (Bainbridge 110) and a literary analogue for the conflict 
between France and England.  Coleridge, for his part, finds national unity in his own 
age foretokened by the English past; writing in The Friend fourteen months after the 
Convention, he observes:  “Though the Restoration of good sense commenced during 
the Interval of the Peace of Amiens, yet it was not till the Spanish Insurrection that 
Englishmen of all Parties recurred in toto to the old English Principles, and spoke of 
their Hampdens, Sidneys, and Miltons, with the old enthusiasm” (qtd. in Wittreich, 
RM 189).    
     As their responses to the Peninsular War and the Convention of Cintra show, the 
Lake Poets adapted Milton’s radical art and republican politics to suit loyalist 
perspectives that in turn reflect a new idea of British cultural identity; as the historian 
Stuart Woolf suggests, “it was in the struggle against Revolutionary-Napoleonic 
France that the image of John Bull as the trueborn free Englishman acquired its full 
contours” (94).  If the Lake Poets, as Raymond Williams contends,  abandoned their 
youthful “revolutionary ardour” (31) for “differing degrees of Burkean conservatism 
in their maturity” (31), then the newly emerging sense of Englishness, defined partly 
by the struggle with Napoleon (whose “overthrow,” Woolf notes, “seemed a 
posthumous vindication of Burke’s passionate rhetoric”) (94), caused the Lakers to 
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reframe Milton and his influence.  The Napoleonic Wars, Woolf asserts, underscored 
“Britain’s separateness, stability and economic strength” (98) as late as Waterloo.  
Furthermore, the Royal Navy’s successes in the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) and during 
the subsequent blockade of the French empire (begun in 1807 by the Orders in 
Council) supported England’s distinctiveness from Napoleonic Europe while 
reinforcing the country’s global status, a position partly defined in the 1790s by 
George Vancouver’s voyage through North America and the Pacific and Mungo 
Park’s African expedition.28   In line with the notions of Englishness that developed 
during the war years, the Lake Poets remake Milton, offering him as an exemplar of 
values and tenets belonging to the emergent national identity.  Consequently, Milton 
becomes so flexible a presence that Southey, in A Vision of Judgment (1821), 
portrays him as redeemed from his anti-monarchism and places him among the Elder 
Worthies, with Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Newton, who welcome George III into 
heaven (IX.451-91).29     
     Certainly, Southey’s poem provides an extreme instance of a Lake Poet re-
imaging Milton to serve conservative interests.  Nevertheless, the fact that Southey, 
without humor or irony, presents Milton as a friend to kings indicates that not all 
Romantic-era authors saw the Puritan poet as a permanent threat to monarchy, as 
Byron does in the “Dedication.”  Southey here clashes also with Blake, who, in 
Milton, portrays the poet as “a man who allowed his pure act of vision to be corrupted 
by personal commitments to certain ideas” or to “moral law,” as Jerome J. McGann 
explains (“The Aim of Blake’s Prophecies” 8).  Whereas Blake seeks to recover 
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Milton’s religious vision from its temporal entanglements, whether political, 
intellectual, or ethical, Southey does away with the poet’s counter-royalist radicalism, 
not to restore the seer’s access to scriptural truth but to claim him as a proper 
antecedent for both the Tory-Hanoverian establishment and the paradigm of 
Englishness that developed during the Napoleonic moment.  Whether the Londoner 
Blake, the Cumbrian Southey, or the expatriate Byron best captures Milton is a 
question less germane to our purposes than the fact that these poets assert differing 
images of him, thus significantly complicating Wittreich’s implication that all the 
Romantics saw the great Puritan in exactly the same way.  
     Such diversity in the Romantics’ thinking about Milton bears important 
consequences for Wittreich’s theories of trans-generational literary relations.  
Although he correctly identifies Milton as the principal historical model for both early 
and late Romantic authors, Wittreich assigns to Milton’s status and influence a single 
value and an all-pervasive effect.  This interpretation, by extension, portrays the 
Romantic visionaries indistinctly.  Such indistinctiveness creates the impression, for 
example, that Blake’s intervention into Milton’s poetic vision of the Bible mirrors 
Wordsworth and Coleridge’s recasting of Paradise Lost, in works such as The Prelude 
and The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, as a vision of the human mind’s private 
renovation in light of a newly developing British identity (Kitson 469).  The 
consequences, then, are twofold:  first, Wittreich’s theories, in application, tend to 
restrict critical inquiry because any one author in the visionary line adequately 
represents the others (thus the DiSalvo generation’s almost exclusive interest in  
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Blake); and second, the description of Milton’s influence, as it stands, cannot account 
for other authors, such as Burke, Barbauld, Joanna Baillie, Mary Robinson,  
Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and Felicia Hemans, who, like Blake, Wordsworth, and 
Coleridge, found the English literary past to be a key to understanding both the 
promise and the crises of the Romantic period.   
     These two problems, in turn, suggest a third:  Wittreich constructs much of his 
theoretical work on a broadly inclusive idea of English literary history.  
Consequently, he seldom discriminates between or among time periods and thus often 
looks beyond the individual historical actualities of differing eras.  Because he 
renders the English past so casually, Wittreich fails to distinguish the visionary poets 
at the level of their respective historical experiences.  With respect to the Romantics, 
Wittreich blends the first generation with the second, thereby imparting a monolithic 
sense of the period during which these authors lived and wrote (that is, the years 
encompassed within the 1789-1832 timeframe).  By coalescing the first wave 
Romantics with the second, Wittreich overlooks the fact that both groups understood 
prophecy and the prophetic role in light of their distinct experiences of the present 
and the past.  Given this study’s focus on Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats, I wish in 
what follows to discuss the post-Waterloo historical milieu both to elucidate the 
distinctiveness of that historical moment and to unsettle Wittreich’s frequently 
nebulous use of history as a theoretical concept.      
 
* * * 
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     Stuart Curran, in his essay “The Siege of Hateful Contraries:  Shelley, Mary 
Shelley, Byron, and Paradise Lost,” writes: 
          One can never ignore the “peculiar relations” the younger generation of 
          Romantics established with the literature and culture of the past.  They 
          survived the intellectual terrors of a quarter-century of war that devastated 
          and impoverished Europe within a pervasive metaphorical assumption. 
          Napoleon pitting himself against that amalgam known as the Holy Alliance 
          was the Satanic rebel defying the upholders of orthodoxy.  The Napoleonic 
          Wars appeared to the sensitive minds of the age as a reality whose imperatives 
          were no less categorical for being fruitless, but more so, enforced with  
          historical urgency.  To these writers—and to the finest minds throughout 
          Europe—there was no public position that was not reactionary, as the inter- 
          changeable empires committed their citizenry to the ruthless mechanism of an 
          inherited paradigm.  (“Siege” 227) 
     With this passage, Curran provides a useful framework through which to discuss 
what Marilyn Butler calls the “Cult of the South,” that is, the group of younger 
Romantic authors comprising, among the most prominent, Byron, Percy and Mary 
Shelley, Keats, Thomas Love Peacock, Leigh Hunt, and William Hazlitt.  Although 
Byron published the first two cantos of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage in 1812 and 
several of his popular Eastern romances, beginning with The Giaour and The Bride of 
Abydos, between 1814 and 1816, the second generation Romantics for the most part  
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composed and published their major works after the Battle of Waterloo decisively 
concluded the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna restored monarchies 
throughout Europe.  These writers, to varying degrees, sought to distinguish 
themselves, both in thought and art, from their introspective and pious literary 
forebears—Wordsworth and Coleridge, respectively (Blake, himself quite unlike 
either Lake Poet, was virtually unknown during the second half of the Regency).  
“The English liberal writers of the post-war period,” Butler notes, “are extrovert not 
introvert, and pagan not Christian” (123-4).  
       The Tory literary establishment, through periodicals such as Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine and the Quarterly Review, savaged this new wave of liberal-
minded artists; the former, in fact, derisively referred to several of these writers, 
particularly Keats, Shelley, Byron, and Hunt, as the Cockney School of Poetry, a 
name that carries, as Jeffrey N. Cox argues, “suggestions of sexual libertinism and 
effeminacy” (24) as well as implications of “aesthetic and political inadequacy” (27).  
Additionally, in his “fawning poem” (Priestman 242) on George III’s first actions in 
the afterlife, Southey damned Byron and Shelley as the foremost members of the 
Satanic School of Poetry.  From the first, bitter ideological disagreements divided the 
new Romantics from the conservative factions of British literary culture in the mid-
Regency.  
     We should refrain, of course, from viewing the younger Romantics as a politically 
radical avant-garde that produced literature by consensus; indeed, these artists often 
clashed over art and personal affairs.  For example, Byron and Shelley’s literary and  
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philosophical conflicts, rather than friendship or ideological like-mindedness, best 
clarify the nature of the two men’s relationship, as Charles E. Robinson asserts.30  
Furthermore, we may note that Mary Shelley’s feelings toward Percy were deeply 
conflicted—several Romanticists accept that Shelley created the ambitious Victor 
Frankenstein in the image of her husband.31  And, as Cox points out, Keats and Byron 
never personally met (perhaps fortunately for Keats, given Byron’s open dislike for 
his work) (48).  These three points serve to illustrate the younger Romantics’ 
independence from one another, thus countering the temptation to see these artists as 
united in an aesthetic and political coalition against Tory England and the 
increasingly conservative Lake Poets.  At the same time, I think it beneficial for the 
present discussion to situate the younger Romantics, as a whole, within the historical 
context of post-war Regency England, thereby suggesting that second generation 
visionary poetics, although practiced in distinction by individual authors, nevertheless 
reflects a shared basic experience of the historical moment.  
     If Butler correctly casts the younger Romantics as cosmopolitan non-Christians, 
then we must understand that general characterization within the scope of the post-
Napoleonic moment, thereby generating a clearer picture of the disillusionment and 
disenchantment that inspired these authors to break in part with British cultural and 
literary conventions.  The Battle of Waterloo, fought between the French Empire and 
the Seventh Coalition in the countryside south of Brussels on 18 June, 1815, formally 
concluded hostilities between France and England.  After Waterloo, Napoleon was 
banished (a second time), the Bourbon King Louis XVIII restored (a second time),  
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and a time of peace was inaugurated.  Auspicious as these beginnings appeared to 
those who opposed expansionist France, “the defeat of Napoleon,” as Cox reminds 
us, “had not brought freedom with peace”:  “The Restoration staged by the Holy 
Alliance had already revealed its oppressive power.  England’s government, capable 
of massive mobilization for the war against revolutionary France, had no interest in 
[resolving] its own internal problems” (55).  Europe may have seen the last of 
Napoleon, but, as Bainbridge reminds us, “Not only had Waterloo restored the 
Bourbon monarchy to the throne of France, and returned Europe to the pre-1789 
position, but it had strengthened monarchical power throughout Europe” (178-79).  
The younger Romantics, for the most part, wrote their major works after the 
Napoleonic drama’s last act brought the curtain down also on the French Revolution’s 
libertarian promise.  These circumstances influenced how the second wave English 
Romantics responded to the culture, politics, and literary climate of post-war 
England. 
     The Seventh Coalition’s victory over Napoleon elevated Arthur Wellesley, the 
Duke of Wellington and commander of the English forces at Waterloo, to British 
national sainthood.  Boyd Hilton notes that Waterloo surpassed Agincourt as “the 
most publicly celebrated battle in English history” (237) and that Wellington awoke 
on 19 June 1815 to find himself superlatively famous:  “Short of being made King, 
Wellington could not be given any more titles” (237) to honor him for delivering 
England from the Satanic Bonaparte and the French demons over whom he reigned.  
Moreover, Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh—whose very name was anathema  
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to the Byron-Shelley literary coterie—brilliantly maneuvered England to the forefront 
of the rejuvenated monarchies that clawed for supremacy in post-Napoleonic Europe.  
Hilton asserts that Castlereagh “largely effaced Metternich, Talleyrand, and the Tsar 
in the Vienna negotiations,” thus helping to position England as the principal 
international power in what appeared to be a new epoch in English history, initiated 
by both the outcome on the fields near Mont-Saint-Jean and the second Peace of Paris 
five months later.32  
     But if Waterloo gestured toward a new age for England, the younger Romantics 
recognized also that Wellington’s victory—as well as Castlereagh’s statecraft—
promised little more than the resuscitation and refortification of the old absolutism 
that the French Revolution challenged in its nascent phase.  Given the less-than-
admirable political figure struck by the Prince Regent during this time, the new era of 
peace, to liberal intellectuals like Byron, Shelley, Keats, and Hazlitt, was in many 
ways dreadfully anachronistic.  The mid-Regency period, as Clarissa Campbell Orr 
points out, saw the formalization of England’s Personal Union with Hanover, lasting 
from 1814 to Queen Victoria’s accession in 1837.  Orr depicts Regency England as 
politically retrogressive: 
          Although George IV was as responsible as any of George III’s sons for 
          bringing the royal family into disrepute, he was also a prince with a strong 
          sense of dynastic history, which was reflected in the fête in August 1814 at 
          three royal London parks, celebrating the centenary of the Hanoverian 
          succession.  Hanoverian arms were also prominent in the costumes for his 
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          visit to Scotland in 1822.  He was fascinated by the House of Brunswick’s 
          genealogy, and founded the Guelphic order to reward the German legion 
          officers at Waterloo and civilian contributions to Hanover, as well as to 
          commemorate the medieval ancestry of the family—another way of under- 
          lining ancient prescriptive rights in an era when Napoleon had occupied 
          Hanover, swept away the old Holy Roman Empire, and redrawn the political 
          and dynastic map.  [. . .]  The visits to Ireland and Scotland also suggest the 
          aim of representing monarchy, of performing acts of kingship, throughout all 
          the component kingdoms of a typical composite, ancien régime type of 
          monarchy.  (250) 
Orr’s account of Regency England suggests that, if Napoleon’s fall occasioned a new 
future for England, then that future was mediated by a political present willfully 
interlocked with many of the bleakest ideas and worst political systems of both the 
remote and recent pasts.  
     The Prince Regent’s anachronistic notions of royal governance, joined to his 
autocratic temperament and corroborated by Tory policy-makers such as Castlereagh, 
Liverpool, Sidmouth, and Eldon, helped to foster a repressive political environment in 
post-war England.  Certainly, political repression and oppositional radicalism were 
hallmarks also of the decade in which Blake published Songs of Innocence and of 
Experience (1794) and Wordsworth and Coleridge collaboratively produced Lyrical 
Ballads (1798).  Kenneth Neill Cameron, in a piece on William Godwin, describes the 
police state that England became in the 1790s, particularly after the 1794 Treason  
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Trials at which Thomas Hardy, John Horne Tooke, and John Thelwall, as well as 
Godwin’s old friend, Thomas Holcroft, were prosecuted:  “Habeas Corpus was 
suspended, trade unions were declared illegal, Ireland was subdued by armed force, 
the leaders of a mutiny in the fleet were summarily executed, the committee of the 
London Corresponding Society was arrested, the editor of The Courier—then a 
liberal, later a Tory paper—was imprisoned (for slandering the Czar of Russia), the 
Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland was made into law” (23).  This series 
of events, according to Cameron, pushed the Lake Poets toward conservatism and the 
liberal political leaders toward a boycott of the House of Commons (23).  We may 
also note that, following the collapse of the Peace of Amiens, Blake himself was tried 
for sedition, as had Thomas Paine in 1792 and John Frost in 1793; unlike either Paine 
or Frost, Blake was acquitted.33     
     The post-war generation of English writers, like the first wave Romantics, faced a 
dangerous and volatile national milieu.  What distinguishes the younger authors most 
sharply from their quietist or newly Tory elders was the way in which these second 
wave Romantics defined themselves as writers vis-à-vis the post-Napoleonic climate 
of political repression and monarchical authoritarianism (note again that Byron and 
his contemporaries knew nothing of Blake, who did not step away from his earlier 
radicalism as the Lake Poets, to varying degrees, distanced themselves from theirs).  
For the artists with whom I am principally concerned in this study—namely, Byron, 
the Shelleys, and Keats—the authorial role involved, in part, the adoption of 
oppositional perspectives and a confrontationist ethic with respect to the Tory- 
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Hanoverian status quo.  Against the Lakers’ respective examples of philosophical 
introspection and public chauvinism, the post-war Romantics sought, according to 
their individual visions, to transform rather than transcend or vindicate their world 
and time.   
     Of course, we must preserve distinctions in comparing the younger Romantics:  
for example, neither Byron nor Keats was, like Shelley, a Godwin-inspired social 
reformist; Keats’s middle-class background, as John Mee suggests, set him apart from 
the aristocrat Shelley (xxix); and Mary Shelley was not, like her husband, a 
philosophical anarchist.  Furthermore, the post-war writers differed in their responses 
to the Lake Poets, to whom they were literary heirs.  Whereas Byron, in English 
Bards and Scotch Reviewers (1809), mocked “simple Wordsworth” (917) and his 
“Christmas stories tortured into rhyme” (245), Keats revered the older poet for having 
restored the human value of poetry (Mee xxi) and wished to follow Wordsworth “as 
the next to extend the empire of the human heart” (Mee xxv).  Keats found much to 
admire in Wordsworth, despite the younger man’s disappointment in Wordsworth’s 
support of the Tories in the 1818 Westminster elections (Mee xxii).34   And, as she 
recounts in her journal for January 1824, Mary Shelley, by this time a widow, took 
comfort in an evening spent with Coleridge because the Lake Poet’s “beautiful 
descriptions, metaphysical talk & subtle distinctions reminded [her] of Shelley’s 
conversations” (JMS 474).  “I will go into the country & philosophize,” she wrote, 
hoping “some gleams of past entrancement may visit me there” (JMS 474). 
These considerations warn against oversimplifying the later Romantics’ relationships   
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 to each other, to England, and to her literary culture during the post-war Regency 
period. 
     At the same time, Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats sought to assert both artistic and 
ideological independence from the Lake Poets, whose early radicalism now clearly 
belonged to the past.  For example, in his 1816 sonnet, “To Wordsworth,” Shelley 
offers a representative expression of second generation disenchantment:  
          In honoured poverty thy voice did weave 
          Songs consecrate to truth and liberty,—     
          Deserting these, thou leavest me to grieve, 
          Thus having been, that thou shouldst cease to be.  (11-14)35    
Shelley here intimates, with a note of personal mournfulness, that the social and 
aesthetic value of Wordsworth’s “songs consecrate to truth and liberty” (12) persists, 
even if the radical Wordsworth now is part of another time.  The young 
Wordsworth’s compassionate Romanticism continues to inspire his heirs, even if the 
poet himself, like his Lake School colleagues, has come to embody a Burkean 
reactionary spirit.  Shelley and his contemporaries recognized that the Lakers no 
longer wrote “in honoured poverty” (11), that is, from a liberalist position. 
Wordsworth, who censured monarchy and aristocracy in a June 1794 letter to 
William Mathews, had by 1813 become the Distributor of Stamps for Westmorland.36   
Coleridge’s radical utopianism and Unitarianism gave way to political and religious 
conservatism.37   Southey became Poet Laureate in 1813.  Shelley’s poem helps to 
show how the new Romantics, amid the political repression, social disaffection, and 
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bloody violence of the times, created their individual authorial identities in varying 
degrees of contradistinction to the principal figures of the recent literary past. 
     The younger Romantics, therefore, wrote in part to challenge the cultural, political, 
and literary establishment of Regency England, and, like Blake, they embraced 
intellectual liberty, political freedom, and transformational art at a time when 
opposition to the Crown and Tory administration often incurred severe responses, 
such as the Gag Acts (1817) and the Six Acts (1819).  The record of civil unrest 
during the Regency period encompasses frame-breaking initiatives in cities such as 
Yorkshire, Derbyshire, and Nottinghamshire (this industrial sabotage provided the 
subject of Byron’s maiden speech in Parliament); the Spa Fields Riots of December 
1816; and, of course, the Peterloo Massacre of August, 1819, “a bloody encounter 
between sixty thousand unarmed English citizens at St. Peter’s Square in Manchester 
and [. . .] a regiment of English hussars, acting on a magistrate’s orders and still 
adorned with their Waterloo medals” (Chandler, “‘Wordsworth’ after Waterloo” 
107).  Most of the open protest activity originated north of London, as Roy Porter 
notes (250), and much of it, like the 1817 March of the Blanketeers, was essentially 
benevolent; all the same, the government of the Prince Regent and Lord Liverpool, 
despite introducing legislation such as the Poor Employment Bill of 1817, showed a 
“tendency to confuse British reformers with French Jacobins” (Derry 140) and so 
militated against what seemed to be a nascent revolution.  Furthermore, as Cox 
reminds us, radical periodicals like Hunt’s Examiner addressed “such issues as the 
national debt, the continuing wars in India, Catholic Emancipation, the struggle for  
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freedom in the Americas, the rights of the poor, child labor, the slave trade, the 
freedom of the press, reform of military discipline, and prison conditions” (43).   
     The historical particulars I have recounted show that England, at the dawn of the 
pax Britannica and the British Empire, was a deeply conflicted nation entangled in 
various crises, most of which involved ideological warfare and human suffering.  
Accordingly, the post-war English writers respond to a unique historical moment, a 
consideration relevant to visionary literature as it takes shape after the Napoleonic 
Wars conclude.  Perhaps Wittreich is right in asserting that “prophecy offers a 
potential release from the tragedy of history” (“Prophecy and Apocalypse in 
Romantic Poetry” 52).  But it is crucial to recognize that what constitutes a tragic 
history for any one generation is seldom the same as what makes up a tragic history in 
others’ experiences.  In light of this simple yet important claim, we may call into 
question the way in which, for theoretical convenience, Wittreich homogenizes 
distinct historical periods and flattens out very different authors’ perspectives on the 
past, present, and future.  With respect to the major English Romantics, this approach 
suppresses nuance and thus renders Romantic prophecy and the seer-poet’s role 
without accounting for variations in either historical circumstances or authorial 
visions of what the world is and what it may become.   
* * * 
     Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats found in Milton and the early Romantics a 
visionary poetics that offered structures, aesthetics, and principles suitable to the 
crafting of politically engaged literature in the wake of England’s triumph over  
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France.  These four authors, of course, took the visionary tradition in varying 
directions to accomplish separate objectives.  At the same time, we may note that 
these artists, like Blake, saw in literary prophecy a special authority and disruptive 
power through which to trouble monarchy and its supports:  dynastic continuity, 
patriarchy, primogeniture, ancient constitutionalism, exchange economics, and proto-
imperial law-making.  In the hands of the post-war Romantics, visionary poetics 
becomes a resource through which to attack “the mighty scheme of truth” 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805 XII.302) that the Lake Poets, each in his own way, 
set forth to make sense of the Girondinist republicans’ overthrow, the 
Septembriseurs’ brutality, and Napoleon’s eventual rise to power.38    
     The Lake Poets’ ideas of England and Englishness, as Brenda Banks suggests 
through her discussion of Wordsworth’s anti-Napoleonic writings circa 1804, are not 
without traces of revolutionary vigor and subversive potential.39   Nevertheless, over 
the course of the next four chapters, I am less interested in speaking to the early 
Romantics than in describing how their post-war heirs transform the visionary poetics 
tradition in ways that Wittreich overlooks.  If Wittreich’s brilliant, generative work 
too closely associates the first and second wave English Romantics, these chapters 
shall attempt to disentangle the two generations through an examination of how 
Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats respectively view and implement literary prophecy.  
My wish is not to discredit Wittreich but rather to broaden the scope of his theories 
and so renew their appeal for the contemporary study of British Romanticism.  By 
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 contesting Wittreich’s idea of Romantic literary history, I hope to unfold the 
continuing value of a critical framework that, if revised with an eye to particularity, 
can importantly and cogently elucidate the art of the period.   
 
             
           
      
 
      
  
 
           
      
      
               
      
      
          
            
          
     
 
Chapter Two 
“A light like a green star”: 
Love’s Prophetic Reformation in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 
Prometheus Unbound 
 
“My vision then grew clear and I could see 
Into the mysteries of the Universe.” 
                                                —Spirit of the Hour, Prometheus Unbound III.iv.104-5 
 
     Less than half a year before his death by drowning on 8 July, 1822, Percy Bysshe 
Shelley published the poem Hellas, a piece that closes with a vision.  In this vision, 
Shelley foresees the rebirth in the present of classical Hellenic civilization:  “Another 
Athens shall arise,” Shelley’s Chorus promises, “And to remoter time / Bequeath, like 
sunset to the skies, / The splendour of its prime” (1084-7).  Thus revivified, “the 
world’s great age” (1060) shall awaken Love, an ancient pagan god (1090-1), whose 
“altar” (1094) is adorned with neither “gold” (1094) nor “blood” (1094) but “votive 
tears and symbol flowers” (1095).1  The poem’s closing stanza, however, reverses the 
vatic optimism of the preceding six stanzas:  “O cease! must hate and death return?” 
(1096).   Hellas concludes by claiming that “the world is weary of the past, / O might 
it die or rest at last!” (1100-1). 
     Shelley glosses this vision with the admission that it “is [as] indistinct and obscure 
as the event of the living drama whose arrival it foretells.  Prophecies of wars, and  
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rumours of wars &c. may safely be made by poet or prophet in any age, but to 
anticipate, however darkly, a period of regeneration and happiness is a more 
hazardous exercise of the faculties which bards possess or feign.”2   Shelley then 
invokes Isaiah and Virgil; these pre-Christian seers, he writes, looked beyond “the 
actual reign of evil which we endure and bewail” to describe “the possible and 
perhaps approaching state of society.”3   
     I begin with Hellas and one of its prose notes because both poem and commentary 
help to clarify Shelley’s visionary aesthetics and sense of literary history in the 1820 
masterpiece, Prometheus Unbound.  This poem, like Hellas, is a lyrical drama, that is, 
a literary product “containing music, from opera to choral drama,” as Stuart Curran 
observes (Poetic Form and British Romanticism 198).  Although cast in the form of a 
stage play, the lyrical drama, like a closet drama, is not principally designed for 
theatrical performance.4   Beyond this generic similarity, Shelley’s two poems share a 
concern with questions of social and political change and the respective roles that 
both history and love play in facilitating such change.  Moreover, the prose note 
places the exploration of reform clearly within the twofold context of visionary 
poetics and the vatic literary tradition.  If Hellas closes nebulously, as the poet states 
in his gloss that it does, then that nebulousness is purposeful:  Shelley couches insight 
in mystery to unsettle and thus transform his readers, in line with the seer-poet’s role.  
In this sense, Shelley follows not only Isaiah and Virgil but also Blake, who, in verse-
prophecies such as The French Revolution (1791) and Visions of the Daughters of 
Albion (1793), aspires to effect beneficial changes through a disruptive art. 
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     Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, like Blake’s major visions, is driven by what 
Stephen C. Behrendt calls “the prophetic artist’s public imperative” (Shelley and His 
Audiences 166).  Shelley does not see literary vision as divorced from political and 
social reform; rather, he believes, as does Blake, that literature facilitates the 
intellectual and affective conditions necessary for human beings to transform self, 
community, and state, thereby remaking the world for the better.  For Shelley, 
however, this idealistic perspective partly reflects his response to late eighteenth-
century theorists of social perfectibility, particularly William Godwin, who was both 
a well-known English radical and Mary Shelley’s father, and the French political 
philosopher Condorcet, whose ideas were introduced to Shelley by his Eton 
instructor, Dr. James Lind (Kelley 20).  Shelley, like Godwin and Condorcet, saw the 
potential for human social harmony and political freedom in an attainable future state 
rather than in an irrecoverable past; furthermore, he recognizes in visionary poetics a 
way both to describe and to bring forth this reformed future state.  Shelley’s 
Prometheus Unbound provides a vision of such a world and, through the actions of 
Prometheus and his beloved Asia, a program for realizing its glory. 
     On this basis, Shelley’s poem may be distinguished from Blake’s verse-prophecies 
insofar as Shelley aligns his vision with Godwin’s principles of gradual reformation 
rather than with scriptural representations of apocalyptic transformation.  “Blake is 
the only Romantic poet,” Wittreich contends, “to present a united vision of 
apocalypse in the mind and in history” (“Prophecy and Apocalypse in Romantic 
Poetry” 59).5   Shelley, unlike Blake, writes from a rationalist, atheistic position, and 
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his perspective reflects Enlightenment-era rationalism as he receives it through 
Godwin and Condorcet, as well as through the young Wordsworth, who was attracted 
to Godwin’s views of social improvement, as Amanda M. Ellis notes (33).6   In his 
lyrical drama, Shelley presents prophetic reform in line with this strain of eighteenth-
century secularist thinking rather than forecasting personal and public changes in 
antinomian or apocalyptic terms, as Blake often does. 
     By casting Prometheus Unbound as a gradualist, reformative vision, Shelley 
places imaginative distance, to our eyes, between his poem and Blake’s work (as far 
as we know, he was not acquainted with this older poet).  At the same time, Shelley 
here also stands apart from Wordsworth and Coleridge, who have become, as the 
former claims in his 1805 Prelude, “Prophets of Nature” (XIII.442), singing the 
beauty of the human mind “which, ’mid all revolutions in the hopes / And fears of 
men, doth still remain unchanged” (449-50).7   Insofar as he asserts through the poem 
a vision of the mind’s unique beauty, Shelley resembles such a prophet; but he does 
not celebrate, as Wordsworth does, the human mind’s transcendence, that is, its 
freedom from history.  Rather, Shelley posits the idea that the human mind finds both 
dignity and transformative power through the struggle with history; as P. M. S. 
Dawson suggests, it is only after Prometheus withdraws his curse against Jupiter that 
thirty centuries of bitter enmity close and the world’s renovation begins (11-2).  By 
choosing to renounce three thousand years of defiance and hatred, Prometheus 
confronts history, thereby creating an opportunity for a new age to come into being 
within history.  For Shelley, vision is a way to remake, not to reject, human history.   
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     The world’s reformation, as Shelley presents it in his poem, thus results from 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary historical processes.  Shelley’s gradualist 
vision, despite its provenance in Godwin and Condorcet, places Shelley in the 
company of Burke and Coleridge, who “argued that political evolution must be a 
‘natural’ process and that the evil of revolution is its ‘unnatural’ attempt to found a 
rational society,” as Hugh Roberts contends (437).  Although Shelley does not 
dismiss either writer’s counterrevolutionary perspective, we should recognize that the 
poet reinterprets Burke and Coleridge, as well as the perfectibilitarians, by asserting 
that history’s movement toward a naturally achieved rational society is guided by 
Love, “that powerful attraction towards all that we conceive or fear or hope beyond 
ourselves” (“On Love” 503).8   He elaborates by describing Love as a selfless 
empathy that is universal in scope:  “if we feel,” Shelley writes, “we would that 
another’s nerves should vibrate to our own, that the beams of their eyes should kindle 
at once and mix and melt into our own, that lips of motionless ice should not reply to 
lips quivering and burning with the heart’s best blood” (503-4).  Love creates “the 
bond and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with every thing 
which exists” (504).  This idea of Love and its part in history distinguishes Shelley’s 
own vision of a new human state from contemporary views on both socio-political 
change and human perfectibility.  
     Shelley’s responses to his literary contemporaries thus register in Prometheus 
Unbound as surely as do his responses to authors of the Western literary past, 
including Milton, Dante, and, of course, Aeschylus, whose work provides a classical 
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model for Shelley’s late-Regency dramatic poetry (including Hellas).  But it is his 
engagement with Byron that most directly influences Shelley’s presentation of a 
world reformed through prophecy.  Shelley’s piece “contains so many studied 
allusions to Byron’s poems,” Curran argues, “as to constitute a deliberate 
counterstatement” (PFBR 198).  With Charles E. Robinson’s groundbreaking work on 
the Byron-Shelley relationship in mind, Curran asserts further that “where Byron 
attains his epic vision by representing irreducible discords,” Shelley strives in his 
lyrical drama for “intricately modulating harmonies that in its last act aspire to the 
music of the spheres” (PFBR 199).  Shelley’s claim that Love shall transform history 
speaks to Byron, who, as Jerome J. McGann suggests, finds humankind alone 
responsible for the past, present, and future, even in the face of “strictly natural 
phenomena” or what Byron often refers to as circumstance (Don Juan in Context 
147).  Shelley’s idea of Love thus clashes with Byron’s belief that humankind is both 
alienated from Nature (and so from Love as Shelley defines it) and solely accountable 
for altering material history.   
     This philosophical conflict between Shelley and Byron is relevant also to the 
former’s use of the figure and myth of Prometheus in his lyrical drama.  Prometheus, 
a Greek god whose philanthropic love for humankind drew Zeus’s wrath, was a 
popular mythological figure among the later Romantics.9   Mary Shelley, for 
example, alternately titled her 1818 novel, Frankenstein, “The Modern Prometheus.”  
Byron, for his part, composed “Prometheus” (1816), a poem in which he presents the 
god as a type of the human being, “in part divine, / A troubled stream from a pure 
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source” (47-8).10  Prometheus offered the younger Romantics an attractive range of 
possible interpretations:  creator, political victim, benefactor, thief, seer, rebel, 
teacher, genius, anarchist, Savior, or Arch-Demon.  The god’s story, moreover, 
evoked the classical literary tradition of Hesiod and Aeschylus rather than the 
Christian British legacy of poets such as Spenser, who refers to Prometheus only once 
(at II.X.70) over the course of The Faerie Queene’s six finished books, or Milton, 
who does not allude directly to Prometheus in his major verse works.11   The 
Prometheus myth thus appealed to Byron and the Shelleys by virtue of both its 
classical associations and its adaptability as a metaphor for the modern European 
experience after Waterloo.12   
     As Shelley explains in the “Preface” to his lyrical drama, Prometheus is a paragon 
of virtue, a visionary who has taken up the cause of humankind and suffered 
mercilessly for his patronage (206); on these grounds, the poet describes his 
protagonist as embodying “the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature, 
impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the best and noblest ends” (207).  
Shelley finds Milton’s Satan to be “the only imaginary being resembling in any 
degree Prometheus” (206), but he deems the Titan superior “because, in addition to 
courage and majesty and firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force, he is [. . .] 
exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, revenge, and a desire for personal 
aggrandisement”(207).  Shelley’s Prometheus epitomizes ethical ideals which are 
vital conditions of human perfectibility.  Moreover, he is a prophet-god; his 
prescience and fortitude together prepare him to effect humankind’s renovation.   
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     In Shelley’s poem, Prometheus is a moral visionary whose act of selfless love—
that is, the withdrawing of his curse against his persecutor—recreates the world both 
politically and socially.  Shelley thus countervails Byron, as Robinson asserts:  
“Unlike Shelley’s hero, Byron’s Prometheus symbolizes man’s inability to perfect 
himself in a fallen world” (31).  Certainly, both poets were well read in classical 
literature, including Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound.  Robinson notes that, in 1816, 
Shelley translated the play into English, likely during the summer that Byron and the 
Shelleys spent together in Geneva, Switzerland (30); he also recounts that “Byron had 
read Aeschylus’ drama while at Harrow, had included a sixteen-line translation of it 
in his Fugitive Pieces, and had likened Napoleon to Prometheus in his Ode to 
Napoleon Buonaparte” (30).  Both Byron and Shelley recognized Prometheus as a 
cosmic oppositionist and a champion of human dignity and freedoms.13 
     At the same time, the two poets put the old myth to significantly different uses, 
thereby reflecting their intellectual dissimilarities.  Byron, on the one hand, employs 
Prometheus as an emblem of noble resolve in the face of a malevolent universe.  In 
this sense, the god’s isolation and disaffection render “a symbol and a sign / To 
mortals of their fate and force” (“Prometheus” 45-6); Prometheus, through his pain 
and loneliness, represents the human spirit in conflict with powers that militate 
against political freedom, intellectual liberty, and happiness.  For Byron, the 
Promethean drama is the struggle with those powers in the here and now.  Shelley, on 
the other hand, implements the Prometheus myth principally as a framework for his 
gradualist vision.  Like Byron, Shelley values Prometheus for his defiance of tyranny 
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and his loyalty to humankind; but Shelley parts with Byron in imagining the Titan 
renouncing hatred altogether, thus facilitating both the fall of Jupiter and the 
liberation of the world.  For Shelley, Prometheus lives an inauthentic, hollow life so 
long as his curse exists.  By withdrawing his curse, Prometheus frees his heart after 
thirty centuries of icy bondage; correlatively, this benevolent and altruistic act 
releases a transformative energy into a spiritually dead world.  Shelley thus recasts 
Byron’s Promethean drama as the struggle to create a new scheme of things. 
     Shelley’s provocative reinterpretation of Byron also involves an equally 
provocative revision of Milton, as Simon Bainbridge suggests in his analysis of the 
“Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte”:  “The failure of Satan,” Bainbridge writes, “is 
transformed into the positive pride of Prometheus, anticipating, and possibly 
stimulating, Shelley’s use of the mythic hero” (151).  Shelley makes clear in his 
“Preface” that Milton’s Satan is Prometheus’s closest literary relative, and, if we 
follow Bainbridge, we see that Shelley’s presentation of the fire-stealer answers both 
Byron and Milton.  Although Byron and the Shelleys do not receive the Prometheus 
myth directly from Milton’s verse, they nevertheless connect the myth to Paradise 
Lost and to the figure of Satan.   The younger Romantics, by relating their versions of 
Prometheus to Milton’s fallen angel, bridge their work to the principal English 
visionary text.  Such interconnectedness among authors and texts is a hallmark of the 
visionary tradition and a defining element in the seer-poet’s relationship with the 
literary past, as Shelley states:  “one great poet is a masterpiece of nature, which 
another not only ought to study but must study” (“Preface” 208).   
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     For Shelley, “the sacred Milton” (“Preface” 208) provides a lastingly meaningful 
influence in terms of both aesthetics and ideology, and the Puritan’s thought and art 
represents important developments in the history of prophetic literature which must 
be carried forward and recast for a new historical moment.  Shelley’s Prometheus 
therefore is a revision of Milton’s Satan, as well as his Byronic counterpart, in light of 
a post-Napoleonic vision of reform:  “The great writers of our own age are [. . .] the 
companions and forerunners of some unimagined change in our social condition or 
the opinions which cement it.  The cloud of mind is discharging its collected 
lightning, and the equilibrium between institutions and opinions is now restoring, or 
is about to be restored” (“Preface” 208).  To articulate his gradualist vision of human 
perfectibility, Shelley re-imagines Milton, not to free his art from the English literary 
past but to harness the subversive and transformative energies of that past in order to 
ameliorate the present.  
      The vatic literary tradition allows Shelley, in Prometheus Unbound, to reassert 
what the Fairy Queen of his dream-vision Queen Mab (issued 1813) proclaims:  
“Futurity / Exposes now its treasures; let the sight / Renew and strengthen all thy 
failing hope” (VIII.50-2).  Shelley understood the years of war with Revolutionary-
Napoleonic France as comprising “an age of despair” (241), as he states in the 
“Author’s Preface” to Laon and Cythna (1817; later The Revolt of Islam, 1818).14  To 
articulate his vision of human perfectibility in the face of such malaise, Shelley 
invokes and modifies both the recent and remote literary pasts.  By doing so, Shelley 
seeks to create a new vision of the human future to counteract the hopelessness 
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engendered by the collapse of revolutionary idealism in the wake of the Reign of 
Terror and the wars with Napoleon.  Although Hellas will later call into question such 
an idealistically hopeful vision, Prometheus Unbound represents Shelley’s best 
attempt to portray humankind’s perfectibility and to offer Love as a force for life-
affirming changes in the midst of historical catastrophes.  The following sections 
address how Shelley pursues these objectives over the course of his lyrical drama’s 
four acts. 
* * * 
     In Prometheus Unbound, Shelley presents human history as crucial to the 
realization of a new age, thereby partly resolving an intellectual conundrum that had 
been with him, as Greg Kucich argues, since Queen Mab.  Kucich claims that this 
early poem “sensitized [Shelley] to fundamental contradictions in his procedures” for 
representing both historical realities and possibilities (16).  Queen Mab, for Kucich, 
compels Shelley to reassess his approach to history because “the poem’s contrast 
between the eternal ideas of an imagined future state and the ruins of time [. . .] 
highlights two competing strategies of historical narration—an ideal historical 
progression toward millennial completion versus a material account of actual human 
misery” (16).  Shelley’s interest in rethinking his ideas of history owes much to the 
direct influence of William Godwin, who fired Shelley’s mind with a fresh 
enthusiasm for reading in history almost immediately after they met in late 1812 
(Kucich 17).  For the last ten years of his life, Shelley strove to work out the 
relationship between material history and his vision of human perfectibility. 
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     Prometheus Unbound dramatizes the birth of a future state in which the principle 
of Love frees living beings from social, political, intellectual, and affective distress.  
In the piece, a process of general transformation is begun when Prometheus publicly 
expresses remorse at having long ago spoken a bitter curse against his captor and the 
sovereign deity, Jupiter.  This act of benevolence liberates the prophet-god from three 
thousand years of agonized captivity; the spell of history breaks and the world is 
slowly renewed.  Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, who by blessing the “happy 
living things” (282) of the sea causes the dead albatross to fall from around his neck, 
Prometheus renovates himself through selfless compassion and, in turn, catalyzes the 
renovation of others.15   Prometheus transforms the world with a single altruistic act 
that discontinues Jupiter’s reign and helps to realize a new state of existence for the 
victims of thirty centuries of history.  The poem thus presents Love as a source of 
personal and communal reform within history, and it does so in accordance with the 
artistic techniques of the visionary poet:  “Imagination provides forms on which 
thought can operate and from which history will take its shape” (Hoagwood 134). 
     These considerations cast light upon Shelley’s poem, which, from the first, places 
the relationship between historical actuality and visionary possibility in the forefront 
of its concerns.  As act one begins, we find Prometheus chained against a “Precipice” 
in “a Ravine of Icy Rocks” as the night gradually gives way to the dawn (s.d. 209).  
Two female immortals, Panthea and Ione, rest close by and so see and hear all that 
takes place and is said.  We soon learn from Prometheus that he has suffered through 
“Three thousand years of sleep-unsheltered hours / And moments” (I.12-13) without 
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acquiescing, despite the fact that the natural world participates in Jupiter’s efforts to 
torture him into submission:  “The crawling glaciers pierce me with the spears / Of 
their moon-freezing chrystals” (I.31-32).  Yet Prometheus finds in his prophetic 
foreknowledge of Jupiter’s fall a source of both consolation and forgiveness; perhaps 
for the first time, the god discovers in his heart what Stuart Peterfreund calls 
“unapologetic and loving empathy” (226): 
          Disdain?  Ah no!  I pity thee.—What Ruin 
          Will hunt thee undefended through the wide Heaven! 
          How will thy soul, cloven to its depth with terror, 
          Gape like a Hell within!  I speak in grief 
          Not exultation, for I hate no more 
          As then, ere misery made me wise.—The Curse 
          Once breathed on thee I would recall.  (I.53-9) 
     If Prometheus alone is responsible for the oath against Jupiter, then he alone can 
withdraw it and thereby redeem all life, as Wittreich suggests:  “Only the human 
mind, once it becomes unbound, can suppress the serpent, seal the pit, and summon 
up a new heaven and a new earth in history” ( “Prophecy” 56).  To inaugurate a new 
historical moment, Prometheus must put an end to the age of Jupiter, an era partly 
upheld by the negativity and violence of his own radically defiant anti-monarchism, 
as well as by his darkest feelings toward his persecutor.  Moreover, Prometheus’s 
altruism has immediate social consequences, as Dawson notes (12); by disavowing 
his curse with the words “I wish no living thing to suffer pain” (I.305), the Titan  
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shows mercy not only to Jupiter but to all the beings who have endured generations of 
conflict between Prometheus and the King of Heaven.  “Prometheus is beginning to 
recognize,” Dawson explains, “that such concern [as the god shows for others] can 
hardly express itself in the form of a curse, for a curse is a form of hatred, and hatred 
is one of the central aspects of Jupiter.  To oppose Jupiter in this way is to help keep 
him in existence” (12).  We may also observe, with Dawson, that “some kinds of 
uncompromising opposition actually work to support what they ostensibly oppose” 
(12), a lesson which Prometheus appears to be learning. 
     Thus Prometheus, with the authority of visionary insight and a prophet’s freedom 
of imagination, seeks to inspire others to reform both themselves and their world 
through love and compassion.  We may here recall Shelley’s “Sonnet:  To the 
Republic of Benevento,” published posthumously in 1824 but composed in mid-1820.  
In the piece, Shelley cautions that the truly emancipated individual “must rule the 
empire of himself” (11), “establishing his throne / On vanquished will” (12-13) after 
“quelling the anarchy / Of hopes and fears” (13-14).  The new golden age, in other 
words, begins with the visionary few and ends in universal peace achieved without 
physical or intellectual violence.  This reformist ideal, embodied by Prometheus in 
the first act of the lyrical drama, is so alien to the characters who witness the god’s 
foreswearing of his curse that they believe him finally broken by three thousand years 
of loneliness and pain. 
     Several Shelley critics comment upon this ironic response; Desmond King-Hele, 
for one, notes that Prometheus’s “willingness to forgive is a necessary prelude to  
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liberation, though The Earth misinterprets it as a sign of weakness” (173).  Michael 
Scrivener argues that the Earth laments her son’s magnanimity because she mistakes 
a new historical course for an old pattern of failure and submission to tyranny (156-
57).  Gerald McNiece contends that Prometheus himself loses heart as the first act 
continues, particularly at the point when the Furies arrive to torture humankind’s 
benefactor with visions of Christ’s Passion and the French Revolution (228).  In sum, 
these critics highlight Shelley’s sense of the true prophet’s difficult social role, an 
understanding the poet draws as surely from the Gospels—for example, Matthew 
13.57—as from the English literary past and his Romantic contemporaries.16       
     Prometheus’s reformed perspective is tested almost at once by Mercury, who, at 
“the great Father’s will” (I.354), arrives at the same moment as the Furies.  
Commanding these bloodthirsty creatures to wait before attacking, Mercury solicits 
the secret of Jupiter’s fate (I.345-80).  Mercury’s interest in Prometheus’s visionary 
insight sparks the Titan’s defiance, showing that Shelley has not simply remade 
Byron’s Prometheus to render a fireless counterexample.  Rather, Shelley’s 
Prometheus, who gestures toward the realization of human perfectibility, must recast 
his cosmic resistance as an act of Love rather than hate.  As a prophet of Love, 
Prometheus becomes responsible for the positive transformation of all life in the 
human and natural world, in keeping with Shelley’s idea of Love as the 
interconnectedness of all that exists.  Accordingly, the seer-god must reinvent his 
Satanic defiance as a function of his new role.  Prometheus recreates his past; 
analogously, Shelley adapts both Byron and Milton to suit a new poetic prophecy. 
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     After he fails in his task, Mercury gives Prometheus over to the Furies, but not 
before he says, in astonishment, “Alas!  I wonder at, yet pity thee” (I.428).  This 
commiseration, if sincere, may reflect that the herald-god truly sees Prometheus in a 
new light.  Possibly, the general renovation that Prometheus begins through his 
personal transformation shows its first effects in Mercury.  Nevertheless, the Furies’ 
savagery reasserts the dark passions that Jupiter’s reign encourages and which in turn 
perpetuate his sovereignty, as Stuart M. Sperry notes:  “Representing the tide of 
human hatred and mistrust, [the Furies] are a perfect metaphor for Shelley’s 
conception of evil because, for all the horror they inspire, they take their reality from 
the fear and terror of their victims” (84).17   Like Jupiter, the Furies are powerless 
save within a nightmarish world of violent feelings and hopelessness, a scheme of 
things that establishes Heaven’s supremacy and creates the illusion that Jupiter’s 
authority is limitless.  For the Furies to torment the now repentant Prometheus, they 
must transport his mind to their realm of fear and false prophecy. 
     In answer to the seer-god’s challenge to “pour forth the cup of pain” (I.474), the 
Furies reveal a twofold vision, involving both images of Christ’s Passion and scenes 
of the French Revolution’s bloody aftermath.  By transmitting this knowledge of the 
future to Prometheus, the Furies hope to inspire fear and despondency regarding the 
distant historical prospects for humankind, the Titan’s “beloved race” (I.386).  
Christ’s fate among those for whom He is incarnate prefigures the patterns of 
intellectual error and spiritual folly which shall reappear when Revolutionary France 
succumbs first to the Reign of Terror and afterward to Napoleon’s authoritarian rule.   
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     This vision strikes at Prometheus by shaking his hopes for human perfectibility; 
history merely reiterates a destructive cycle.  Just as Christ—Who represents for 
Shelley a “symbolic and ethical complex” (Hoagwood 146) signifying Love and 
moral perfectibility—shall be a victim of others’ fear and ignorance, so the French 
Revolution shall fail because, centuries earlier, “Prometheus kindled in man a 
consuming thirst for knowledge which outstripped man’s ability to use his knowledge 
humanely” (McNiece 229).18   The Furies seek to persuade Prometheus, through 
vision, that history is foreordained and thus Love and hope are mirages; the future 
shall bring not Rousseau’s “ideal republic, founded on virtue” (Breunig 46) but 
Robespierre’s Republic of Virtue, “the heart of the Terror” (Breunig 46).   
     Unlike Panthea, who looks away from the vision because she cannot bear her 
heartbreaking clairvoyance, Prometheus recognizes the Furies to be false 
prophetesses.  Just as the ancient Greeks distinguished between the true and false 
dreams that pass through the gates of horn and ivory respectively, a seer such as 
Prometheus cautiously interprets the visions vouchsafed to him.  Thus the Furies 
inadvertently steel Prometheus to his task, as he reveals in crying out heavenward:  
“The sights with which thou torturest gird my soul / With new endurance, till the hour 
arrives / When they shall be no types of things which are” (I.643-45).  The seer-god 
knows that the Furies’ power to prophesy is framed within the scope of Jupiter’s 
unreal authority; consequently, by presenting the narrative of human history 
conclusively and fatalistically, the Furies render it falsely.  Panthea’s fears reflect the 
Olympian world-illusion that Prometheus, Love’s prophet, fights against.   
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     A counterexample to the Furies is provided at once by Earth, who summons a 
group of spirits that Panthea likens to “flocks of clouds in spring’s delightful 
weather” (I.665) as they approach the icy ravine wherein the god is captive.  “A 
commentator bent on showing the classical symmetry of the act,” Carlos Baker 
contends, “might point out that Shelley has balanced the visitation of the Furies [. . .] 
with a chorus of fair spirits, who prophesy that love and unselfishness will in the end 
prevail” (100).  Yet the arrival of these beautiful spirits points to more than Shelley’s 
faithful reproduction of classical dramatic conventions.  Rather, the contrast between 
the Furies and the Spirits suggests a change in the intellectual and affective climate of 
the poem’s world, the beginnings of a transformation facilitated by Prometheus’s 
visionary intervention into the lives of the beings around him.  Consider the solace 
that Earth offers her child: 
          I felt thy torture, Son, with such mixed joy 
          As pain and Virtue give.—To cheer thy state 
          I bid ascend those subtle and fair spirits 
          Whose homes are the dim caves of human thought 
          And who inhabit, as birds wing the wind, 
          Its world-surrounding ether; they behold  
          Beyond that twilight realm, as in a glass, 
          The future—may they speak comfort to thee!  (I.656-663) 
     Presumably, Earth all along possesses this invocative power—a precise 
counterpart to Jupiter’s command of the Furies—but she reveals her access to  
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sources of prophetic foresight only now because Prometheus has revivified the 
transformative and life-affirming energies of vision itself.  As dawn breaks over the 
frozen escarpments, three thousand years of spiritual winter draw to a close because 
Prometheus has restored the vatic imagination.  Thus Earth, who has prayed for 
revenge, now calls upon a benevolent chorus of spirits “from unremembered ages” 
(I.672) to convey a historical vision organized around Love’s part in human affairs.  
Such consolation reflects a renovated world in which hope has been restored.  
Consequently, Earth’s maternal compassion occasions a vision of history that would 
have been vain and inauthentic had it appeared at the beginning of the poem, before 
Prometheus the prophet-god remade the world through selfless love. 
     The principal incidents and ideas of the poem’s first act, as I have recounted them, 
point to the uniqueness of Shelley’s historical vision in second generation Romantic 
literature.  Shelley proposes Love as the most important reforming agent within 
history, the guiding principle for human perfectibility.  This notion of Love and its 
relation to history distinguishes Shelley’s idealism from the more materialistic 
approaches offered by Mary Shelley, Keats, and especially Byron.  To be sure, 
Shelley draws much from both Godwin and Condorcet, the French philosopher whose 
theories of human perfectibility bridge Rousseau, d’Alembert, and Diderot with 
Madame de Staël and the French ideologues whom Napoleon so hotly despised 
(Herold 91-5).  Shelley’s idea of Love also combines elements of classical and 
Christian thinking, evoking works such as Plato’s Symposium, in which Love 
connects humankind to the divine reality of the World of Forms (Hamilton 20-21), 
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and St. John’s First Epistle, which claims that “God is love; and he that dwelleth in 
love dwelleth in God, and God in him” (I John 4.16).  If Love is to facilitate a new 
course for history, the principle itself must belong to history, whether Hellenic or 
Christian, recent or remote.  By asserting the historical reality of Love and its 
reformative potential, Shelley parts ways with his three foremost contemporaries, 
none of whom demonstrates a similar faith in universal human perfectibility or its 
historical precedents. 
     The first act of Prometheus Unbound, as I have asserted, portrays a reformation 
rather than a revolution.  In line with this interpretation, I wish to discuss the poem’s 
second act as a continuation of the process of renovation initiated by Prometheus’s 
compassion for his heavenly persecutor.  This compassion reflects Love’s 
transformative power; at the same time, Love is not mercy alone.  Shelley accounts 
for the erotic qualities of Love through the introduction of Asia, Prometheus’s 
spiritual and intellectual bride.  After the Spirits depart, Prometheus says: 
          How fair these air-born shapes!  and yet I feel 
          Most vain all hope but love, and thou art fair, 
          Asia!  who when my being overflowed 
          Wert like a golden chalice to bright wine 
          Which else had sunk into the thirsty dust.  (I.807-811) 
Without Asia, Prometheus’s vision is confined to the ice-encrusted ravine; with her, 
the renewal of all beings may truly begin:  “I said all hope was vain but love,” the 
Titan confides to Panthea, adding, after a pause, “thou lovest. . .” (I.824). 
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* * * 
     Like Keats’s Hyperion (1820), the second act of Prometheus Unbound begins in a 
vale, although in Shelley’s poem there is not the deposed Saturn amid the waste 
forests, but rather Asia, who celebrates the revivification of Nature that follows 
Prometheus’s repentance:  “thou hast descended / Cradled in tempests; thou dost 
wake, O Spring!” (II.i.5-6).   “This is the season,” she says, “this the day, the hour” 
(II.i.13).  Her apostrophe to the time of year suggests from the first that Asia, as Linda 
Brigham notes, enjoys a special harmony with the natural world (257).  Brigham’s 
observation is significant in light of Asia’s role as a facilitator of the visionary 
reformation that Prometheus initiated in the first act, since, as Angela Leighton 
asserts, “Asia continues [this] work [. . .] by returning to the second world beneath the 
grave” (88).  Asia is thus prepared for her otherworldly task by virtue of her thorough 
integration with a natural world which, as act two opens, is in the nascent moments of 
a general rejuvenation. 
     The promise of a new world is underwritten at this point in act two by recurring 
references to stars and starlight.  In visionary literature, the star is a conventional 
symbol, an image typically associated with rebirth or purification, as in the case of the 
Star of Bethlehem that presages Christ’s Nativity (Matt. 2.2) or in the closing verses 
of Dante’s Purgatory:  “From those holiest waters I returned / to her reborn, a tree 
renewed, in bloom / with newborn foliage, immaculate, / eager to rise, now ready for 
the stars” (XXXIII.142-45).19   The star image also recalls Shelley’s earlier, less 
 
76 
successful attempts at poetic prophecy, particularly Laon and Cythna, in which “a 
wandering meteor”—that is, a shooting star—consecrates the sexual union of the 
protagonists (VI.XXXII.283).  In these instances, stars are harbingers of hope and 
renewal.   
     As the second act begins, however, Shelley employs the image of Venus, or the 
Morning Star, to signify the indecisiveness and fragility of Prometheus’s vision. Asia 
notices that “one white star is quivering still / Deep in the orange light of widening 
morn / Beyond the purple mountains” (II.i.17-19).  She describes how the star 
fluctuates:  “through a chasm / Of wind-divided mist the darker lake / Reflects it—
now it wanes—it gleams again” (II.i.19-21).  But within a moment Asia proclaims, 
“’Tis lost!” (II.i.24).   If Asia feels hope in the coming of spring, she senses 
uncertainty and impermanence in the fading of Venus.  Furthermore, Asia’s sympathy 
with natural processes attunes her to the material consequences of the reformation 
Prometheus has instigated.  Thus she intuits, before knowing what took place in the 
icy ravine of act one, that a new, generative energy infuses the world around her; 
simultaneously, she fears that this life-affirming power is as transitory as the Morning 
Star at dawn.  This conflict between hope and loss represents that the world’s 
renovation is at this point provisional.  Asia must intervene if the human and natural 
worlds are to be freed of Jupiter’s rule. 
     By recasting the star as an equivocal symbol, Shelley modulates a convention of 
the visionary poetics tradition, adapting it to the drama of reform that he presents in 
his poem.  Similarly, Shelley re-imagines the vatic tropes of dreams and dreaming. 
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Shelley’s use of dreams in act two, for Hoagwood, invokes “a prophetic common- 
place” that has its provenance in the Book of Daniel (158).  Shelley remakes this 
commonplace, however, to accord with his poem’s presentation of Love as both the 
interconnectedness of all life and a transformative agent in human history.  In act two, 
Panthea comes to Asia to tell her “great Sister” (the two women, as well as Ione, are 
Oceanides) (II.i.35) a dream she has had in which Prometheus appeared, free and 
enveloped in light.  Panthea recounts:  “I saw not—heard not—moved not—only felt 
/ His presence flow and mingle through my blood / Till it became his life and his 
grew mine” (II.i.79-82).  After Panthea relates this first dream, Asia sees a second, 
forgotten dream in her sister’s eyes; the Dream itself then speaks, encouraging the 
women to “follow, follow” (II.i.131).    
     The precise content of Panthea’s two dreams is less interesting in the context of 
Shelley’s visionary poetics than the method of the dreams’ transmission.  “In the 
dream that Panthea can remember,” Donald H. Reiman observes, “Prometheus’ soul 
[has] merged into Panthea’s” (58).  Through this night-vision, Earth’s son and the 
ocean’s daughter are one.  Asia then shares this first dream, as well as its forgotten 
counterpart, through a communion enacted at the level of bodily vision.  Such 
interaction suggests more than familial sympathy between the two sisters.  Rather, 
Asia, with her sister and her beloved, becomes a part of “the One Mind,” the “Being, 
or Life” with which, according to Earl Wasserman, “Prometheus is identical” (143).  
As a foreshadowing of the future spiritual unity among all living beings, this joining 
of souls through Panthea’s dreams revives human community, liberty, and love.   
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     As he did with the Venus symbol, Shelley reconfigures the prophetic dream 
convention to serve his poem’s particular aims.  In this respect, Shelley shows less 
interest in using this convention to establish continuity with scriptural, medieval, or 
Renaissance precedents than to depict the ideal end of his reformist vision. Panthea’s 
two dreams, like Asia’s experience of the Morning Star’s brightening and dimming, 
foretell the future state of perfection while at the same time revealing that human 
perfectibility is a chimerical notion unless the present world is first remade through 
Love.  Thus Shelley’s use of dreams, in terms of its allusiveness, suggests a closer 
engagement with Byron, who in his dream-poem, “Darkness” (1816), depicts a global 
cataclysm, than with Daniel, Chaucer, Milton, or even the Lake Poet Coleridge, 
whose struggled throughout his career to understand both the imaginative and 
medical implications of dreaming, as Jennifer Ford has shown.20    
     If he seeks to counter the nightmare of “Darkness” through Panthea’s hopeful 
dreams, Shelley responds also, as Sperry notes (100), to Byron’s Manfred (1817) by 
shifting the action from Asia’s vale to the lair of Demogorgon, an oracle to whom the 
Dream calls the two sisters.  Asia and Panthea follow to the very threshold of 
Demogorgon’s Cave, located on “a Pinnacle of Rock among Mountains” (II.iii.s.d.) 
that evokes “the Summit of the Jungfrau Mountain” (Manfred II.iii.s.d.) on which act 
two, scene three of Byron’s dramatic poem takes place.21   In Shelley, the pinnacle 
astonishes Asia with its pristine beauty and benevolent grandeur, inspiring her to 
praise Nature’s splendor against the “savage sea” (M II.iii.4), “rugged breakers” (M 
II.iii.6), and “dead whirlpool’s image” (M II.iii.8) of Byron’s Alps.  “How glorious  
79 
art thou, Earth,” Asia rejoices (II.iii.12), adding, “I could fall down and worship [. . .] 
thee” (II.iii.16).   
     Through her impassioned outburst, Asia makes a sovereign of Nature, thereby 
committing a grave mistake that, in Sperry’s view, the poet was swift to guard 
against:  “Shelley was always aware of the human tendency to anthropomorphize and 
worship the power behind the natural universe and its eternal process of creation and 
destroying” (99-100).  Asia’s error, in other words, is to substitute one sort of 
monarch with another; by imaging herself as Nature’s subject, Asia simply replaces 
Jupiter with Nature in a relationship that recycles the king/subject historical dynamic 
from which Prometheus seeks to free the world.  Like Prometheus’s own change after 
recanting his curse, Asia’s renewal is gradual and imperfect.  Thus Sperry 
acknowledges that, before her first speech in the scene concludes, “Asia refuses to 
bow down and adore a might that, for all its sublimity, she recognizes as inhuman and 
amoral” (100).  Rather, she realizes that all sovereign powers are susceptible to 
reformative pressures, as in the case of “the sun-awakened avalanche!  whose mass 
          Thrice sifted by the storm, had gathered there 
          Flake after flake, in Heaven-defying minds 
          As thought by thought is piled, till some great truth 
          Is loosened, and the nations echo round 
          Shaken to their roots:  as do the mountains now.  (II.iii.36-42) 
     This epiphany better prepares the two sisters for their audience with the oracle in 
the forthcoming scene.  Also, the avalanche metaphor challenges Melynda Nuss’s  
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recent claim that, in Shelley’s work, the world’s transformation “just happens, 
without any need for any sort of human agency that would dirty the hands of 
[Shelley’s] peaceful and nonviolent heroes” (420).  The passage I have quoted 
demonstrates that reformation, as Shelley conceives it, is the work of human 
communities striving for freedom and solidarity, often over the course of great spans 
of time (consider that, in Prometheus Unbound, the world’s liberation is thirty 
centuries in coming).  If humankind is indeed perfectible through Love, and such 
perfectibility may be facilitated by prophecy, then the process of change must follow 
an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary course.  The sisters’ encounter with 
Demogorgon reveals, against Nuss’s view, the great difficulties facing those who 
labor to bring forth the state of human perfection as Shelley imagines it in his lyrical 
drama. 
     Demogorgon’s part is to trouble Asia and Panthea’s thoughts and unsettle the 
women’s imaginations; the burden of interpretation lies with the oracle’s auditors. 
Purposefully cryptic, Demogorgon responds to Asia’s questions—only the last of 
which (II.iv.128) concerns the future—in order to enlighten the sisters beyond the 
level of simple declarative knowledge.  The ancient being frustrates the women’s 
search for truth because he knows—and the sisters must discover—that truth lies 
within the human heart, rather than within an oracle’s sanctuary.  Thus Sperry is 
correct to assert that the “pointlessness” of this exchange “is Shelley’s point” (101), 
as Dawson is right to note that “Demogorgon can only tell Asia what she already 
knows” (117).  Pilgrims before a strange and powerful intelligence, Panthea and Asia  
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receive from Demogorgon the transforming insight that “all things are subject but 
eternal Love” (II.iv.120), a revelation that helps the two women to move forward in 
the process of renewal. 
     The Demogorgon figure represents the third major reconstitution of the visionary 
poetics tradition that Shelley undertakes in the poem’s second act.  Shelley recasts 
Demogorgon, who in Spenser and Milton is a terrifying primal deity, as both 
“Eternity” (III.i.52) and Jupiter’s own son (III.i.54) and usurper.22   This complex 
redefinition falls in line with Shelley’s effort to remake the conventions and 
commonplaces of English prophetic literature to fit a new vision of reform guided by 
Love.  As Love begins to free the men and women of the poem’s world, these people 
must come to terms with how the future relates to the present and the past.  
Demogorgon challenges Asia and Panthea, who are here humankind’s 
representatives, to understand how human history reflects the eternal truths which 
Love reveals.  Demogorgon provides the women with the knowledge they require in 
order to comprehend Love’s historical reality.  Asia and Panthea, in their turn, must 
transform themselves in light of what Demogorgon, albeit cryptically, imparts to 
them.  Shelley thus refashions the mythic character to perform an important role in 
Love’s renovation of humankind.  On this count, Shelley resembles Coleridge circa 
1820, since, as Mary Anne Perkins argues, the Lake Poet at this time held that “the 
re-creative imagination of the present” must engage “the creative imagination of the 
past” to forge “a vision for the future” (189).   Shelley follows Coleridge’s tenet in his 
revision of the Demogorgon myth. 
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     The sisters’ intellectual and spiritual progress is represented by the continuation of 
their journey through worldly space and time.  With a spirit who identifies himself as 
“the shadow of a destiny” (II.iv.146), Asia and Panthea depart Demogorgon’s realm 
on a chariot drawn by “coursers” (II.iv.163) that subsist on lightning, “drink of the 
whirlwind’s stream” (II.iv.164), and “bathe in the fresh sunbeam” (II.iv.166).  In this 
series of images, a life-affirming picture of Nature supersedes the frozen waste land 
of the first act.  Correspondingly, Asia undergoes a positive metamorphosis; Panthea 
marvels: 
          How changed thou art!  I dare not look on thee; 
          I feel, but see thee not.  I scarce endure  
          The radiance of thy beauty.  Some good change  
          Is working in the elements which suffer 
          Thy presence thus unveiled.  (II.v.16-20) 
A new day arrives; nevertheless, as Hoagwood reminds us, “the fallen world” is 
“redeemed, not replaced” as act two closes (170).  The renovation of history through 
vision is forthcoming but as yet incomplete:  Jupiter still reigns, and Prometheus 
remains a prisoner in the icy ravine.  The poem’s third act further depicts Love’s 
reformative power and historical agency by way of the Olympian’s dethronement and 
the Titan’s liberation. 
* * * 
     The penultimate act of Prometheus Unbound depicts, in fairly quick succession, 
the fall of Jupiter, Prometheus’s release by Hercules, and the reunion of Prometheus  
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and Asia.  Essentially, the last vestiges of Jupiter’s ancien régime vanish as the new 
world comes into being.  For Timothy Webb, the major incidents of act three have 
less to do with actual patterns of political change than with Prometheus’s change of 
heart:  “When hatred has been rejected,” Webb asserts, “and the vacuum filled by 
love [. . .], Jupiter necessarily falls” (148).  The monarch’s fate, in Webb’s view, has 
its provenance in the question Shelley poses to conclude “Mont Blanc” (1817):  “And 
what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, / If to the human mind’s imaginings / 
Silence and solitude were vacancy?” (142-44).23   With these verses in mind, Webb 
frames the collapse of Olympian rule within the context of the new Promethean mind:  
“If man can populate the universe with the divinities he imagines to himself, he also 
has the power to recall those images and demythologise them” (148).   
     Such an analysis risks the conclusion that the poem’s drama begins and ends in 
Prometheus’s moral and intellective transformation.  If we consider all conflicts 
resolved by the middle of the piece, we neglect the basic fact that “Prometheus 
Unbound is not merely a poem, it is a drama” (Curran, Shelley’s Annus Mirabilis 42).  
To deny the work its claim to dramatic unity is to halve the poem, thereby inviting 
readings in which the vision of renewal begins where ancient hatreds end.  Although 
not theatrical after the fashion of a traditional stage play, Prometheus Unbound 
nevertheless features conflicts, tensions, and structural cohesiveness, all of which 
suggest that the process of reformative transformation—the very heart of the poem’s 
drama—continues well after Asia’s beatification and Demogorgan’s bloodless 
victory.  If act three were simply a sequence of incidents demonstrating a radical shift 
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from a totalitarian state to utopia, then Shelley would merely be creating an 
imaginative reversal of the historical pattern set by the French Revolution as it moved 
from libertarian idealism and democratic ardor to Robespierre, the Septembriseurs, 
and Napoleon. 
     At the same time, Shelley’s reader might understandably ask how three thousand 
years of despotism could close within the scope of fewer than three hundred verses.  
Whether we consider the old state’s last gasps or the new world’s first moments, we 
face important questions regarding Shelley’s dramaturgy of vision.  Are the poem’s 
principal conflicts fully resolved in act three?  And if so, does Shelley imply that 
history loses all meaning with the emergence of a golden age in which human 
perfectibility is realized? 
     The key to making sense of Shelley’s dramatic technique in act three is to 
recognize that the poet strives, here and throughout the work, to remake visionary 
poetics as a way of mirroring the individual, social, political, and natural 
transformations he depicts.  That is to say, Shelley recasts various hallmarks of 
literary prophecy to suit them to his individual vision, as we see in his authorial 
experimentation in act two with Venus, Panthea’s two dreams, and Demogorgon.  In 
the poem, the particular vision in question involves Love as a reforming power that 
fosters human perfectibility.  Shelley refits literary conventions to accommodate this 
unique vision, and his reworking of tradition encompasses the genre of drama as well 
as the genre of poetry.  Shelley thus does not do away with dramatic conflict; rather, 
he reinvents it to accord with an original artistic contribution. 
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     In the literature of the theatre, dramatic conflict provides structure, direction, 
energy, and meaning; through the resolution of conflict, growth and change become 
possible.  This principle was as familiar to the ancient Greek and Roman playwrights 
as it is to contemporary dramatists such as Brian Friel, Marie Jones, and Alan 
Bennett.  Shelley too understood both the nature and the power of literary conflict 
(consider, for example, the tragic conflicts of his play The Cenci, which, unlike 
Prometheus, was written with stage performance in mind).24   To suggest, then, that 
Shelley’s third act serves simply as a coda to the first two acts or an overture to the 
fourth seriously misrepresents the fact that the poem continues to employ the 
technique—and thus achieve the outcomes—of traditional dramatic conflict.  But 
Shelley also tailors generic aesthetic standards to his visionary ideals.  Scrivener 
writes to this point by claiming that Shelley, in his “anarchist poem” (174), must 
“create images and dramatic actions that embody authentically Promethean values” 
(175).  This task, as Scrivener describes it, requires Shelley the lyrical dramatist to 
intermediate between the known and the unknown.  The third act of Prometheus 
Unbound, especially after scene one, represents Shelley’s efforts to strike an 
imaginative balance between radical innovation and literary common sense. 
     After Jupiter is deposed, the poem turns to the question of the development of a 
new social reality under Love’s auspices.  Shelley often aligns his artistic tenets with 
his social theories, as he does in “A Defence of Poetry” (1821; published 1840), an 
essay containing his most important statements on literary prophecy.  “The social 
sympathies,” Shelley writes, “begin to develope themselves from the moment that   
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two human beings coexist; the future is contained within the present as the plant 
within the seed; and equality, diversity, unity, contrast, mutual dependence become 
the principles alone capable of affording the motives according to which the will of a 
social being is determined to action [. . .] and constitute pleasure in sensation, virtue 
in sentiment, beauty in art, truth in reasoning, and love in intercourse of the kind” 
(“Defence” 511).25   Shelley here expresses his belief that human social relations 
inherently involve both the nucleus of human perfectibility and the interconnectivity 
that he associates with his principle of Love.  Moreover, art and artists from the first 
play a part in the development of human communities over historical time:  “In the 
infancy of society every author is necessarily a poet, because language itself is poetry; 
and to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word the good which 
exists in the relation, subsisting, first between existence and perception, and secondly 
between perception and expression” (512).   
     These statements help to elucidate the principal conflicts of the third act, insofar as 
these conflicts reflect Shelley’s thinking on the relationship between social history 
and the poetical imagination.  Two incidents in act three dramatize this relationship.  
Few Shelley critics discuss the first; conversely, the second is one of the poem’s best 
known episodes.  Let us begin with the latter of the two.  This incident involves 
Prometheus’s reunion with Asia, at which point Prometheus articulates his wish to 
withdraw with her to a halcyon cave, “paved with veined emerald” (III.iii.13) and in 
the midst of a vernal alpine forest (III.iii.10-21).  Prometheus promises Asia that, in 
this “simple dwelling, which shall be our own” (III.iii.22), the two shall make a  
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new life together:  “we will sit and talk of time and change / As the world ebbs and 
flows, ourselves unchanged” (III.iii.23-24).  In this sanctuary, Prometheus and Asia 
shall pursue artistic creativity (III.iii.49-63) as a way to celebrate Love’s generative 
and liberating power.  Microcosmically, the scene establishes the beginning of Love’s 
new social order and promotes the significance of all the arts, but especially poetry 
(III.iii.54-56), to the success of a nascent world.26   
     The incident preceding the lovers’ reunion, however, receives far less commentary 
from Shelley critics; typically, this moment in the poem is viewed as a flat 
interpolation between Jupiter’s fall and Prometheus’s emancipation.  Yet the second 
scene of act three, during which the deities Apollo and Ocean discuss their fates in the 
post-Olympian scheme of things, presents an important picture of historical 
continuity between the old and new worlds.  The episode also illustrates how Shelley 
depicts conflict in the poem after Jupiter, the principal antagonist, is overthrown.  
     In this brief scene, Apollo and Ocean respond hopefully to the change in power; 
Ocean, in fact, foresees freedom and peace on the seas, thereby evoking, as Kenneth 
Neill Cameron suggests, recent memories of the Battle of Trafalgar and other nautical 
engagements between England and France during the Napoleonic Wars (Shelley:  
The Golden Years 531).  Ocean frames his thoughts as a prophecy:  “Henceforth the 
fields of Heaven-reflecting sea / Which are my realm, will heave, unstain’d with 
blood / Beneath the uplifting winds” (III.ii.18-20).  Once the site of atrocious 
bloodshed, the seas soon “will flow / Round many-peopled continents and round / 
Fortunate isles” (III.ii.21-23).  The Morning Star—in act two a symbol of in- 
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determinacy—now emblematizes Nature’s constant benefaction (III.ii.25-28) as the 
world’s populations are united by peaceful sea-travel.  Thus Venus, accompanied by 
“the light-laden moon” (III.ii.26), unfailingly guides human beings, who sail without 
“blood and groans / And desolation, and the mingled voice / Of slavery and 
command” (III.ii.29-31).  Such a prophecy bears obvious relevance for early 
nineteenth-century England, a slave trade nation (until 1833)27 whose “naval 
supremacy was never challenged after 1805,” the year of Admiral Horatio Nelson’s 
victory at Trafalgar (Harvie 435).          
     Shelley thus recasts, by way of the Promethean renovatio mundi, the scope and 
nature of dramatic conflict to accord with both visionary tradition and his sense of his 
own times.28  Prophecy’s dramatic tenor, as Wittreich shows (with reference to 
Joseph Mede, Thomas Goodwin, and David Pareus), is established by the Book of 
Revelation:  “The whole drama of cosmic conflict is played out on the stage of John’s 
prophecy; and that stage, first in the prophet’s mind, is shifted into the mind of the 
reader.  Thus what Coleridge once said of The Faerie Queene, that its domain is 
neither history nor geography but mental space, is true of all prophecy” (VP 40).  
Wittreich further elaborates that “John’s prophecy is not dramatic in the usual sense 
of showing characters in conflict with one another; rather, according to Goodwin, its 
drama is internalized, presenting a ‘true portrait of the Holy Ghost’s mind’” (VP 
40).29    Whether in the Christian perspective of John of Patmos and Goodwin or in 
Shelley’s atheistic view, prophetic conflict is less individual characters clashing— 
Clytemnestra against Agamemnon, Hamlet against King Claudius, Victor 
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Frankenstein against his Creature30—than the clashing of historical moments both in 
the world and in the human heart.31   
     As Ocean’s prophecy suggests, humankind shall now battle that which threatens 
the all-embracing vision of dignity and peace that Love engenders; in other words, 
conflict becomes interiorized, and all rule becomes the rule over one’s self, a moral 
self-discipline that, for Dawson, reflects Shelley’s idea of harmony in Love (130-31).  
Human perfectibility in a real-world future state is possible, but only through 
individuals’ unwavering dedication to the gradual reform of their own minds and 
souls.  Shelley presents this ideal with an eye to both prophetic precedents, such as 
Revelation, and the historical particulars of post-war England, now a Great Power and 
key member of the Concert of Europe (Breunig 121).  By the time Shelley published 
his poem in August 1820, the Spa Fields Riot (1816), the death of Princess Charlotte 
(1817), the Peterloo Massacre (1819), and the passage of the Six Acts (December 
1819 and January 1820) had created political and social instability throughout 
England.32   On the continent, where the expatriated Shelleys were living, the year 
1820 saw uprisings in Spain, Naples, and Sardinia (Breunig 138-140).  The post-
Napoleonic moment, marred by unrest, violence, and governmental repression, posed 
serious obstacles for the vision Shelley articulates in Prometheus Unbound.   
     Shelley thus invokes prophetic precedents in his lyrical drama with a sure sense of 
the contemporary historical realities surrounding the poem’s composition.  In this 
respect, the piece’s dramatic conflict is clarified both by visionary conventions, such 
as Wittreich describes, and by the post-war scene in England and on the continent.   
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Consequently, the two questions asked earlier in the section may be answered 
together:  act three eliminates neither dramatic conflict nor history because, after 
Jupiter’s fall, the poem turns toward the new conflict between human perfectibility 
and historical actuality as that conflict plays out in both the intellectual and socio-
political realms.   
* * * 
     Like the first, the fourth act of Prometheus Unbound comprises a single scene; the 
closing act, however, is two hundred and fifty-five lines shorter than act one, has very 
little plot to recount, and does not feature Prometheus at all.  Written in autumn 1819, 
well after Shelley completed work on the rest of the poem, the fourth act—perhaps 
best described as a composite song of individual and choral voices sung in the forest 
beyond Prometheus and Asia’s retreat—is closer to Blake’s prophecies (which 
Shelley probably never read) than to most of the major works of Byron, Mary 
Shelley, or Keats.33   
     The poem’s concluding act, according to Hoagwood, replaces “the sequence of 
time” with a “sequence of perspectives” (171), thus bringing the poem as a whole into 
line with the literary prophetic tradition originating in scripture, especially Revelation 
(171).  The importance of multiple and changeable perspectives also suggests, in 
Hoagwood’s view, a similarity between Shelley’s poem and the radical writings of 
authors such as Godwin and Robert Owen, whose 1813 piece, A New View of 
Society, Hoagwood claims, evinces a clear “concern with perspective—a new view 
precedes and precipitates a new social order” (173).  
91 
     Hoagwood’s reference to Romantic-era radicalism evokes early nineteenth-century 
Utopian Socialism and figures such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and, of 
course, Owen himself, all of whom held beliefs that Karl Marx later deemed 
“excessively abstract, not sufficiently grounded in the facts of history,” as Charles 
Breunig writes (175).34   Several British Romantic authors took interest in utopian 
schemes and ideologies.  Coleridge and Southey, for example, sought (and failed) in 
the mid-1790s to create a Pantisocracy, that is, an ideal egalitarian community, on the 
Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania.35   In a book-length study, Nicholas M. Williams 
treats the utopian elements of William Blake’s verse.36   And Shelley’s poetic vision 
of  human perfectibility arguably gestures toward Victorian-era socialist utopias such 
as one finds in Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1887) and William Morris’s 
News from Nowhere (1890).   
     The Romanticist who views Shelley and his work in light of later developments in 
nineteenth-century political and social philosophy of course risks superimposing an 
artificial structure on the past, an analytical error that troubled many Romantic-era 
intellectuals, Coleridge particularly (Perkins 183).37   We may note, with Jean-Paul 
Sartre, “that the historian is himself historical” (643).  By seeing Shelley as a 
Romantic prototype of social reformists such as Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, 
or by reading the renovated world of Prometheus as a blueprint for Bellamy’s Boston 
or Morris’s London, one perhaps assigns a role to the poet and a value to his text 
retrospectively, therefore neglecting the distinctiveness of the man, his work, and his 
historical moment.38 
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     At the same time, by juxtaposing Shelley and Owen, Hoagwood invites us to 
consider whether the fourth act of Prometheus Unbound offers a utopian vision.   To 
address this question, we may begin by recalling, with Susan Bruce, that Thomas 
More’s Utopia (1516), being the principal English source of the word and concept, is 
a notoriously indecisive work; the very name of the island commonwealth, for 
example, is in part a jest, a pun on the Greek that translates into “no-place” (xxi).  She 
deems the work “a tissue of paradox and contradiction” (xix) that promotes, “even to 
its last lines, an ambivalence which it never resolves” (xxv); this indeterminacy is so 
pronounced that some interpreters find the piece to be “a vision of an ideal Catholic 
society” while other analysts “see it as a proto-Communist text” (xix).  Furthermore, 
the two books of Utopia frustrate a conclusive understanding of the work; we are 
never quite sure which island, England or Utopia, More wishes to praise or damn 
(Bruce xix).  In sum, the work from the first creates “an April Fool atmosphere” 
(Turner 22) which imparts ambiguity and irony to any subsequent applications of the 
terms utopia, utopian, and utopianism in critical discussion.  
     By prophesying an ideal future or otherworld, Shelley may appear to anticipate 
Utopian Socialist thinking (or Marxist socialism, as Eleanor Marx, Karl Marx’s 
daughter, argued in an 1888 essay).39    But Shelley, as Reiman reminds us, “was a 
philosophical anarchist rather than a socialist” (“Shelley and the Human Condition” 
6).  Reiman claims that a privileged childhood in rural Sussex inculcated in the youth 
a hatred for both conformity and violence, especially within social relationships 
(intensified by his experiences at Eton and Oxford) (5).  The works of Godwin and  
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Condorcet inspired Shelley to champion gradualist reformism over revolutionary 
upheaval as a corrective for social and political wrongs.  Reiman thus casts the 
mature Shelley as a radical social reformer whose anti-monarchism, atheism, and 
liberal economic theories reflect the poet’s lifelong belief in a continuing process of 
universal social amelioration:  “Ultimately, he foresaw a democracy that would give 
each person one vote in the political process, but this was to be achieved over a series 
of stages, as a growing economic equality gave the poorer classes a stake in avoiding 
violent revolution and as improved education gave them a clearer sense of their own 
interests, so that they would resist manipulation by demagogues” (6). 
     Shelley’s reformist principles clarify his use of prophecy in Prometheus Unbound 
and are of salient importance to the social vision presented in act four.  For Shelley, 
poetry and prophecy help to remake a world whose history, as Behrendt notes, “is the 
record of the failure of love” (SHA 185).  The visionary imagination facilitates both 
the realization of human perfectibility within history and the recreation of all social 
relations through Love.  In this respect, Shelley shares much with Blake, who, in 
“There is No Natural Religion [b]” (1788), writes:  “If it were not for the Poetic or 
Prophetic character.  the Philosophic & Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all 
things & stand still, unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again” 
(3).40  Blake concludes:  “Therefore God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is” 
(3).  For Shelley and Blake alike, vision and prophecy, especially as expressed 
through art, moves human history forward by creating transformative energies and 
ideas.   
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     However, Shelley’s fourth act cannot properly be read as prophesying a 
proletarian Eden; the new Promethean world is not analogous to an ideal community 
after the fashion of Owen’s New Lanark experiment in the first years of the 
nineteenth century.  “My purpose,” Shelley writes, “has hitherto been simply to 
familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical 
readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware that until the mind can 
love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles of moral 
conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the unconscious passenger 
tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of his happiness” (“Preface” 
209).  Although he finds in Godwin and Condorcet both doctrinal and structural 
principles for his reformist vision, Shelley has not couched a utopian manifesto 
within his poem’s final act.  Rather, he brings together the poem’s characters, whether 
as voices or presences, to perform what amounts to a polyphonic encomium to Love 
and a rejuvenated humanity.  In this sense, act four celebrates a new social beginning, 
charged with utopian hopefulness, without proposing any systematic program for the 
actualization of a utopian state.     
     Shelley is in fact cautious to advocate neither a utopian republic nor an empire of 
Love.  Love may renew social relationships and create a world community—but not 
by means of revolution, bloodletting, or aggression.  Thus the central dramatic event 
of act four involves Demogorgon preventing a nascent expansionist desire on the part 
of the Spirits of the human mind.41   As a prophet of gradual reform, Shelley approves 
of a philosophical anarchism that may in time foster an ideal community or brother- 
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hood of man.  Nevertheless, as act four’s resolution makes clear, he declines to 
represent any sort of political plan whereby such a state may be realized.  “If conquest 
is to be repudiated,” Dawson points out, then “the desire for conquest must itself be 
conquered” because “regenerated man will have the scope for the absolute 
domination previously associated with Jupiter” (132).    
     Accordingly, Demogorgon, the representative of eternity, intercedes before 
utopian hopefulness develops into full-blown imperial ideology.  He convokes the 
various characters who appear throughout the act—including the sisters Ione and 
Panthea, Earth, Moon, the “Demons and Gods” (IV.529) who guide the celestial 
bodies, the “happy Dead” (IV.534), “elemental Genii” (IV.539), and the Spirits of 
earthly Nature—and declares that “Conquest is dragged captive through the Deep” 
(IV.556) because now 
          Love from its awful throne of patient power 
          In the wise heart, from the last giddy hour 
            Of dread endurance, from the slippery, steep, 
          And narrow verge of crag-like Agony, springs 
          And folds over the world its healing wings.  (IV.557-61) 
     Demogorgon offers “Gentleness, Virtue, Wisdom, and Endurance” (IV.562) as the 
guiding principles of the new social order and states that the citizens of a world 
renovated by Love are “to suffer” (IV.570), “to forgive” (IV.571), “to defy” (IV.572), 
“to love” (IV.573), and “to hope, till Hopes creates / From its own wreck the thing it 
contemplates” (IV.573-4).  He consecrates the pursuit of both an inward utopia of 
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moral self-rule and an outward utopia of peaceful and benevolent social relations.  In 
this sense, Demogorgon describes in his concluding speech the ethical, intellectual, 
and affective qualities necessary to actualize utopian hopes.  Demogorgon’s address 
thus constitutes a utopian social prophecy enfolded within the reformative prophecy 
of Love that is the poem itself.  We may therefore conclude that act four dramatizes 
the continuing process of renewal as that process is set into motion by the visionary 
imagination. 
* * * 
     In this discussion, I have sought to present a reading of Prometheus Unbound that 
stresses the distinctiveness and originality of Shelley’s prophetic stance.  Although he 
participates in the English tradition of visionary literature, and so adopts certain 
aesthetics in line with that tradition, Shelley modifies the legacy of British visionary 
poetics to accord with his poetical ideas, his gradualist reformism, and his special 
perspective on the post-Napoleonic historical moment.   
     At the same time, Shelley evokes through his visionary poetics the spirit of the 
older Romantic poet-prophets, especially Blake (although, as we know, Shelley’s 
evocation of Blake is decidedly coincidental).  Shelley, for example, writes that the 
seer-poet “beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to 
which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and 
his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time” (“Defence” 513).  
Shelley contends also that “a poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one” 
(“Defence” 513).  We may compare Shelley’s claims in “A Defence of Poetry” with 
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Blake’s in A Vision of the Last Judgment (1810):  “The Nature of Visionary Fancy or 
Imagination is very little Known & the Eternal nature & permanence of its ever 
Existent Images is considered as less permanent than the things of Vegetative & 
Generative Nature” (555).  For Blake, a poet-prophet is moved by “the daughters of 
Inspiration” (holy revelation) (554), rather than “the Daughters of Memory” (worldly 
history) (554), to revive eternal truths through imaginative production:  “The Nature 
of my Work is Visionary or Imaginative it is an Endeavour to Restore <what the 
Ancients calld> the Golden Age” (555).  
     As this comparison helps to illustrate, Shelley, for all his uniqueness, partly carries 
forward the spirit of the first generation Romantic visionaries, namely, Blake and the 
Lake Poets.  But if Shelley continues first generation visionary poetics into post-war 
Romantic literature, then Byron, Shelley’s contemporary, friend, and competitor, 
represents a point of discontinuation between the older Romantic seer-poets and their 
heirs.  In The Vision of Judgment (published 1822), Byron confronts the older 
Romantics, Southey particularly, through his ironic, materialist perspective on vision 
and its relationship with both poetry and history.  At the same time, Byron’s ongoing 
intellectual dialogue with Shelley during the late Regency years influences this 
confrontation in crucial and perhaps surprising ways.  Although Byron never 
acquiesces in his fellow poet’s visionary idealism or notion of an all-transforming 
Love, he responds to Shelley by writing a prophecy of compassion into his comic 
vision.                  
                
Chapter Three 
The Privilege of Southey’s Damnation: 
Visionary Poetry and the Devil’s Scripture in Lord Byron’s 
The Vision of Judgment 
 
“The past is nothing—and at last 
The future can be but the past” —Hugo, Parisina 304-51  
 
     After reigning almost sixty years, King George III died on 29 January, 1820.  In 
praise of the late monarch’s life and character, Robert Southey, England’s Poet 
Laureate, published A Vision of Judgment in April 1821.  The twelve-part poem, 
written in hexameters, depicts the speaker’s vision of George’s triumph over his 
accusers (parts IV-VII), beatification and entry into heaven (parts VII-VIII), and 
reunion with his wife, the late Queen Charlotte, and departed children, among whom 
the youngest, Princess Amelia (1783-1810) was the most famously mourned (part 
XII).2   Once in heaven, the king is welcomed by myriad figures from English history, 
including, in part IX, Geoffrey Chaucer, Thomas Cranmer, William Shakespeare, 
Edmund Spenser, Isaac Newton, and George Berkeley.  Surprisingly, John Milton too 
is present, but “of passion now as of blindness / Heal’d, and no longer here to Kings 
and to Hierarchs hostile” (478-79).  In this particularly British afterworld, Milton 
recovers both his sight, like the Apocryphal Tobit, and his political senses, like 
Southey himself, who started a Jacobin radical but became a Tory royalist.3         
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     Southey’s Vision, by virtue of its strained prosody and shallow historical 
revisionism (for not only is Milton now a monarchist, but George Washington speaks 
on the king’s behalf in part VI), receives a good deal of critical scorn from those 
Romanticists who bother to read it.  When Romanticists do discuss the piece, their 
point of interest almost invariably is the poem’s relation to Byron’s The Vision of 
Judgment (published October 1822), a brilliantly mirthful response to the Poet 
Laureate, who prefaced his Vision with an ad hominem attack of Byron as the 
principal representative of what Southey fancied the Satanic School of Poetry.4   
Although much has been written, and reasonably so, on the personal dimensions of 
the two poets’ public conflict, Romanticists have offered far less on the aesthetical 
disputes between Byron and Southey, especially as these disputes pertain to 
Romantic-era visionary poetics.  With respect to the English vatic tradition, Southey’s 
Vision would qualify as a false prophecy rendered by a false prophet; rather than a 
disruptive remaking of history, the poem is a politically-motivated manipulation of it, 
a conspicuous instance, as Peter W. Graham puts it, of “paid kowtowing to a 
repressive establishment” that sickened the “Popean gentleman-poet” Byron (68).   
     Byron’s quarrel with Southey yields far more than an amusing, satiric rejoinder to 
a poet whom Byron saw as an apostate and royal propagandist.  Byron’s contest with 
the erstwhile radical poet in fact contributes significantly to general changes in 
Romantic prophecy after Waterloo.  By counterstriking Southey’s poem through his 
decidedly materialist visionary poetics, Byron broadens the possibilities of visionary 
literature by testing the vatic technique’s capacity to accommodate unorthodox  
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political commentary and historical analysis.  Furthermore, he asserts the idea of 
history as a record of opposition rather than a principal foundation of the status quo 
for which Southey is a prominent, if at times absurd spokesman.  And, perhaps most 
startlingly, Byron finds in his battle with Southey an occasion for a poetical gesture of 
mercy toward both the Poet Laureate and the late sovereign, a concession that 
dignifies Byron’s poem and commends the piece over its chauvinistic Tory rival. 
* * * 
     In Tom Stoppard’s 1993 comedy Arcadia, the Coverly family’s private tutor—a 
charmingly rakish Trinity College man named Septimus Hodge—is challenged to a 
duel by a conceited poet, Ezra Chater, after Chater learns of his wife’s sexual 
intimacy with the young teacher.  Hodge cleverly mollifies Chater, and so avoids the 
threatened combat, by appealing to Chater’s vanity:  “There are no more than two or 
three poets of the first rank now living,” Hodge protests, with the literary culture of 
1809 England in mind, “and I will not shoot one of them dead over a perpendicular 
poke in a gazebo with a woman whose reputation could not be adequately defended 
with a platoon of musketry” (1.1).5   To sweeten this life-saving lie, Hodge claims 
that he “would say the same to Milton were he not already dead” (1.1); but, when a 
guardedly delighted Chater asks if Hodge would count Robert Southey also among 
the great living English poets, Hodge replies, “Southey I would have shot on sight” 
(1.1). 
     In Arcadia, Hodge condemns Southey because the former, a practiced amorist, 
hopes to flatter his way out of a sticky wicket.  Beyond the incidents of Stoppard’s  
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play, however, Hodge’s virulence toward Southey mirrors a long-standing critical 
take on this least-esteemed of the Lake Poets:  for most Romanticists, Southey is 
clownishly incompetent, a royalist hack whose verse is almost from the first as 
abominable as his politics in general became.  Moreover, this perspective has deep 
roots:  its history reaches back to Regency-era works such as Thomas Love Peacock’s 
Melincourt (1817) and the eighth of William Hazlitt’s Lectures on the English Poets 
(1818).   
     But it is Byron’s The Vision of Judgment that most thoroughly asserts the lastingly 
persuasive image of Southey as court poet and court jester all in one man, as 
Raymond Williams suggests (22).  This comical portrayal of Southey has proven so 
successful that many Romanticists transfer Byron’s irreverent merriment to their 
critical analyses of Southey’s poem.  Susan J. Wolfson, for example, writes that 
Southey “knocked himself out” in composing A Vision of Judgment (171).  In a 
similar vein, Edward T. Duffy contends that “the pretentiousness of Southey’s [poem] 
is immediately evident from its opening, where the poet laureate assimilates his 
sitting down to grind out a piece all but required of his position to:  a rush of 
Pentecostal spirit, Dante’s onset of vision at the beginning of the Commedia, and the 
bodily assumption of the Virgin into heaven.  Southey’s spiritlessly mechanical 
invocation of some of our more prestigious literary and spiritual signifiers stretches to 
absurdity Coleridge’s dictum that poetry should make evident in the symbols of time 
the translucence of eternity” (189).  Accordingly, Duffy claims that Southey’s “flight 
of vision” is in reality “a gaping abyss of the inappropriate and the absurd” (189). 
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     If many good Byron critics evoke the levity and sarcasm of Byron’s Vision at the 
expense of analytical impartiality, thus rendering Southey a caricature as ridiculous as 
Stoppard’s Chater, Williams helpfully reminds us, in Culture and Society:  1780-
1950, that “a caricature is not a life” (22).  “In his social thinking at least,” Williams 
argues, “Southey remains an influential if unacknowledged figure; and his approval 
of [Robert] Owen reminds us of the complexity of this difficult period.  Where 
[William] Cobbett sneered at Owen’s ‘parallelograms of paupers’, Southey, with very 
many of the new generation of English industrial workers, approved” (22).  Williams 
astutely cautions against oversimplifying either the individual Romantic poets or their 
shared historical moment, and this lesson has particular merit in the case of Byron 
and Southey’s literary war during the later Regency years.  Byron’s oppositional 
values, incisive wit, and poetic brilliance sway many Romanticists in ways that 
Southey’s loyalist sympathies, self-righteous solemnity, and limited talents never 
have.  At the same time, the seriousness of both the Lake Poet’s false prophecy and 
Byron’s counter-vision is lessened if, with Wolfson and Duffy, we see Southey as 
little more than a hopeless buffoon.  
     Of course, Byron’s own characterization of his conflicts with Southey partly 
contributes to the critical atmosphere that has long enveloped studies of the poets’ 
relationship.  For example, in a 12 January, 1822 letter to Sir Walter Scott, a man he 
warmly admired, Byron writes, “I’ll work the Laureate before I have done with 
him—as soon as I can master Billingsgate therefor.—I like a row” (BLJ 9.86).6   
After Southey published a heated attack on Byron in the Courier in January 1822,  
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Byron accelerated his efforts to publish the completed Vision while arranging to call 
the Poet Laureate to account, that is, to challenge him to a duel.7   In a letter to 
Douglas Kinnaird dated 6 February, 1822, Byron instructs Kinnaird “to print fifty 
copies” of the poem “at my expence” (BLJ 9.100) and, in a postscript, wonders 
whether Southey would appear for the duel and so justify Byron’s return to England 
(BLJ 9.101).  Kinnaird never delivered Byron’s letter of challenge.8    
     In an important sense, Southey was indeed Byron’s “dark double,” as McGann 
asserts.9  But in thinking about Byron as a Romantic visionary, it is perhaps helpful to 
consider that his conflicts with Southey—and, by extension, with the Cumbrian 
Romantics or so-called Lake School of Poetry—are too complicated to couch in terms 
of a Henry Jekyll-Edward Hyde opposition.  As the older Romantic poet who 
benefited most during Byron’s lifetime from his alignment with the Tory royalist 
establishment, Southey appears the proper and natural target for a poet who casts 
himself, in Don Juan, as having once been deemed “the grand Napoleon of the realm 
of rhyme” (XI.LV.440).  The open personal animosity between the young lord and 
the Poet Laureate simply adds a spice of drama to Byron’s ongoing quarrel with the 
Lake Poets’ political and aesthetic views.  Thus when he laughingly censures the 
Lakers as “the very Botany Bay of moral geography” (Don Juan III.XCIV.842), 
Byron has more than the older Romantic poets’ loyalist counterturn in mind, as 
McGann points out:  “Byron had heard Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare, he read 
the Biographia, he knew Wordsworth’s ‘Prefaces,’ and he was familiar with Keats’s 
early poetic manifesto ‘Sleep and Poetry,’ where Keats rashly attacked Byron’s  
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Augustan hero [namely, Alexander Pope].  He was, in short, thoroughly familiar with 
contemporary aesthetic theory, not only from his own reading, but from his frequent 
intercourse with persons like Hunt, Shelley, and Mme de Staël.  Consequently, when 
he singled out the Lakers for attack, he was going to the fountainhead of the new 
poetic theories as they were being advanced in England” (DJiC 107).10 
     For McGann, Byron came to fancy himself a Horace among Juvenals, that is to 
say, as a plain-speaking, flexible poet, honoring and honored by literary tradition, 
who wished to distinguish himself against the self-important, hypocritically high-
minded, and shallowly anti-traditional Lake Poets (DJiC 70-3).  Horace’s clarity and 
humanity provided Byron with a classical model whereby authorial truthfulness and 
accessibility were privileged to the sort of “assertiveness and bombast” (McGann, 
DJiC 71) Byron found in Southey, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, as well as in much of 
his own youthful verse, especially the Eastern Romances of 1812-1816.  By evoking 
Horace’s satiric techniques in his later works, Byron countervails the “Romantic 
stylistic revolution” undertaken by the Lake Poets:  “Byron attacked the pretensions 
of his age according to the terms and rules which that age had repudiated” in order “to 
show that Romanticism was in danger of losing when poets ‘systematically’ turned 
their backs upon past poetic traditions” (McGann, DJiC 73). 
     As Graham suggests, Byron found the “theory-based innovations tried out by the 
Lake poets” (68) especially distasteful.  This contention reflects the younger 
Romantic’s acrimony toward intellectual systems in general.  Because they restrict 
freethinking, foster inauthentic conformity, and typically benefit the few to the loss  
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of the many, Byron distrusts and indicts such systems, particularly with respect to the 
writing and reading of literature (although certainly Byron’s thinking on systems 
extends beyond questions of art into the realms of culture, politics, social relations, 
economics, theology, and morality).   What is more, Byron did not hesitate to 
condemn the literary systems of his peers as well as of his elders, a fact borne out by 
his November 1815 letter to Leigh Hunt:  “I have not time nor paper to attack your 
system—which ought to be done—were it only because it is a system—so by & bye—
have at you” (BLJ 4.332).  Although we may not wish to overstate this point, as 
Graham does by calling Byron “a declared foe to system in all forms” (67), we may 
nevertheless allow that Byron’s conflicts with Southey, and so with the Cumbrian 
Romantics as a whole, involve aesthetic as well as personal disagreements.  
     Byron’s complex relationship with the older Romantics is thus obscured by the 
commonplace and easily amplified critical paradigm in which Byron the witty 
Romantic genius silences Southey the insufferable oaf with a single text.  After 
teasing Scott in English Bards and Scotch Reviewers, Byron wrote cordially to this 
fellow countryman and author of The Lay of the Last Minstrel (1805) and Marmion 
(1808).11   In 1813, the young lord helped to bring Coleridge’s play, Remorse 
(formerly Osorio, 1797), to the Drury Lane stage.12  Moreover, Byron supported the 
Lake Poet financially during the Waterloo year, as he recounts to his publisher, John 
Murray, in an 11 September, 1822 letter concerning “Rogue Southey”:  “in 1815 Mr. 
[William] Sotheby wrote to me saying that Coleridge was in great distress [. . .] I 
immediately sent him one hundred pounds—being at a time—when I could not  
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command 150—in the world” (BLJ 9.206-7).   Byron’s words on Coleridge’s behalf 
persuaded Murray to publish “Kubla Khan” and “Christabel,” both older pieces, in 
1816 (Sibylline Leaves, a full volume, appeared in the following year).13   And, in the 
suppressed prose “Preface” to the first two cantos of Don Juan, Byron laments that 
Wordsworth, perhaps Southey’s best rival for the lord’s disesteem, “has long 
abandoned a mind capable of better things to the production of such trash as may 
support the reveries which he would reduce into a System of prosaic raving that is to 
supersede all that has hitherto by the best & wisest of our fathers [. . .] been deemed 
poetry” (qtd. in McGann, DJiC 71).   
     As his relationships with Scott and Coleridge demonstrate, Byron could be humble 
and generous; not all of his literary quarrels threatened to end in duels (even in 
Wordsworth’s case).  Yet “Rogue Southey,” at first glance, appears a different matter 
entirely, and not simply because of his vitriolic remarks against Byron or his political 
sycophancy.  Clearly, George’s heavenly reward disconcerts the Whig Byron—“for 
by many stories, / And true, we learn the angels all are Tories” Byron’s speaker quips 
(TVJ 26.207-8).14   Yet Southey’s more serious infraction pertains to his seer-poet 
pretensions and his countenancing of false prophecy for decidedly opportunistic ends.  
For Byron, the author of “Darkness” and “The Prophecy of Dante” (1819), Southey is 
a ravening wolf in sheep’s clothing (Matt. 7.15), who must not simply be mocked but 
also revealed and repudiated.        
     Southey’s unconscionable abuse of visionary poetics, moreover, is exacerbated by 
a selective glorification of history as a pattern thankfully yielding the Hanoverian  
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dynasty and British international hegemony.  In his poem, Southey casts George’s 
reign as uninterruptedly benevolent; any voice of opposition—Satan, John Wilkes, 
Junius, Washington—is either silenced or enlightened, as it were, through heaven’s 
divine altruism.  Even Milton, the arch-radical and apologist for regicide, atones for 
his former republicanism in Southey’s Celestial City.   Such conspicuously Tory 
chauvinism appears elsewhere in Southey’s Regency-era writing, for example, in The 
Poet’s Pilgrimage to Waterloo (1816), a piece in which Southey offers the battle “as a 
decisive event in a progressive and providential model of history,” as Simon 
Bainbridge notes (177).15   Whether he takes seriously such a view of history, 
Southey presents it as a matter of course in his work as Poet Laureate, and Byron, a 
contemporary oppositional voice, consistently provides counterexamples through his 
atheist, materialist perspective. 
      Southey envisions Waterloo as a historical confirmation of British royal power 
and loyalist ideology, as Bainbridge suggests (177).  Such a view contrasts sharply 
with Byron’s verses, from the third canto of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage (also 1816), 
on the Belgian countryside where Napoleon fell:   
          As the ground was before, thus let it be;— 
          How that red rain hath made the harvest grow! 
          And is this all the world has gained by thee, 
        Thou first and last of fields! king-making Victory? (17.150-53)16   
Has Napoleon “the Lion” (CHP III.19.169) been overcome simply so a new age of 
historical victims may genuflect on “servile knees to thrones” (CHP III.19.171)?   
108 
Byron’s questions cast Waterloo primarily as neither a military nor an ideological 
victory for England; rather, Byron stresses the persistent threat, emblematized by the 
site, that monarchial rule poses to human freedom, whether the liberty is intellectual 
or political in nature.   
     Furthermore, Byron allows that this threat, even in the wake of France’s defeat and 
the restoration of monarchies across Europe, may be counteracted through continuing 
resistance; thus Byron answers his own questions by writing, “No; prove before ye 
praise” (CHP III.19.171).  History, for Byron, is less a “Polybian cycle of rise and 
fall,” as Cian Duffy claims (160), than the chronicle of the struggle between long-
standing powers, like God or the world’s Crowns, and the opponents of these powers, 
like Prometheus, Cain, Alp, or Hugo, who represent the historical imperative for 
change but typically must fight from positions of dispossession, alienation, and 
disaffection.17   Although Byron writes that “History, with all her volumes vast, / 
Hath but one page” (CHP IV.108.968-9), we cannot, with Duffy, read this statement 
as hopelessly fatalistic (160); rather, we must realize that Byron asserts not merely the 
recurrence of tyranny but the relentless striving against it as well.  His oppositional 
sense of history thus puts Byron in direct conflict with Southey over both the topical 
question of Waterloo’s historical significance and the more general issue of what 
history actually is. 
     Byron indicts Southey’s historical outlook from the very moment that the demon 
Asmodeus (who shares his name with Sara’s tormentor in the Apocryphal Book of 
Tobit) brings the Lake Poet before Heaven’s gate in the Vision.  When the  
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Archangel Michael inquires after the living mortal’s identity, the devil, nearly 
breathless with exhaustion, replies: 
          ‘Confound the Renegado!  I have sprain’d 
              My left wing, he’s so heavy; one would think 
          Some of his works about his neck were chain’d. 
              But to the point:  while hovering o’er the brink 
          Of Skiddaw (where as usual it still rain’d), 
              I saw a taper, far below me, wink, 
          And stooping, caught this fellow at a libel— 
              No less on History than the Holy Bible.  (86.681-88) 
     “‘The former is the devil’s scripture,’” Asmodeus says, “the latter yours, good 
Michael; so the affair / Belongs to all of us, you understand’” (87.689-91). The 
demon, of course, has caught sight of Southey at work on A Vision of Judgment in 
his Keswick home near Mount Skiddaw (a mountain north of the town in the Lake 
District’s Northern Fells).  Southey’s presence in the poem at this point serves a 
twofold purpose beyond the obvious comic opportunities:  first, it allows Byron, 
through Asmodeus, to assert the worldly, material nature of human history; and 
second, it permits Byron to expose both Southey as a false prophet and A Vision of 
Judgment as deceitful.18  Thus Byron puts Southey’s mendacity on display almost at 
once:  the Lake Poet first offers to write a life of Sathan (Byron’s spelling), not to 
commemorate him as an oppositionist, but to flatter him for profit (99.785-92); when 
Sathan declines, he solicits the same commission of the Archangel (100.793-800).      
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     In part, Byron presents Southey’s weathervane performance to ridicule a poet 
whose disregard for historical reality emboldened him to recast Milton, a man who 
“equated monarchy with Antichrist” (Hill, Milton and the English Revolution 106), as 
a friend to the British Crown.19   Given Hill’s contention that “the one form of 
idolatry to which [Milton] was never tempted was king-worship, for that denied the 
dignity of man” (MER 179), Milton’s redemption in A Vision of Judgment evokes, 
for the contemporary reader, Winston Smith’s conversion at the close of George 
Orwell’s novel 1984 (1949) or young Alex’s cure in Anthony Burgess’s novella A 
Clockwork Orange (1962).  As Byron knows, Milton’s recovery in the Southey piece 
is a brazen authorial imposition rendered to harmonize the blind poet with the 
prevailing value system of late Regency England.  Moreover, the Lake Poet “also 
carefully omitted Dryden and Pope” from Heaven, as Claude M. Fuess points out 
(191).  In Byron’s eyes, Southey plays the part of a false prophet not by 
misrepresenting God’s everlasting truths but by twisting English cultural and literary 
history, that is to say, by blaspheming the devil’s scripture. 
     Accordingly, Byron strikes a visionary stance to countervail Southey’s self-
serving poetic contrivances and to contest the Laureate’s claim to vatic authority 
(perhaps explaining why Byron particularizes his poem’s title with a definite article).  
Byron pursues these aims in his Vision by applying satiric tropes to prophetic ends, 
that is to say, he crafts his vatic counterattack with an eye to literary satire’s 
conventions.  The interrelatedness of satire and prophecy, as Michael G. Cooke has 
argued, is a basic characteristic of much British Romantic poetry:  “satire [. . .] re- 
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quires prophecy to give voice to its own inner needs and concepts.  The world that 
satire cannot find prophecy makes” (15).  In the upcoming section, I discuss how 
Byron employs satire in The Vision of Judgment to enrich both his subversion of 
Southey’s poem and his subtle compassion toward his rival. 
* * * 
     In Dramatic Satire in the Age of Walpole, 1720-1750 (1976), Jean B. Kern asserts 
that literary satire is eclectic and thus somewhat difficult to define clearly (6):  
“Obviously satire borrows techniques—wit from comedy, irony from rhetoric, 
allegory from morality, invective and physical abuse from farce” (7).  In her study of 
stage satire in the first half of the eighteenth century, wherein she gives special 
attention to Henry Fielding, Kern offers the general point that all literary satire, 
essentially,  “is rational criticism of human conduct” (11).20   “The satirist does not 
concern himself with the irrational in nature,” she elaborates, “nor is he concerned 
with the cosmic ironies of history; he is concerned with the conduct of humans whom 
he perceives as rational but” who seldom behave so (11).  Consequently, “the folly of 
irrational behavior is constantly held up to the cold light of reason” (Kern 11) not for 
spite but for edification:  “Beneath the satirist’s attack on irrational behavior from 
men who are capable of knowing better lies the serious implication of human 
responsibility, although the satirist’s intention may be so masked by ridicule that his 
audience or readers do not immediately grasp the implication of what produced their 
laughter at the exposure of folly” (Kern 11-12).  Kern’s specifications helpfully frame 
the satiric tradition as Byron engaged it during England’s Regency period. 
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     Byron revered Pope and greatly admired Charles Churchill, whose Dover gravesite 
he visited before departing England permanently in April 1816; the Romantic poet 
was fascinated by both the history and the contemporary value of literary satire.21   Of 
course, both first and second wave Romantic poets experimented with this genre.  
Blake, for example, composed a satire, entitled An Island in the Moon (1785), that 
foreshadows later pieces such as The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1792).  Also, 
before Lyrical Ballads appeared in 1798, Wordsworth and Francis Wrangham worked 
together to write imitations of Juvenal (Liu 289).22    Furthermore, in late 1819, 
Shelley produced “Peter Bell the Third,” a satiric retelling of Wordsworth’s homiletic 
“Peter Bell” (also 1819).23   But in an age when satire was a tremendously popular 
vogue, as Gary Dyer shows in his book-length study of Romantic-era satire, Byron 
distinguished himself as the wittiest and most prolific satirist among the major British 
Romantic poets.24     
     Byron’s status as the principal Romantic satirist, however, distracts many fine 
Romanticists from recognizing that Byron is a visionary poet as well.  M. H. Abrams, 
for example, excludes Byron from Natural Supernaturalism “because in his greatest 
work he speaks with an ironic counter-voice and deliberately opens a satirical 
perspective on the vatic stance of his Romantic contemporaries” (13), a resolution 
that has drawn fire from critics such as Wittreich (“Prophecy” 53) and Jane Stabler 
(19).  Despite Wittreich and Stabler’s respective objections, Abrams’s perspective has 
proven lastingly influential in analyses of The Vision of Judgment.  Shirley Clay 
Scott, for one, follows Abrams by asserting that “Byron, by means of frequent ironic 
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allusions and pointed references to Paradise Lost, sets his poem against the pseudo-
visionary poetry of a poet like Southey and, more ambitiously, against the tradition of 
visionary poetry that derives from Milton” in an effort “to subvert the mythic impulse 
itself” (207) because “myth—any myth—deprives men and women of their flesh and 
blood potential to contend with the conditions of existence” (209).   
     Clay Scott’s emphasis on Byron’s materialist poetics, defensible as it is in part, 
creates a shallow impression of Byron’s complex poem and its discreet vision of 
mercy toward both Southey and the late king.  In fairness to both Clay Scott and 
Abrams, Byron himself encourages an uneven interpretation of his materialism vis-à-
vis his visionary perspective; writing in his 1821-1822 journal, Byron strikes a 
distinction between “men of the world” like Walter Scott and Thomas Moore and 
“visionaries out of it,” like Shelley (BLJ 9.30).  Nevertheless, we should realize that, 
if he at first sought in his Vision to cross swords with Southey specifically and the 
Lake Poets by extension, Byron ended by achieving a coup d’état in Romantic 
prophecy that enriches the genre without being uncritical of it.  Moreover, what 
Caroline Franklin writes of Byron’s “mythological drama,” Heaven and Earth 
(published January 1823), helps also to clarify the Vision because in both poems 
“Byron takes on the very materiality of humanity and demonstrates that nobility 
arises as a consequence of it, not despite it” (247).  Accordingly, we may better 
appreciate Byron’s intricate blending of satiric materialism and vatic idealism in The 
Vision of Judgment, a poem that invokes simultaneously both the English wit 
tradition of Dryden, Pope, and Churchill and the visionary legacy of Milton. 
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     If we accept that satire reveals and ridicules human folly and that prophecy creates 
visions of new and better worlds, then we may see how innovative Byron’s 
commingling of the wit and vatic traditions in the Vision actually is.  Byron, as we 
know, closed the tyrant-hater he begun:  shortly after the death of his daughter by 
Claire Clairmont in April 1822, Byron promised Douglas Kinnaird that “your present 
Public [. . .] shall not interrupt the march of mind—nor prevent me from telling the 
tyrants who are attempting to trample on all thought—that their thrones will yet be 
rocked to their foundation” (BLJ 9.152).  Yet the passionately anti-monarchical poet 
writes George III into heaven after the Archangel Michael and Sathan fail to resolve 
who has the right to the king’s soul.  Dyer, for one, holds the young lord less than 
charitable by so favoring the king, if indeed heaven is the royalist paradise Southey 
describes (91).  Nevertheless, Byron’s accommodative conclusion reflects a spirit of 
radical tolerance that appears throughout the piece and is rendered possible through 
the confluence of the satiric and visionary traditions.  Were the poem simply a 
burlesque of Southey modeled on classical, Augustan, and Italian sources, then 
Byron’s twofold show of compassion toward the king and the laureate (who falls 
from heaven back to Keswick rather than to the infernal regions) could not be realized 
as strikingly or as cogently. 
     The Vision of Judgment thus represents a composite of satire and prophecy that 
speaks not only to Southey but also to Shelley, whose direct influence on the poem 
registered his sharpening impatience with Southey and the Quarterly Review, as 
Charles E. Robinson notes (190-95).  By virtue of the ongoing dialogue between the 
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two younger Romantic poets, Byron responds to the Lake Poet with significant 
implicit reference to Shelley’s ideas and poetics.  If Shelley undertook Prometheus 
Unbound in part to counter what he perceived to be a fatalistic tendency in Byron, as 
Robinson claims (113), and so “replace the Byronic triumvirate of Heaven, Fate, and 
Hate with the principle of divine and liberating Love” (115), then we may view the 
Vision as a response in turn to Shelley’s notions of human perfectibility, gradualist 
reformation, and restorative Love as these are set forth in Shelley’s works.25   In 
short, Byron takes Shelley seriously without accepting his thoughts uncritically.  
Rather, Byron draws on Shelley’s prophetic idealism selectively, answering his 
friend’s challenge by re-imagining the ways in which poetic vision can realistically 
facilitate human change. 
     In the poem, Byron brackets out Shelley’s reformist alacrity and hopes for human 
perfectibility but engages closely his friend’s tenets regarding compassion and 
reconciliation.  Consequently, Byron’s intertextual conversation with Shelley 
contributes meaningfully to the poem’s less than scathing conclusion.  In the closing 
stanzas, George III finds his way into heaven, and Southey is shown the way back to 
Keswick; but Byron gives neither man over to the devil.  Byron rejects a cosmic 
revenge, at least partly because he sees in Shelley’s idealism a truth about human 
relations too intricate to be represented by his earlier Promethean vision and its 
rhetoric of absolute defiance.  Warren Stevenson asserts that “Byron refuses to damn 
the king, partly out of aristocratic good manners [. . .] and partly because he agrees 
with Blake (whom he had probably never read) that hell is a state of mind rather than  
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a place” (147).  For Stevenson, Byron’s resolve to “jettison damnation, whether of the 
Hellenic or Judaeo-Christian variety,” suggests intellectual maturity and “helps 
clarify Byron’s developing vision of a world restored” (147).  We may also note 
Martin Priestman, who contends that Byron, “for all his ‘Satanism’, [. . .] leaves the 
damning of others to the angelic party” (242). 
     Byron’s brilliant mirth and satiric facility perhaps prevent us from realizing that 
the poet shows mercy just when he has George III and Southey where one imagines 
that he wants them.  If we read the poem strictly as a satire, we may cite Horace’s 
mollifying influence as a way to clarify Byron’s leniency.  However, if we approach 
the piece as a purposeful intersection between satire and prophecy, then we may see 
that Byron strives, with Shelley’s prophetic idealism in mind, to renovate his world 
and times through an authorial benevolence toward a monarch and a poet he alike 
despised.26 
     Whatever the degree of Shelley’s implicit or explicit input, the lenity Byron shows 
his political and literary adversaries in the poem’s closing moments is not an 
afterthought; rather, Byron’s altruistic conclusion amplifies the work’s recurring 
stress on the positive value of interpersonal deference and public acts of mercy.  
Sathan and Michael, as they meet outside heaven, exemplify the former, whereas 
John Wilkes and Junius, as they provide testimony at the king’s trial, epitomize the 
latter.  In the following section, I discuss these characters and incidents in greater 
detail to demonstrate that Byron’s clemency toward his two principal foes is part of a 
fully developed vision rather than a textual anomaly.       
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* * * 
     Byron’s Sathan, as Clay Scott has pointed out, bears little conspicuous 
resemblance to his Miltonic predecessor:  “such moral ascendancy as Satan has in the 
poem derives from the fact that he has demystified himself and has trimmed his own 
ego in the knowledge that the evil in the cosmos is far too great to be of his making or 
subject to his control.  Byron’s Satan knows he is not Milton’s Satan—and that is his 
strength” (209).  Clay Scott submits that the Sathan of the Vision parts ways with the 
Satan of Paradise Lost principally in that the first eschews the cosmic hatreds and lust 
for vengeance which fire the mind of the second.  Byron’s rather mild Sathan is far 
removed from the saboteur of human happiness one finds in Milton’s visionary epic. 
     Much of the difference between Byron’s devil and Milton’s owes to the 
characters’ individual senses of purpose.  In Paradise Lost, Satan makes his objectives 
plain to Beëlzebub early in Book I: 
              Fall’n Cherub, to be weak is miserable 
          Doing or Suffering:  but of this be sure, 
          To do aught good never will be our task, 
          But ever to do ill our sole delight, 
          As being contrary to his high will 
          Whom we resist.  (I.157-62) 
Although fallen, Satan promises to continue the war with God, restoring hostilities at 
any cost.  His initial commitment to malevolence proves more than a moment of 
bravado, as his soliloquy early in Book IV bears out: 
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          So farewell Hope, and with Hope farewell Fear, 
          Farewell Remorse:  all Good to me is lost; 
          Evil be thou my Good; by thee at least 
          Divided Empire with Heav’n’s King I hold 
          By thee, and more than half perhaps will reign [. . .] (IV.108-12) 
Satan speaks these verses as he first sees Eden and “conscience wakes despair” 
(IV.23); thus renewed malice resolves his impassioned longing for heaven, stirred by 
the sight of the earthly paradise.  As these two moments illustrate, Satan carries 
within him the hell that is his thirst for revenge.  Lost in his obsession, he claims, 
“For never can true reconcilement grow / Where wounds of deadly hate have pierc’d 
so deep” (IV.98-9).   
     Little of this cosmic resentment drives Byron’s Sathan.  Rather, Sathan asserts his 
right to George’s soul through a process of litigation that relies upon rational public 
debate to settle disputes.  Certainly, Byron does not take the law’s part in a poem that 
casts a skeptical eye on political, social, and literary institutions; the Vision in fact 
lampoons the law and its practitioners by presenting a celestial court so disordered by 
Southey’s presence that George sneaks into heaven before a verdict is reached.  
Although it has much to say about tolerance and broad thinking, the poem does not 
acquiesce in what Mark L. Barr calls “the legal institutionalization of mercy” (362).  
Rather, Byron renders a picture of Romantic-era bureaucracy (a subject of which 
Regina Hewitt has written recently) (305) in order both to humble Sathan and to high- 
light the naturalness of human compassion vis-à-vis the law’s infernal machinery.27 
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     Byron indeed takes pains to cast his otherworld in what, to a Romantic-era 
audience, would have been an increasingly recognizable context of administration 
and official transaction; a point of Byron’s materialist critique is that heaven, where 
George’s eternal fate is to be decided, more closely resembles the Inns of Court or 
Parliament than the cosmos in which Paradise Lost takes place.  In his Vision, Byron 
provides a heaven scarcely more sublime than a banker’s office in Threadneedle 
Street.  The poem’s first moments, for example, present “six angels and twelve 
saints” who “act as a business-like Board of Clerks,” as Fuess notes (193).  In short, 
Byron dispels the respective mystiques of the scriptural and Miltonic visionary 
traditions in order to introduce a new interpretation of Satan and his literary milieu.                              
     By the same token, although to a lesser extent, the reader encounters in Sathan a 
re-imagined version of the relentlessly scornful, formidably unfunny Byronic hero, 
long familiar from Byron’s Childe Harold and Eastern romances, such as The Giaour 
and The Bride of Abydos (both 1813).  The Byronic hero—typically a proud, outcast 
aristocrat who carries with him some mysterious burden of guilt—influenced many 
authors across Europe in the decades following Byron’s death in 1824.  Emily 
Brontë’s Wuthering Heights and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (both 1847), for 
example, embody the Byronic hero in Heathcliff and Rochester, respectively.  The 
Russian author Aleksandr Pushkin borrows elements of the Byronic hero for the title 
character of his Eugene Onegin (1833); another Russian, Mikhail Lermontov, invokes 
the type through Pechorin, who appears in A Hero of Our Time (1840).28   Of course, 
Byron’s less somber works, especially Beppo (1818) and Don Juan, appealed to  
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writers like José de Espronceda, Stendhal, and Adam Mickiewicz, as Peter Cochran 
discusses; all the same, the Byronic hero enjoyed myriad international reincarnations 
in nineteenth-century literature.29 
     Yet by the time Byron produced The Vision of Judgment in late 1821, his haughty, 
alienated protagonist underwent significant transformations, as Sathan, in part a 
descendent of the Byronic hero, exemplifies.  In the “neutral space” (33.257 and 
35.273) where Michael first confronts “his former friend and future foe” (32.252) 
over the affair of George’s soul, the Enemy comports himself not simply with civility 
but with amity; before a word is spoken between angel and devil, “a mutual glance of 
great politeness” (35.280) is shared.  Whether this scene, as Stuart Peterfreund 
suggests, evokes the early Regency House of Lords, with Sathan and Michael 
representing Byron and Lord Eldon respectively, what strikes one immediately is the 
guarded yet unaffected politesse with which these otherworldly beings interact.30   
From the outset, this forbearance recasts the Byronic hero’s hauteur, as well as the 
overreaching ambitions of Milton’s fallen angel, by intimating not divisive passion 
but rather a quiet empathy which complicates the idea that an absolute enmity exists 
between the two beings. Thus when Michael and Sathan meet at the gates of heaven, 
“a high, immortal, proud regret” (32.253) is “in either’s eye, as if ‘twere less their 
will / Than destiny to make the eternal years / Their date of war, and their ‘Champ 
Clos’ the spheres” (32.254-6).   
     During this initial meeting outside heaven, Sathan, who by turns contradicts and 
amplifies elements of the Byronic hero, brings to mind Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage 
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III, in which Byron writes “that two, or one, are almost what they seem” (114.1065) 
and “that goodness is no name, and happiness no dream” (114.1066).  If Michael 
represents for Sathan a true friend and peer, Sathan fears, without saying as much, 
that the Archangel’s friendship is eternally inaccessible, for the devil stands, as does 
Harold, “alone,—remembered or forgot” (CHPIII 112.1048).  Thus “the Prince of 
Air” (39.305) evokes the Byronic hero’s conflicting impulses to both hope and 
despair.  In the Vision, however, Byron recasts this conflict within a visionary 
context, thereby allowing that the old inner battle may be resolved finally in favor of 
the obstinate hopefulness inherent in the Byronic hero’s psyche at least from the time 
of Childe Harold.  By showing an austere benevolence toward Michael, Sathan begins 
to resolve this internal turmoil and thus remakes his own spirit as well as the Miltonic 
and Byronic protagonists that he recapitulates. 
     Through Sathan and Michael, Byron offers a sophisticatedly nuanced approach to 
his characters, and this technique recurs in his depiction of John Wilkes and the 
enigmatic Junius.31   In life, both Wilkes, an anti-Bute member of Parliament, and 
Junius, an anonymous Whig letter writer, directly opposed George III; not 
surprisingly, both men draw Southey’s asperity in the sham trial scene of A Vision of 
Judgment.  But George’s “two shamefaced accusers,” as Fuess observes, have 
changes of heart when Byron transports them from Southey’s poem:  “Wilkes 
scornfully extends his forgiveness to the king, and Junius, while reiterating the truth 
of his original accusations, refuses to be enlisted as an incriminating witness” (194).  
Although not precisely writing what we today refer to as history from below, Byron  
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nevertheless anticipates the Annales school by allowing oppositionists like Wilkes 
and Junius to represent the past as something other than the story of the victors.  Even 
more basically, Byron refines his vision of compassion through Wilkes and Junius, 
both of whom, though summoned by Sathan to testify against the late king, break the 
law of retribution that Southey winks at in his poem.32  
     As a witness for the prosecution, Wilkes rationally and freely chooses mercy over 
revenge.  At Michael’s request, he speaks to the case at hand:  “‘Why,’ 
          Replied the Spirit, ‘since old scores are past, 
               Must I turn evidence?  In faith, not I.   
          Besides, I beat him hollow at the last, 
              With all his Lords and Commons:  in the sky 
          I don’t like ripping up old stories, since 
          His conduct was but natural in a prince. 
 
          ‘Foolish, no doubt, and wicked, to oppress 
              A poor unlucky devil without a shilling; 
          But then I blame the man himself much less 
              Than Bute and Grafton, and shall be unwilling 
          To see him punish’d here for their excess, 
              Since they were both damn’d long ago, and still in 
          Their place below; for me, I have forgiven, 
          And vote his “habeas corpus” into heaven.’  (70-1.554-568) 
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     Whether we take Wilkes at his word that George’s folly owed more to prime 
ministers like the Earl of Bute (who served May 1762 to April 1763) and the Duke of 
Grafton (who served October 1768 to January 1770) than to forthright personal 
malice, we may appreciate, with Clay Scott, that Wilkes becomes “the center of value 
in the poem” (211) by pardoning the king.33   Through his magnanimity (which 
incidentally startles the prosecution), Wilkes represents an ideal of compassion, as 
Clay Scott contends:  “Byron knows, with Blake, that mercy, or any other virtue that 
makes human life possible, has a human face” (212).34  Byron knows also that 
Wilkes’s forbearance strikes a telling counterexample to what we find in Southey’s 
royalist account of George’s all-too-happy life after death.  The Wilkes episode both 
amplifies the sober benevolence of Sathan’s first moments with Michael and 
foreshadows the redemptive qualities of the poem’s closing stanzas.   
     Like Wilkes, the cryptic Junius declines to help Sathan in the pursuit of the old 
monarch’s soul.  Junius maintains that his animosity for the king belongs to earthly 
history and so has little relevance in the afterworld:  “‘My charges upon record will 
outlast / The brass of both his epitaph and tomb’” (83.657-58).  With reference to 
Pontius Pilate’s well-known disavowal in the Gospel of Saint John (19.22), he adds, 
“‘What I have written, I have written:  let / The rest be on his head or mine” (84.665-
66).  Sathan’s second witness, like the first, fails to bring a conviction.  Both Wilkes 
and Junius thus refuse to participate in George’s damnation, not because they are 
now, like Southey’s Milton, fond of sovereigns, but rather because mercy, within the 
scope of the poem, proves the most advanced and self-assertive form of opposition.   
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That is to say, Byron posits human mercy as a source of special power over the darker 
aspects of one’s self; as Wilkes and Junius show, compassion allows one to overcome 
one’s hatreds and recriminations, not as Winston Smith finds a “victory over himself” 
(245) in Orwell, but rather as a visionary freely remakes his own heart as a step 
toward remaking humankind.  In this sense, mercy opposes that which is negative 
both in the self and in the world by revealing that true power lies in forgiveness rather 
than in coercion, persecution, or revenge. 
     Byron thus answers Shelley by recasting his contemporary’s visionary ideals 
within a more modest though no less meaningful context.  In the Vision, Byron 
argues for the value of mercy as a transformative quality in human relations, as 
Shelley does also in works such as Prometheus Unbound.   However, Byron shows a 
reluctance to follow his friend in asserting that a single act of mercy can wholly 
renovate material realities.  Although Wilkes and Junius, like Shelley’s Titan, 
discontinue a long-standing pattern of malignity toward a royal figure, their 
respective acts of compassion do not spark a grand reformation of heaven, hell, or 
earth.  The angels and devils still hold power in the otherworld, and George’s trial 
continues despite the hesitance of Sathan’s key witnesses to participate.  Byron agrees 
with Shelley that the spirit of mercy provides an ideological weapon against 
monarchical power, whether such power is earthly, heavenly, or hellish in nature; 
nevertheless, the two poets part ways over the question of mercy’s consequences in 
the material world.  Whereas Shelley foresees the possibility that one compassionate 
act can set into motion a global reformation, Byron presents human mercy as a type 
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of rational opposition that vexes hegemonic power structures without claiming that 
such resistance alone can undermine those structures and so transform the world.  
Accordingly, Byron offers a Romantic vision of mercy anchored in a practical, 
materialist perspective, a point of view that in turn reflects his intellectual inheritance 
from the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and writers such as David Hume 
and Adam Ferguson as well as his literary inheritance from Horace, Dryden, Pope, 
and Churchill.   
     Byron thus discounts neither Shelley nor the visionary tradition; rather, he 
approaches both through a skeptical rationalism drawn from eighteenth-century 
Scottish philosophy and English satire alike.  To put this point in Wittreich’s terms, 
Byron comes to the line of vision by way of the line of wit.  Consequently, The 
Vision of Judgment represents a crucial intersection of the two literary traditions.  In 
my concluding remarks, I wish to discuss this synthesis more fully and suggest how 
Byron’s poem, by hybridizing the two lines, contributes significantly to Romantic 
prophecy while preparing the way for Mary Shelley and John Keats to take Romantic 
prophecy apart. 
* * * 
        Byron’s pointedly topical poem, composed and published in the heat of battle 
with Southey, appears a somewhat anomalous addition to the corpus of Romantic 
visionary works.  Furthermore, Byron presents a perplexing case as a visionary poet 
because he approaches the visionary poetics tradition with expressly materialist 
concerns and a strong affinity for satire, a literary form belonging to the competing  
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wit legacy.  At a glance, Byron seems more closely affiliated with Dryden and Pope 
than Spenser and Milton, and a great many Byron critics advance this interpretation in 
their readings of The Vision of Judgment.  Edward T. Duffy, for example, likens the 
poem to Pope’s The Dunciad (1728), one of the great English satires (190).    
Moreover, Fuess sees Byron’s poem in dialogue with Dryden’s Absalom and 
Achitophel (1681) rather than Milton’s Paradise Lost and notes Byron’s fascination 
with “the mocking, grotesque, colloquial, and humorous manner of [Luigi] Pulci and 
[Giambattista] Casti” (199), a point taken up more recently by Peter Vassallo in his 
book on Byron’s Italian sources.35     
     Given his many successes with satire, one can understand to a degree why critics 
like Duffy and Fuess place Byron principally in what Wittreich terms the English line 
of wit.  At the same time, Byron’s contributions to Romantic prophetic literature, 
particularly as rendered by the Vision, merit closer scrutiny.  Byron’s poem, without 
question, is superb comedy; nevertheless, behind the poem’s humor is a vision of 
change that makes the piece something more than an exercise in Romantic travesty or 
mimesis.  No less than Dryden or Pope, Byron possesses a facility with classical 
forms and English neoclassical conventions.  Yet he also demonstrates a command of 
the visionary idiom and a pronounced understanding of prophecy’s subversive and 
revivifying potential.  Although within his element in either tradition, Byron, as 
author of the Vision, represents the focal point at which the two lines meet, and the 
poem itself stands at the cusp of these traditions.  Thus to compartmentalize the poet 
and his work as purely neo-Augustan in spirit risks blurring the fact that he creates,  
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through a distinctly materialist poetic, a vibrant new model for Romantic visionary 
literature.  
     As we have seen, Byron privileges Southey and the king alike by re-imagining 
damnation through a vision of mercy, an authorial act that is much more than simply 
noble and altruistic.  By challenging himself to forgive his adversaries in print, 
however subtly, Byron reveals a personality and imagination far more complicated 
than the critical caricature of him as a vitriolic, Anglophobic exile allows.   With 
stanzas 47, 48, and 49 of Beppo in mind, Richard Lansdown and Dosia Reichardt 
have asserted recently that “combative opposition was by no means all there was to 
Byron’s attitude to bourgeois, post-Napoleonic Europe” (70-1).36     
     Although he contested royal authoritarianism, Tory statecraft, and propagandist 
literature such as Southey’s Vision, Byron possessed too keen a mind to fight one sort 
of reaction with another and to answer hate with hate.  Rather, Byron adopts in the 
Vision a position which may be clarified with reference to Beth Lau’s description of 
the influential arguments offered by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759) and by William Hazlitt in An Essay on the Principles of Human Action 
(1805).  Lau notes the influence of Smith’s piece on Shelley and writes that Hazlitt 
“sought to refute Hobbes’s claim that human beings are inherently selfish by 
demonstrating that, in order to calculate their interests, people must project 
themselves into their own futures, and this ability to identify with one’s future self is 
the same imaginative act as that of identifying with other people.  According to 
Hazlitt, the tendency to enter into the perspectives of others, whether other people or 
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one’s future self, is one of the most common habits of the human mind, which 
therefore can be considered ‘naturally disinterested’ rather than inherently selfish” 
(91).37   Lau’s analysis, which she thereafter applies to her discussion of Negative 
Capability in John Keats and Jane Austen, casts light also on Byron’s compassion 
toward Southey and George, insofar as “the sympathetic imagination” (91) was an 
important intellectual concern of the poet’s times.  This fact too is missed if one reads 
The Vision of Judgment without considering the poem as a purposeful confluence of 
the wit and visionary traditions. 
     Byron’s materialist experimentations with the vatic literary mode, couched in a 
verse counterstrike against England’s Poet Laureate, yield an important and unique 
poem that is both remarkably funny and wholly serious.  If it shouts at Southey, this 
complex, innovative piece speaks in an aside to Shelley, whose influence, as I have 
asserted (by way of Robinson), helped to shape Byron’s thought and art from the time 
that the two poets met in 1816 (a favor, so to speak, that Byron granted Shelley as 
well).  Yet Byron’s Vision, for all its daring and literary sophistication, gestures not 
to the perpetuation of Shelley’s visionary poetics, which in itself carries forward the 
spirit of first generation Romantic prophecy, but rather to a decisive confrontation 
with the countervailing aesthetic articulated by Mary Shelley in her 1826 novel, The 
Last Man.  Although she composes and publishes the novel only after both Shelley 
and Byron had died, Mary Shelley challenges both of these writers by radicalizing 
Romantic prophecy and its historical bases.  Shelley thus subverts the subversive 
visions of both her husband and her friend through her late Romantic prose work.        
Chapter Four 
Time and the Sibyl in Mary Shelley’s 
The Last Man 
 
     Mary Shelley’s 1826 novel The Last Man, too often read as a prose séance 
couched in a roman a clef or as a mere catastrophe narrative, is rather a sophisticated 
product of post-Waterloo visionary poetics.  Shelley’s third published book, in fact, 
may be seen as the capstone achievement in Regency-era vatic literature.  In her late 
Romantic prophecy, Shelley to an extent continues the subversive projects enacted by 
her literary coterie in works such as Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound (1820) and 
Byron’s The Vision of Judgment (1822).  At the same time, Mary Shelley overtakes 
and surpasses her contemporaries by authoring a work that radically reconfigures the 
historical source of authority upon which the English prophetic tradition is founded, 
thereby uniquely revivifying the genre’s subversive and ameliorative possibilities.  
Specifically, Shelley restores the Sibyl, a prophetic figure from Western antiquity, as 
the principal authority in vatic Romantic literature.  In this reconfiguration, the 
visionary line originates not in patriarchal, Judeo-Christian history but in the 
matriarchal, pagan past. 
     Moreover, Shelley’s novel unsettles hierarchical, linear understandings of human 
temporality.  Her apocalyptic narrative presents history as founded indecisively on 
disrupted time, thus allowing Shelley great freedom to explore the literary, cultural, 
and political pasts through the Romantic prophetic lens.  Whether an expressly  
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Godwinian performance, as Pamela Clemit suggests (196), or a self-assertive quest 
for authorial identity “in a culture of mass, anonymous readership” (120), as 
Samantha Webb claims, Shelley’s disturbing novel brings together history and 
sibylline prophecy to take apart the specious first principles of culturally sanctioned 
belief systems.  To accomplish this subversive end, Shelley resuscitates the Sibyl, 
thereby provisionally recovering the sibylline feminine from the Mosaic patriarchal, 
as Wittreich contends (“Prophecy” 50).  Shelley engages Romantic prophecy for a 
twofold purpose:  first, to renew the younger Romantics’ visionary critique of the 
post-Napoleonic world; and second, to amplify that critique to encompass a new 
vision of human possibilities unfolding in the face of history. 
     In what follows, I discuss how Shelley, in her first novel after the deaths of her 
husband and Byron (1822 and 1824, respectively), assays the Romantic visionary 
tradition in order to assert that history, despite its myriad nightmares, is never 
foreordained; like humankind itself, history is flexible, unfixed, and changeable.  The 
chapter is divided into three sections:  the first part treats Shelley’s use of temporal 
distortions in The Last Man, a work comprising a cryptic frame narrative as well as 
Lionel Verney’s account of an annihilating plague; the second part examines 
Shelley’s use of the Sibyl as the origin of vatic authority; and the third part explores 
the crucial implications of Shelley’s radical experiment with Romantic prophecy. 
* * * 
     Mary Shelley’s The Last Man reaches a particularly poignant moment as Lionel 
Verney—soon to find that he is helplessly alone in a plague-savaged world—records 
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the movements of the last few English survivors (as a group, they have abandoned 
their dead island) across a depopulated continent: 
          We rambled through Romantic Switzerland; till, fear of continuing winter 
          leading us forward, the first days of October found us in the valley of La 
          Maurienne, which leads to Cenis.  I cannot explain the reluctance we felt at 
          leaving this land of mountains; perhaps it was, that we regarded the Alps as 
          boundaries between our former and future states of existence, and so clung 
          fondly to what of old we had loved.  (334)1   
     For Verney, Europe’s sovereign mountains figure tellingly both in landscape and 
in timescape, the latter collapsing and coalescing past, present, and future—history 
and time themselves—into a temporal state within which, to borrow Verney’s later 
remark, “each moment contain[s] eternity” (348).  The Alps emblematize a division, 
in the here and now of Verney’s narrative, between the post-monarchical English past 
(Verney’s story begins where the history of England’s royalty ends) and a stateless 
future. 
     That the Alps suggest to Verney a clear delimitation in the English refugees’ sense 
of their own history is unsurprising, given that he often describes temporal matters in 
spatial terms.  For example, as he and his fellow countrymen prepare to sail from 
Dover to Calais, Verney notes:  “Death had hunted us through the course of many 
months, even to the narrow strip of time on which we now stood; narrow indeed, and 
buffeted by storms, was our footway overhanging the great sea of calamity” (291).  
And long before Adrian, who is England’s Lord Protector, Verney’s closest friend,  
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and an avatar of Percy Shelley, arranges the survivors’ evacuation to France, Verney 
claims:  “Time and experience have placed me on an height from which I can 
comprehend the past as a whole; and in this way I must describe it, bringing forth the 
leading incidents, and disposing light and shade so as to form a picture in whose very 
darkness there will be harmony” (209). 
     In tracing out his approach to historiography, Verney casts light also on his sense 
of history itself.  By using a topographical metaphor to express historical perspective, 
he appears to posit human history as a closed pattern; seemingly, the pandemic 
discontinues the relation of the past with the present and, by extension, with the 
future.  Although the natural world’s deep time is unaffected by the plague—animals 
live on, the seasons change, the seas maintain their magnificence and the mountains 
their grandeur—human history, in Verney’s eyes, has ceased.2     
     As Verney’s plague-chronicle continues, we see this idea of history significantly 
unsettled by the sibylline influence that is everywhere throughout The Last Man.  
Deidre Lynch notes, in her analysis of Mary Shelley’s thoughts on history vis-à-vis 
Sir Walter Scott’s, that the novel “challenges such closure” as one finds in Scott’s 
Waverley (1814) “by running the tape of history backward” (139):  “the convention 
that diagrams time’s linear, progressive advance as a westward migration of 
civilization from Greece to Rome to England to America” is put “into reverse” when 
“the plague arrives in England on a ship that has voyaged east across the Atlantic 
from Philadelphia” (140).  Lynch suggests that Shelley thus purposefully counters the 
hierarchical, chronological, and mistily nostalgic method that Scott prefers.3 
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     As a Romantic visionary, Shelley seeks to undermine the idea that history is lineal 
and unidirectional; for her, history is not organized by the same logic that posits the 
past as an authority for dynastic succession, primogeniture, imperialist aggression, 
and whole traditions of oppression.  To borrow from Ina Ferris’s discussion of 
Romantic-era writers such as Lady Sydney Morgan and Michael Banim, the “sense of 
the past as unclosed, as an ongoing power that be turned to present account, prompt[s] 
an understanding of history writing as neither memorializing remembrance (as in 
nationalist historiography) nor as impartial knowledge (as in the emerging Rankean 
model) but precisely—and romantically—as active recollection” (141-2).  
Accordingly, these writers create “a model of history as a pointed intersection of the 
horizons of past and present directed to a shaping of the horizon of the future” (142).  
By virtue of her novel’s sibylline timescape, Shelley achieves what Anne McWhir 
calls a “visionary synchronicity” (xxvii) that complicates history as a resource for 
institutional forms of power. 
     Time collapses throughout Verney’s account of the pandemic that devastates 
humankind in the late twenty-first century.  For example, upon revisiting the now 
empty home of his late sister, Perdita, Verney says, “The time when in proud and 
happy security we assembled at this cottage, was gone—soon the present hours would 
join those past, and shadows of future ones rose dark and menacing from the womb of 
time, their cradle and their bier” (202).4   Later, in one of his last moments with her, 
Verney gently admonishes his wife, Idris, who has been imaging their love’s 
continuation in the afterworld:  “Let us not [. . .] neglect the present.  This present 
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moment, short as it is, is a part of eternity, and the dearest part, since it is our own 
unalienably.  Thou, the hope of my futurity, art my present joy” (268).  In both of 
these important scenes, Verney articulates his emotions through thoughts and words 
that point to time’s indistinctness; in essence, Verney sees his world and the people 
around him as belonging to a reordered temporal scheme in which past, present, and 
future commingle to the point of inseparability. 
     This reconfiguration of time appears tellingly in Verney’s passage on the last 
plague victim’s interment in the ice caves at Chamonix, the “rocky vale” at which the 
pandemic’s “barbarous tyranny” finally ceases (332).  Verney dryly commemorates 
the nightmare’s passing, unable to forget the tremendous scope of the plague’s 
ravages—so far as he knows, only four people outlive the disease (332).  He likens 
the now spent plague to a female sovereign:  “She abdicated her throne, and despoiled 
herself of her imperial scepter among the ice rocks that surrounded us.  She left 
solitude and silence co-heirs of her kingdom” (332).  This metaphoric representation 
is a bitterly ironic counterpoint to his earlier notation of the King of England’s 
abdication in 2073 and the subsequent creation of an English republic (15).  By 
likening the plague to a royal person, Verney brings his chronicle back to its 
beginning.  Less an insight into Verney as a political thinker than as a man struggling 
to make sense of time and history, the plague-as-queen metaphor bridges the novel’s 
last moments with its first.5    
     Chamonix thus takes on a twofold significance, serving as both the site of the last 
plague-grave and as a new cradle of civilization, a place of human nascence.  At 
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Chamonix, though, the waters of life are suspended in icefalls, séracs, and the Mer de 
Glace.  Amid this glacial icescape, Verney further explores his conflicted sense of 
temporality and history: 
              My present feelings are so mingled with the past, that I cannot say whether  
          the knowledge of this change visited us, as we stood on this sterile spot.  [. . .] 
          The coming time was a mighty river, down which a charmed boat is driven,  
          whose mortal steersman knows, that the obvious peril is not the one he needs  
          fear, yet that danger is nigh; and who floats awe-struck under the beetling  
          precipices through the dark and turbid waters—seeing in the distance yet 
          stranger and ruder shapes, towards which he is irresistibly impelled.  What  
          would become of us?  O for some Delphic oracle, or Pythian maid, to utter 
          the secrets of futurity!  O for some Œdipus to solve the riddle of the cruel 
          Sphynx!  Such Œdipus was I to be—not divining a word’s juggle, but whose 
          agonizing pangs, and sorrow-tainted life were to be the engines, wherewith to 
          lay bare the secrets of destiny, and reveal the meaning of the enigma, whose 
          explanation closed the history of the human race.  (332-33) 
     For Verney, history appears to be at an end, and the unforeseeable future promises 
little save further cause for fear and trembling.  Yet his distress is put into question by 
his invocations of the classical world.  Verney associates vatic power with antiquity, 
that is, with a past so far removed from the current moment that no recourse to 
prophecy now exists.  His readers, however, realize that the Cumaean Sibyl’s 
continuingly vital power, as established in the brief frame narrative (which I address  
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at length in the next section), governs the recovery and reconstitution of his text.  The 
very prophetic authority that he laments as irretrievably lost in the past in fact 
prevents his account of the future from becoming irretrievably lost in the past. 
     Her experiments with time in The Last Man reflect the fact that, in the Romantic 
period’s closing years, Shelley was personally interested in questions of narrative 
temporality and fictional historiography, a point evinced by her novel The Fortunes of 
Perkin Warbeck (1830), a work which concerns the fifteenth-century pretender to the 
newly established Tudor throne in England.   “In one chilling episode [of Warbeck],” 
Lynch argues, “Richard/Perkin breaks into the Tower of London, his prison during 
childhood.  When he suddenly recognizes the chamber in which he has sought 
sanctuary, he wonders whether time has not gone backward” (142).  In this scene, 
Lynch claims, one “glimpses a view of history that foregoes the notions of linear 
advance and modernization usually stressed by the novel’s narrator”; consequently, 
“time moves in circles” (142).  In light of this example, we see that Shelley’s 
innovations in her 1826 novel point not only to her criticism of Romantic prophecy 
but also to some of her general concerns at this point in her career.  
     Recent Romantic scholarship by Karen Hadley and Christopher Miller has shown 
that the question of time, like the question of history, mattered deeply to English 
writers of the period.6  Wordsworth’s nocturnal poetry, for example, is haunted by the 
“de-sanctification” and “secularization” of human time by “the clock-reckoning of 
modernity,” as Miller asserts (3).  The predictability and regularity of time as  
measured by clocks and watches (and, Hadley reminds us, as taxed by William Pitt  
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in the late 1790s) (693) led Romantic writers to ascertain a conflict between what 
William Deresiewicz, in Jane Austen and the Romantic Poets (2004), calls 
“Bergsonian temps—linear, unidirectional clock-time” (37) and what John Wyatt, in 
Wordsworth and the Geologists (1995), calls “deep time” (157), that is, the 
unquantifiable time of the earth and the cosmos.  Such humanly produced records of 
time and history as the clock, the timeline, and the museum typically register the 
principal ideologies and powers of the moment (the Great Exhibition of 1851 being a 
case in point).7   As a part of her visionary aim, Shelley disrupts linear temporality in 
The Last Man to call into question artificial clock-time and chronological history, two 
of the basic props of the highly industrialized, expansionist nineteenth century. 
     Although she effects this disruption throughout the novel, Shelley establishes the 
logic for it in her brief frame narrative, in which a Regency-era Englishwoman 
describes both her visit to the Cumaean Sibyl’s cave in Italy and her subsequent 
collation of the sibylline leaves she discovers there.  By virtue of her editorship, the 
unnamed woman reconstitutes Verney’s narrative; moreover, the circumstances of its 
recovery recast the text as a foretelling, despite the fact that Verney offers it as 
factual.  The brevity of the framing device belies its importance, however, for its 
invocation of the sibyl (who does not appear as a living member of the book’s 
dramatis personae) creates an environment in which time and history, as these were 
most commonly understood in postwar England, fall to pieces.  In the following 
section, I discuss Shelley’s use of the sibyl more closely in order to show how the 
ancient priestess’s presence and power shape the novel’s radical visionary poetics. 
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* * * 
     The Last Man is not simply Lionel Verney’s account of a biological catastrophe in 
the late twenty-first century.  The novel’s “Introduction,” set in 1818 Naples, 
contextualizes this terrifying story of human loss and cosmic isolation.  The 
“Introduction,” in effect, repositions the historical account of what takes place 
between 2073 and 2100—“the last year of the world” (365)—within the frame of the 
sibylline prophetic tradition.  If we are to see Shelley’s doomsday narrative as 
ultimately redemptive, we must keep foremost in mind that Verney’s bleak history is 
in fact mediated by his 1818 editor, who reinterprets Verney and remakes his story’s 
“destructive, anti-civilizing power” (McWhir xxv) as part of an augury of hope. 
     Although the Sibyl herself does not appear as a character in the work, her presence 
and influence pervade the book.  She occasions, in 1818, the recovery of a text that 
may be the work of a person long dead or as yet unborn.  This text receives definite 
form only through the ambitious redaction of an Englishwoman who comes across its 
fragments in what she believes is the cave of the Cumaean Sibyl; therefore, Verney’s 
history is in reality the composite product of two minds separated by at least two 
centuries.  Verney recounts his life and sad fate as a series of events in time, taking 
place in a clear, relatable order.  All the same, the sibylline collapse of time that we 
find in the “Introduction” reappears in the three volume plague-chronicle; cases in 
point include the visit to Perdita’s desolate cottage and Verney’s discussion with Idris 
of eternal life.  The Sibyl’s vatic influence causes lineal ideas of time and history to 
break down; what is more, because of the framing sibylline context, Verney’s sketch  
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of the future, in its nihilistic forecasting of a single pattern for history, fails to speak 
the last word on humankind’s destiny. 
     Shelley’s “Introduction” establishes the Sibyl’s cave as a nexus of collapsed time-
states, the cusp at which past, present, and future blend in an extraordinary 
continuum.  In this milieu, the frame narrator chances upon the sibylline leaves and 
afterward devotes herself to their reconstitution: 
          Sometimes I have thought, that, obscure and chaotic as they are, they owe 
          their present form to me, their decipherer.  As if we should give to another 
          artist, the painted fragments which form the mosaic copy of Raphael’s 
          Transfiguration in St. Peter’s; he would put them together in a form, whose 
          mode would be fashioned by his own peculiar mind and talent.  Doubtless the 
          leaves of the Cumæan Sibyl have suffered diminution of interest and excellence 
          in my hands.  My only excuse for thus transforming them, is that they were 
          unintelligible in their pristine condition.  (4) 
Whether brought forward or backward in time to 1818, the last man’s narrative, 
because it is set in the late twenty-first century, performs the part of an especially 
unpleasant prediction of the future.  Beyond the fact that its provenance is uncertain, 
the work is restored through another’s intellectual labors; moreover, the redactor does 
not share Verney’s feeling of alienation from classical sources of visionary insight.  
Framed as it is by the 1818 narrative, the plague-chronicle—perhaps from the past, 
perhaps from the future—is mediated at all times by a contemporary, feminine 
perspective. 
140    
     The Englishwoman’s endeavors, as recounted in the frame narrative, accord with 
Wittreich’s description of how visionary artists remake their respective literary 
inheritances.  In this sense, Verney’s chronicle is not a message in a bottle; rather, the 
work represents an intricate process of co-authorship properly associated with the 
visionary poetics tradition as Wittreich theorizes it.  Just as St. John of Patmos 
engages and recreates his scriptural predecessors or as the Romantics study and revise 
Spenser and Milton (as well as biblical seers such as the author of Revelation), so the 
traveler to the Sibyl’s cave resets Verney’s thoughts and words within the scope of 
her own day and her own life.  Thus the linearity and cohesiveness of the plague tale 
are illusory, simply impressions rendered through the Englishwoman’s diligent 
redaction of the fragmented chronicle. 
     That chronicle, in fact, represents a trans-generational collaboration between 
Verney and the unnamed woman.  “What is important,” Wittreich says with respect to 
this point, “is a decipherer—someone to integrate and explain and give continuity to 
the fragments.  Prophetic works are, by definition, fragmentary, the particles of a 
vision that receives articulation and definition only to the extent that an author of a 
prophecy is able to make its fragmentary parts cohere, each with the others” 
(“Prophecy” 51).  Webb supports Wittreich in this regard, albeit indirectly:  “Both the 
plague and the fragmented text that writes of it are alien, their authorship 
unaccountable.  They beg to be assimilated into an epistemology, to be made 
intelligible, to be ‘framed’” (121).  To provide such a frame, Shelley calls upon a 
sibylline vatic authority which vexes customary notions of time and history.  The 
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future collapses into a past recovered in the present by a woman whose collative art 
suggests that she is not unlike the seer-poet who intervenes in past visions to create 
new ways of seeing and being. 
     If in the novel Shelley “asserts the urgent necessity of collective psychic 
transformation,” as Kari E. Lokke claims (133), then she does so with the visionary’s 
unshakeable beliefs in the value of human life and the openness of human history. By 
design, Shelley employs the poet-prophet’s subversive strategies to effect intellectual 
and spiritual transformations in her audience.  Thus she complicates our 
understanding of history, as well as our basic sense of what it means to be human, 
partly to challenge the deterministic, even fatalistic perspective of history as the 
record of absolute necessity.  Clearly, her novel is more than a fictional reiteration of 
the 1650s debate between Thomas Hobbes and Bishop John Bramhall regarding 
chance and necessity or a revisiting of the early eighteenth-century conflicts between 
the philosophers Anthony Collins, a necessitarian, and Samuel Clarke, a Newtonian 
libertarian.8   At the same time, the book touches upon a polemic in English 
philosophy by evoking the old quarrel between determinism and indeterminism and 
by exploring how this quarrel relates to the question of humankind’s role in history.  
An important part of Shelley’s visionary project in The Last Man is the presentation 
of history as the realization of possibilities, that is, of what may be as opposed to what 
must be.   
     The figure of the Sibyl, who connects worldly to otherworldly power, is crucial to 
Shelley’s explorations of necessity and free will in the novel.  By transferring vatic  
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authority from the patriarchal Judeo-Christian scriptures to the matriarchal sibylline 
leaves, Shelley significantly unsettles the masculine bias in Romantic prophecy—
consider the fact that Byron’s radically innovative The Vision of Judgment features 
an all-male cast—and so places “the whole prophetic tradition, previously withheld 
from women,” into contact with “a newly emerging female literature” (Wittreich, 
“Prophecy” 50).  Of course, Coleridge published a collection of poems entitled 
Sibylline Leaves in July 1817, the same month and year in which Biographia Literaria 
first appeared.9   All the same, Coleridge invokes the sibyl in his title as a way of 
commenting on the volume’s fragmentary contents, including the supposedly 
incomplete dream-poem “Kubla Khan” (which was first composed in the late 
1790s).10   Shelley, however, looks to the Sibyl and her prophetic agency as a means 
to counter the prevailing tenets and values of England in the late Romantic moment 
rather than to create a metaphor for either her authorship or her work. 
     The Sibyl, whose prophecies were gathered into sacred books which the classical 
Romans turned to for help in times of crisis, represented a distinctly matriarchal 
authority within a patriarchal culture.  Mary Beard, John North, and Simon Price state 
that “many innovations were inspired by the Sibylline Books, the collections of 
oracles, kept and consulted by the duoviri sacris faciundis, which served both to 
initiate change and to provide [legitimacy] for what might otherwise have been seen 
as deviations from the ancestral tradition” (62).  Beard, North, and Price specify that 
these writings, rendered in Greek verse (62), later came to be associated with the 
Cumaean Sibyl and “were believed to contain the destiny of the Romans” (62), a 
143 
people whose empire included parts of Asia and North Africa as well as most of 
Europe.  These sibylline prophecies enjoyed a special status in imperial Rome 
because, unlike most oracular utterances, they were written down, and “the Roman 
empire,” David Potter reminds us, “was an empire of the written word” (95).  The 
Cumaean Sibyl thus was distinguished from other sibyls by virtue of the cultural faith 
that the Romans showed in her visions as these were recorded in written language. 
     Sibylline prophecy influenced the literature as well as the political affairs of 
classical Rome. For example, the Roman poet Vergil, as Potter notes, evokes the 
Cumaean Sibyl in his Fourth Eclogue (which Potter dates circa 44 to 40 B.C.) (70), a 
work that so persuasively recapitulates the Sibyl’s prophecies of “the coming of peace 
[. . .] that the poem has been taken to be an actual prophecy” (70).  The Sibyl also 
facilitates Aeneas’s journey to the underworld, where his father shows him Rome’s 
future, in Book VI of The Aeneid.     
     We need not look only to classical literature, however, for imaginative 
representations of the Sibyl and her vatic power.  Robert Graves’s 1934 novel I, 
Claudius scrutinizes the private lives of the first three Roman emperors—namely, 
Augustus, Tiberius, and Caligula—from the perspective of the fourth, Claudius, who 
for most of his life is generally (though not universally) vilified by other members of 
the imperial family for his physical impediments and personal eccentricities.  After 
specifying that he writes for “an extremely remote posterity” some “hundred 
generations ahead” (5), Claudius—who plans to conceal his manuscript in the earth  
until its prophesied restoration in the 1900s A.D.—describes his direct encounter with 
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the renowned prophetess: 
              I went to Cumæ, in Campania, a little less than eighteen years ago, and  
          visited the Sibyl in her cliff cavern on Mount Gaurus.  There is always a 
          Sibyl at Cumæ, for when one dies her novice-attendant succeeds; but they 
          are not equally famous.  Some of them are never granted a prophecy by Apollo 
          in all the long years of their service.  [. . .]  It was cold December weather.  The 
          cavern was a terrifying place, hollowed out from the solid rock, the approach 
          steep, tortuous, pitch-dark and full of bats.  I went disguised, but the Sibyl 
          knew me.  (5-6) 
     When Amalthea, the current sibyl, appears, she is “seated on an ivory throne in the 
shadows” (7).  Within a few moments, she slips into a trance:  “Gradually her face 
changed, the prophetic power overcame her, and she struggled and gasped, there was 
a rushing noise through all the galleries, doors banged, wings swished my face, the 
light vanished, and she uttered a Greek verse in the voice of the God” (7).  The 
priestess speaks a prophecy, at the time scarcely comprehensible to Claudius, in 
which she foretells both his accession to the emperorship and the end of the Julian-
Claudian imperial line following the death of Nero in 68 A.D (11-12).   
     Whether we draw our illustrations from classical authors like Vergil or modern-era 
writers like Graves, the Sibyl is an especially powerful figure in the European 
tradition of visionary literature.  She represents a connection between Apollo—the 
god of prophecy, medicine, and poetry—and all people, because, as Potter suggests, 
the visionary tradition to which she belongs “provided material for discussion, com- 
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fort, and information both for members of the highest aristocracy and for the humble 
inhabitants of the cities and countryside” (96-7).  The Cumaean Sibyl receives 
particular attention in literary history for several reasons:  her Greek origins (Potter 
dates the nascence of the Italian sibylline tradition at around the sixth century B.C.) 
(73) situate her within both the Hellenic and Roman classical pasts; she possesses a 
special relationships with the deity of art; and her prophecies found their way into 
books which in turn were archived and consulted by the imperial government for help 
in times of the greatest need.  Like all sibyls, she is a specifically feminine source of 
vatic authority.  But the ancient Romans distinguished the Cumaean Sibyl also by 
attributing contemporary political relevance to her written prophecies.  These points 
cast light on Shelley’s interest in the Sibyl as a prophetic and cultural figure whose 
power transcended patriarchal constrictions on women and whose authority arose 
from a classical rather than Judeo-Christian visionary tradition. 
     A striking contrast to the Cumaean Sibyl whom T. S. Eliot evokes in the epigraph 
to his poem The Waste Land (1922), Shelley’s priestess is not subject to temporal and 
historical disturbances; rather, she designs such disturbances as part of her 
continuingly vital role.  In Eliot’s epigraph—a passage taken from Petronius Arbiter’s 
Satyricon (mid-first century)—the Sibyl withers, like Tennyson’s Tithonus, who also 
received everlasting life without obtaining eternal youth as well.11   Unlike her 
counterpart in Shelley’s novel, the Sibyl here is at a loss; she prays for death to free 
her from time and history.  Throughout Eliot’s poem, her prophetic power is 
diminished almost to absurdity, and her authority is transferred to others, some human 
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(like Tiresias and Madame Sosostris), some non-human (like the thunder of part five).  
Shelley’s Sibyl is silent, invisible, seemingly a historical association only—yet she is 
the novel’s principal influence, commanding time and text from the work’s margins.  
In this sense, the Sibyl, who never appears in person, is the book’s central presence. 
     Shelley thus recovers the sibylline prophetic tradition to challenge the patriarchal 
aspects of Romantic visionary literature without departing from historical precedents.  
It should be noted that this interpretation countervails Webb’s contention that the 
Sibyl, by 1826, had become a powerless symbol of Western antiquity.  “For the 
nineteenth-century reading public,” Webb claims, “the Sibyl does not carry the 
prophetic authority she once did.  Therefore the editor, as the figure who grounds the 
frame for this novel in the contemporary world, receives the Sibylline text as an 
artifact, a historical curiosity from a bygone era, which achieves its value as a rare 
object, not as a prophetic warning” (132).  She likens Shelley’s frame narrator to 
Scott’s Peter Pattieson, who, in the 1816 novel Old Mortality, “reworks” the title 
character’s “biased history into an ‘authoritative’ one” (132); consequently, the frame 
narrator “refuses to appropriate the scattered Sibyl’s leaves for the prophetic purpose 
they would have carried in ancient Rome—as a kind of revelatory sacred document 
that inscribes the end of the world by merely describing it” (132-33).   
     By portraying the frame narrator as an antiquarian (132-33), Webb misses the fact 
that she is also a modern-day chresmologue, that is, a collector who facilitated the 
circulation of prophetic texts in the classical Roman world (Potter 95-6).   “The 
chresmologos,” Potter states, “did not claim authority as a prophet for himself  
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(as far as we know this seems to have been an overwhelmingly male profession):  his 
claim to importance rested upon his credibility as an accurate purveyor of ancient 
wisdom” (95).  Although the chresmologue seldom redacted the prophetic books 
within his possession, he contributed significantly to the promulgation of these works, 
as Potter notes by writing that “it was the ubiquitous chresmologos who spread the 
wisdom of the inspired sages throughout ancient society” (96).  As the “Introduction” 
suggests, the unnamed Englishwoman performs the chresmologue’s role by 
presenting the reading public with what she has recovered from the sibylline leaves, 
not because the plague-chronicle is a historical oddity but because the work possesses 
a visionary importance imparted to it by the spirit of the Cumaean Sibyl.12  
     In much Shelley criticism, this point is lost because the anonymous redactor too 
often is identified as Shelley herself.  The novel’s roman a clef features partly 
encourage this mistake:  if Adrian, the well-born idealist, and Raymond, the willful 
aristocrat, reincarnate Percy Shelley and Byron respectively, then the frame narrator, 
for many critics, surely represents Mary Shelley, who of course edited and published 
much of her late husband’s work.13    Thus Morton D. Paley asserts that “almost 
everyone who has written about this novel adverts to the personal element of isolation 
in it” (109).  With reference to Mary Shelley’s own journals, Paley usefully 
distinguishes between fiction and reality:  “The introduction recapitulates an 
excursion to the supposed Cavern of the Sibyl on the Bay of Naples.  In reality, that 
trip, made by Mary and Percy Shelley with Claire Clairmont [Mary’s stepsister] on 
December 8, 1818, had proven disappointing” (110).14   Yet many fine Romanticists  
148 
confuse the author with her creation; for example, just before quoting at length from 
the “Introduction,” Wittreich writes:  “This is Mary’s account of her visit to that 
cave” (“Prophecy” 50). 
     In contrast, Audrey A. Fisch insists that The Last Man’s “political acumen” (267) 
becomes less accessible if readers conflate Shelley and the frame narrator.  She 
expatiates on her claim by noting that the Englishwoman who redacts the sibylline 
leaves “seems strangely unaware of any public and political function for the prophetic 
narrative” (279); consequently, “the manuscript, instead of offering lessons about 
politics and survival, instead of functioning as prophecy, has offered ‘solace’” (280).  
In Fisch’s analysis, the nineteenth-century redactor mitigates the prophetic power of 
the sibylline leaves because she fails to see, or at least neglects to discuss, the 
recovered narrative’s revolutionary potential.15 
     Fisch is not alone in seeing Shelley’s Englishwoman as purposefully lessening the 
force of Verney’s doomsday account.  Webb, for instance, remarks:  “What is striking 
about Shelley’s editorial frame is that the editor reaction to the story is so muted.  
Rather than showing the editor is disturbed or frightened by the apocalyptic narrative, 
as one would expect, her framing narrative seems to indicate she is engaged in a 
solipsistic exercise in personal nostalgia” (131).  Such striving after consolation 
through literary work, Webb judges, compromises the work’s authority as a vision:  
“Rather than framing the Sibylline text as a warning and as a prophesy [sic], the 
editor frames it through its gathering and assimilates it to a personalized past rather 
than to a terrifying generalized future” (132).  
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     If Fisch and Webb share some surprise at the frame narrator’s seeming lack of 
interest in the Verney material’s overarching implications, it is because both critics—
who are among the novel’s most incisive and eloquent readers—see written prophecy 
as essentially predictive in nature.  Prediction differs from prophecy in that the former 
presupposes a single direction or pattern for human history (whether at the personal 
or collective level), whereas the latter posits history as neither settled nor fore- 
ordained.  We may look to one of the central scenes in English vatic literature, 
namely, Adam’s vision of the human future in the two closing Books of Paradise 
Lost, as illustrative of how prophecy addresses “the contradictions and conflicts of 
the historical process” (97), to borrow from David Loewenstein.  “As Adam learns 
from Michael’s historical drama,” he states, “the history of the human race involves 
no linear process; rather it consists, as Adam himself observes, of men in successive 
ages treading ‘Paths indirect’ (XI.631)” (97).  On this basis, Loewenstein discerns in 
Adam’s vision a way for Milton “to probe the causes and patterns of those tragic 
conflicts which had so often frustrated the progressive historical process in his own 
deeply divided age” (97). 
     Adam’s vision, as Paley argues, is crucial to both the structure and content of The 
Last Man.16  Shelley draws the novel’s epigraph from the penultimate Book of 
Paradise Lost (XI.770-72); the verses she selects are an especially piteous outcry 
from the first man:  “Let no man seek / Henceforth to be foretold what shall befall / 
Him or his Children.”  Although she quotes these words only, Shelley, who writes 
from a perspective of post-Waterloo disenchantment, surely also has in mind the 
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lines which follow: 
                                                            I had hope 
          When violence was ceas’t, and War on Earth, 
          All would have then gone well, peace would have crown’d 
          With length of happy days the race of man; 
          But I was far deceiv’d; for now I see 
          Peace to corrupt no less than War to waste.  (XI.779-84) 
     If the novel were linearly predictive, these explicit and implicit allusions to 
Paradise Lost would support Paley’s assertion that Shelley gives “a terribly 
pessimistic coloring [. . .] to prophetic vision” (115).  But this criticism, in light of 
both Loewenstein’s analysis and Milton’s poem itself, proves at best the right finding 
from the wrong premise.  We need look only one hundred lines further into Book XI 
to discover, with Loewenstein, “a vision of apocalyptic renovation” (97) that moves 
Adam, after witnessing five strife-filled visions (including the vision of the lazar-
house), to rejoice in the promise of a new covenant between man and God that shall 
follow the great Flood: 
             O thou who future things canst represent 
          As present, Heav’nly instructor, I revive 
          At this last sight, assur’d that Man shall live 
          With all the Creatures, and their seed preserve.  (XI.870-73) 
     Whether such happiness, as Loewenstein contends, owes to Adam’s inexperience 
as a student of history (100), we see that Michael’s prophecy blends “tragedy and  
151 
renewed hope” and so diversifies the significances to which the spectacle of history 
points (124).  Accordingly, we should qualify Paley’s assessment of Shelley’s use of 
Milton by recognizing that the author’s choice of epigraph encompasses the whole of 
Adam’s troubling but not hopeless vision.  Prophecy disallows the closure of history 
to possibilities.  Thus Adam and Eve depart Eden with “the World [. . .] all before 
them” (XII.646) and so enter history, as Loewenstein suggests, “with humility and 
courage” (125).  Despite what Adam has seen with his eyes and what Eve has seen in 
her dreams, hope continues because history promises myriad possibilities rather than 
a single, inevitable outcome. 
     Just as the concluding verses of Paradise Lost complicate the idea that history 
invariably follows a single course, the few pages comprising the “Introduction” to 
The Last Man transform the notion of unidirectional history that Verney’s three-
volume chronicle of the future advances for many readers.  If the frame narrator is not 
distressed by her look into the twenty-first century, it is because she knows she has 
gazed simply into one possible future, and she realizes that what she has seen is best 
interpreted as a general delineation of human truths rather than a precise description 
of what awaits humankind in the years to come.  Although Shelley’s Englishwoman 
comes upon Verney’s account accidentally, she redacts that account purposefully, 
demonstrating that she possesses the visionary’s sense of history without telling her 
readers so.  Furthermore, her editorship suggests that we receive nothing from Verney 
that we can trust is his work alone:  the linear unity and individual authorship of his 
narrative are thus illusive.  By recasting the sibylline leaves, the frame narrator 
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prophetically intervenes into the plague-chronicle and, by extension, into history 
itself.   
     In this respect, The Last Man presents a prophecy within a prophecy, or, rather, a 
vision of history within a vision of history.  Verney and his female redactor 
collaborate across time:  his vision imperceptibly intertwines with hers, a crucial fact 
given that the woman’s imagination integrates distinct ideas regarding non-linear 
historical time, sibylline vatic agency, and the private past.  The frame narrator 
acknowledges her role in bringing together “the slight Sibylline pages” (4) without 
diminishing the Sibyl’s part:  “Scattered and unconnected as they were, I have been 
obliged to add links, and model the work into a consistent form.  But the main 
substance rests on the truths contained in these poetic rhapsodies, and the divine 
intuition which the Cumæan damsel obtained from heaven” (4).  Thus the narrative 
that Shelley’s Regency-era traveler recovers is a restorative prophecy, not a literal 
prediction; moreover, the restored text bears relevance to the Englishwoman’s past 
and present as well as to Verney’s life in the forthcoming years.  Consequently, a 
chronicle of the future, inscribed on ancient leaves, tells the story of the present. 
     The sibylline tradition allows Shelley a way to critique both Romantic visionary 
literature and the postwar West.  For all its resourcefulness, however, Shelley’s use of 
this tradition is not subversive or revolutionary per se; after all, the Cumaean Sibyl 
played an important and culturally sanctioned role in Rome’s patriarchal, imperial 
government.  Her complicity in Roman statecraft notwithstanding, the Sibyl 
represents a matriarchal presence whose vatic authority rests principally on written 
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prophecy.  Moreover, she provides Shelley with the means to disrupt linear time and 
history, to the effect that “the end of man [. . .] will have always already coincided 
with the moment of predicting, the moment of translating, and the moment of 
writing,” as Barbara Johnson states (266).  Shelley thus recasts the sibylline legacy 
for the sake of her novel’s radical post-Waterloo critique, and it is in this sense that 
the Sibyl possesses subversive potential.  In the closing section of this chapter, I 
consider how, for these reasons, The Last Man represents both a new beginning and a 
decisive ending for the Romantic visionary line. 
* * * 
     Shelley’s re-imagining of time and the Sibyl in The Last Man is, for Wittreich, 
anticipated by Milton’s Paradise Lost, a poem that ends “as it began, with a prophecy 
whose vision of history, not full of glad tidings, is fraught with the misery, fever, and 
fret of human existence” (“Prophecy” 43).  Wittreich claims that the last two Books 
of Milton’s epic present “the history of the poet’s own time.  Prophecy of the past 
masking as prophecy of the future is actually being written in the present tense” 
(“Prophecy” 43).  Accordingly, the temporal distortions and historical non-linearity 
that we find in Shelley’s novel reflect Miltonic precedents; in this sense, Shelley’s 
radicalism may be seen as anchored in the vatic tradition.  All the same, Shelley 
amplifies these distortions to a remarkable extent, thereby assaying the possibilities of 
visionary poetics without disregarding its basic conventionalities.  
     Like Frankenstein, The Last Man reflects the influence of Milton on Shelley’s 
authorial imagination and sense of the literary past.  Shelley understands prophecy  
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primarily through Milton, who understands it through Spenser, Chaucer, and the 
Bible.  Foretelling what is to come is a task of little appeal to Shelley, who follows 
Milton in seeking to fashion the future rather than forecast it.  Thus The Last Man, as 
Sylva Norman suggests, is a fairly murky crystal ball:  Shelley, who “was thinking, or 
should have been, some 240 years ahead [. . .] never tried to picture a world advanced 
in industry, transport, architecture, or technology of any kind” (77-8).   
     But if the novel cannot properly be read as a prototype of the speculative fiction 
genre—that is, as a precursor to Jules Verne or H. G. Wells—it also resists 
classification as an allegorical index of Shelley’s times.  Alan Bewell, for example, 
reads the work as a register of the collective distress with which Europeans regarded 
incidents such as the Bengalese cholera outbreak of 1817 (296).17   The novel’s 
eschatological significance, though, involves much more than the epidemiological 
circumstances of the early nineteenth century.  Although she thinks and writes as a 
woman of the late Romantic and early Victorian periods, Shelley seldom presents 
synchronic history for its own sake.  Rather, she explores both private and public 
history not simply as an accumulation of particulars but as a series of interrelated 
phenomena accessible to the seer-poet’s imagination and reinterpretation.   
     Her sense of the poet-prophet’s role, then, allows Shelley to write critically and 
with equal sophistication of past, present, and future all at once.  Moreover, Shelley 
writes from a position of unique witness; her personal losses (three of her four 
children died between 1815 and 1819, and her husband drowned in 1822), together 
with her experience of international war and a questionable peace, contribute to what 
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Lokke sees as a novel that anticipates later postwar literature rather than the emerging 
speculative fiction genre.  Lokke claims that, with The Last Man, Shelley speaks to 
“the horrors of the French Revolution, the subsequent carnage of the Napoleonic 
wars, and the metaphysical and cultural uncertainties attendant upon Romantic-era 
attacks on religious and political authority” (116).  She adds that the piece “bears 
comparison with twentieth-century existentialist, absurdist, and nihilist reactions to 
two World Wars, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb, such as Camus’s La Peste or 
Ionesco’s Les Chaises” (116).  Like Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Nazi death camps 
130 years later, Waterloo marked a moment of historical catastrophe which 
compelled intellectuals like Shelley to answer “a demand to choose definitively 
between hell and reason,” to borrow Camus’s comment on the bombing of Hiroshima 
(111).  Lokke posits that Shelley’s choice of responses provides a key to The Last 
Man:  “In the aftermath of the failed French Revolution and the grim Restoration of 
the ancien régime all over Europe after the fall of Napoleon, Shelley surveys the 
political theories and practices of her day and finds them all inadequate” (129).   
     Shelley’s personal acts of witness, consequently, provoke her literary acts of 
visionary intervention.  The genre of prophecy offers Shelley a powerful medium 
through which to present new possibilities for thought and action in an age of 
renewed monarchies and conspicuous repression.  The claim that her novel stands in 
special relation to Romantic vatic art helps to clarify that the work is not simply a 
roman a clef like Thomas Love Peacock’s Headlong Hall (published December 1815) 
or his Nightmare Abbey (1818).  Nevertheless, the book’s relatively late publication 
156 
date (1826) bears upon its status as a contribution to British Romantic literature.  By 
the time that the work appeared in print, Keats, Byron, and Shelley all were dead, as 
were Mary Robinson (1800), Charlotte Smith (1806), Anne Yearsley (also 1806), 
Jane Austen (1817), and Anna Letitia Barbauld (1825).  Within twelve years of the 
book’s publication, several more Romantic authors passed away, including Blake 
(1827), Hazlitt (1830), Scott (1832), Hannah More (1833), Charles Lamb (1834), 
Coleridge (also 1834), Felicia Hemans (1835), and Letitia Elizabeth Landon (1838).  
Southey, now the Poet Laureate, and Wordsworth, now a supporter of the Earl of 
Liverpool’s Tory administration (which had controlled Parliament since Spencer 
Perceval was assassinated in 1812) showed that the Lake Poets’ 1790s radicalism was 
long past.  As a critique of Romantic visionary literature, The Last Man reflects the 
fact that Shelley, by the age of twenty-nine, witnessed not only wartime violence and 
postwar authoritarianism but also the first and final years of second wave British 
Romanticism. 
     By the mid-1820s, the community of British Romantics was considerably 
depleted, and Mary Shelley did not benefit from a continuing textual dialogue with a 
working contemporary such as Percy and Byron enjoyed, according to the theory that 
Charles E. Robinson posits regarding the two poets’ relationship.18   These 
considerations bear relevance to the fact that The Last Man, despite its radical 
innovations to Romantic visionary poetics, “remained virtually forgotten (in sharp 
contrast to the fate of Frankenstein) from shortly after its publication in 1826 until 
1965 when it was first reprinted in the United States,” as Patrick Parrinder points out  
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(65-6).   Shelley’s experimental critique of Romantic prophecy thus stands at a short 
but important distance from the high point of second wave British Romanticism, and 
this removal complicates our analysis of the work as a prophecy and Shelley as a 
member of the English visionary line.  From this evidence, a twofold question may be 
asked:  Is Shelley, like Aphra Behn, “a rejected mother in the national literary 
tradition, leaving an inheritance that was richly influential but more often denied than 
acknowledged” (Spencer 11),19 or is she the principal figure in a matrilineal line of 
vision, a writer who creates through her works, as Barbara Jane O’Sullivan argues, a 
legacy that establishes continuity among authors as diverse as Florence Nightingale, 
Virginia Woolf, and the German author Christa Wolf?20     
     Although it is tempting to portray Mary Shelley as the focal author in a female 
visionary line that counters the male-dominated, Milton-centered tradition, The Last 
Man does not adequately support such a recasting.  The novel is too deeply embedded 
in both the coterie aesthetics of the Byron-Shelley circle and the intellectual concerns 
of postwar England to serve later generations of women writers as a touchstone piece 
(to adapt Matthew Arnold’s idea for the measure of great verse from the 1880 essay, 
“The Study of Poetry”).21     While The Last Man represents an especially 
sophisticated contribution to Romantic visionary literature, the work fails to carry 
forward the spirit of second wave Romantic vision as Percy Shelley’s Prometheus 
Unbound revivifies first generation Romantic prophecy.  Rather, Shelley introduces 
several significant innovations, such as experimentations with temporal reality and 
the restoration of the Sibyl as a vatic authority, to critique the male Romantics and 
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their aesthetics, not to perpetuate them.  Shelley thus employs these innovations to 
subvert and disrupt Romantic visionary poetics, as well as to challenge the prevailing 
reactionary ideologies of her time.  In this sense, the novel serves as a requiem for 
Romantic visionary art; ironically, the work also stands as perhaps the most daring 
experiment in a genre that Shelley forthrightly contests.   
     If Shelley’s oeuvre offers the possibility of a distinctly female line of vision, as 
O’Sullivan suggests, then we must acknowledge from the first that The Last Man 
poses formidable difficulties as part of a hypothetical counter-tradition.  The 
circumstances of the work’s composition and publication, as I have described them, 
prohibit the notion that Shelley sought to revive the Romantic visionary idiom at a 
late moment in the period.  Moreover, as Parrinder reminds us, The Last Man 
languished in obscurity for well over a century; despite its originality and complexity, 
the work, unlike Frankenstein, did not lastingly enter the international imagination 
(consider, for example, the Spanish director Victor Erice’s use of Frankenstein’s 
narrative and imagery, as rendered through twentieth-century cinematic adaptations, 
in the 1973 film, The Spirit of the Beehive).    The literary critic who would construct 
a female vatic line with Mary Shelley at its heart, then, neglects certain basic facts 
involved in why and how Shelley engages Romantic visionary poetics in her 1826 
novel.   
     With The Last Man, Shelley enriches the tradition of English visionary literature.  
At the same time, she calls that tradition to account insofar as the younger Romantics, 
mainly during the later years of the Regency period in England, engaged with it in 
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several of their poetical works.  By providing so thoroughgoing a critique, Shelley 
offers the final word on postwar Romantic prophecy.  By virtue of her critical 
perspective regarding visionary poetics, Shelley shares much with John Keats, the 
brilliant young London poet who died five years before The Last Man’s publication.  
Although she does not write Keats into her novel and the two were never close, 
Shelley first met Keats in February 1817 and was familiar with both him and his 
poetry.22   Yet the two younger Romantics, despite a lack of personal or professional 
intimacy, demonstrate a like-minded discontent with literary prophecy and its cultural 
role in the post-Napoleonic world.  The concluding chapter of this study examines 
Keats’s own critique of post-Waterloo visionary poetics and its idealistic, 
transcendent implications.                  
      
         
      
               
                  
      
                  
       
      
   
     
Chapter Five 
“Fled is that music”: 
John Keats’s Challenge to Romantic Vision 
 
“Let the fish philosophise the ice away from the Rivers in winter time and they shall 
be at continual play in the tepid delight of summer.” 
—John Keats to the George Keatses, the 14 February-3 May 1819 letter1 
 
“Do you not think this of great import?  You will hear by the papers of the 
proceedings at Manchester and [Henry] Hunt’s triumphal entry into London—I would 
take me a whole day and a quire of paper to give you any thing like detail—I will 
merely mention that it is calculated that 30.000 people were in the streets waiting for 
him—The whole distance from the Angel Islington to the Crown and anchor was 
lined with Multitudes.”   
—John Keats to the George Keatses, the 17-27 September 1819 letter 
 
     In much of his mature writing, John Keats, like Byron and Mary Shelley, calls into 
question the transformative power of Romantic literary prophecy.  Keats surpasses 
both contemporaries, however, in the outspokenness and intellectual confidence of his 
persistently materialist critique of visionary poetics.  This critique, as expressed in 
both his verse and his prose, distinguishes Keats as the principal opponent of a kind 
of art which, whether implicitly or explicitly, promotes the hope of transcendence  
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over the clear-sighted struggle with human life on its own terms.  Moreover, the 
poet’s criticism of the Miltonic tradition and its aesthetic legacy significantly 
complicates Wittreich’s theory of a unified, Romantic visionary line.  In fact, Keats 
breaks almost completely from the vatic tradition, asserting his materialist perspective 
against what in that tradition is idealistic, even escapist, in nature.  Consequently, his 
work sets the stage for Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (an 1826 novel discussed in the 
previous chapter) and anticipates any number of the British Victorians, very few of 
whom adopt the visionary stance with the alacrity and success of their Romantic-era 
forebears. 
     In his 14 February-3 May 1819 letter to George and Georgiana Keats (who in 
early 1818 had emigrated from England to the United States), and after referencing 
his reading in both Voltaire and the Scottish historian William Robertson (II.100), 
Keats offers his analysis of human existence in a material world which he likens to a 
“vale of Soul-making” (II.102).  Given that 1819 was an especially productive year 
for Keats—he composed at this time the great Odes and Lamia, among other pieces—
the thoughts he shares by letter with his brother and sister-in-law help to represent the 
poet’s frame of mind at a moment when he was writing some of the period’s finest 
verse.  Keats states that human beings are “subject to the same mischances as the 
beasts of the forest, destined to hardships and disquietude” (II.101); accordingly, the 
poet discounts the concept of human perfectibility because “the nature of the world 
will not admit of it—the inhabitants of the world will correspond to itself” (II.101).  
He provides a metaphor to illustrate his point: “suppose a rose to have sensation, it 
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blooms on a beautiful morning it enjoys itself—but there comes a cold wind, a hot 
sun—it can not escape it, it cannot destroy its annoyances—they are as native to the 
world as itself:  no more can man be happy in spite, the world[l]y elements will prey 
upon his nature” (II.101).   
     Keats’s view of the human condition, as these remarks suggest, reflects a 
fundamentally materialist, non-Christian perspective through which the poet, despite 
what seems his note of cheerlessness, finds hope in life without seeking theistic 
solace or otherworldly consolation.  This perspective, moreover, provides the 
principal tenet of Keats’s aesthetic practice, as Jack Stillinger notes:  “his significant 
poems center on a single basic problem, the mutability inherent in nature and human 
life, and openly or in disguise they debate the pros and cons of a single hypothetical 
solution, transcendence of earthly limitations by means of the visionary imagination” 
(The Hoodwinking of Madeline 100).  So important is this point to Keats criticism 
that Stillinger offers an elaboration of it as a key to the poet’s imaginative 
productions:  “If one were to summarize the career in a sentence, it would be 
something like this:  Keats came to learn that this kind of imagination was a false 
lure, inadequate to the needs of the problem, and in the end he traded it for the 
naturalized imagination, embracing experience and process as his own and man’s 
chief good.  His honesty in treating the problem and his final opting for the natural 
world, where all the concrete images of poetry come from and where melodies 
impinge on ‘the sensual ear’ or not at all, are what, more than anything else, 
guarantee his place ‘among the English poets’” (Madeline 100).2 
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     Stillinger’s reference to the well-known 14-31 October 1818 letter to the George 
Keatses evokes an earlier, more personalized illustration of Keats’s distinction 
between real life and visionary experience.  Keats describes his feelings after having 
met a young lady named Jane Cox, an Indian-born relation of the Reynolds Family, 
with whom the poet was intimate:  “I believe tho’ she has faults—the same as 
Charmian and Cleopatra might have had,” the woman nevertheless “speak[s] in a 
worldly way:  for there are two distinct tempers of mind in which we judge of 
things—the worldly, theatrical and pantomimical; and the unearthly, spiritual and 
etherial—in the former Buonaparte, Lord Byron and this Charmian hold the first 
place in our Minds; in the latter John Howard, Bishop Hooker [. . .] and you my dear 
Sister are the conquering feelings” (I.395-96).   
     Although Aileen Ward maintains that these comments reveal the poet’s maturing 
“self-assurance” (225) with women, the statements also point to his thoughts on the 
roles of vision and reality in poetry, as well as to his sense of British literary history 
and its connection to contemporary politics.3    Keats foresees himself “among the 
English Poets after my death” (I.394) and makes clear that he counts Milton among 
the great intellectual lights of the national past.  Further, he laments that, at a time 
when politics are “only sleepy because they will soon be too wide awake” (I.396), 
“our national Honesty” (I.396) is at risk because “there are none prepared to suffer in 
obscurity for their Country—the motives of our wo[r]st Men are interest and of our 
best Vanity—We have no Milton, no Algernon Sidney” (I.396).  By invoking Milton 
and republican history, Keats associates literary greatness with political radicalism. 
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Moreover, he looks to England’s past rather than to her present for ideals of selfless 
libertarianism, and his remarks encompass any number of contemporaries and 
intimates, including Byron and Shelley, Wordsworth and Coleridge, Leigh Hunt and 
Hazlitt, who, as the poet implies, prove poor heirs to Milton’s legacy. 
     That Keats imagines himself placed, albeit posthumously, in the company of 
England’s greatest writers is much more than an instance of youthful exuberance or a 
hope against hope (as we know, conservative periodicals such as Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine reviled Keats’s “Cockney School” verse).  Keats’s faith in his 
imaginative and compositional talents, as he confides to his brother and sister-in-law, 
suggests that the young Romantic saw within his work to date a revolutionary 
promise anchored within English literary tradition.  Thus Keats aspires to create 
poetry which challenges both the aesthetic conventions and political commonplaces 
of his day, in accordance with the paradigm established by Milton a century and a 
half earlier. 
     Given his belief in the worth of his art and his claim to literary immortality, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Keats casts certain statements later in the piece within a 
vatic idiom.  “If I had a prayer to make for any great good, next to Tom’s [John and 
George’s brother’s] recovery,” Keats writes, “it should be that one of your Children 
should be the first American Poet.  I have a great mind to make a prophecy and they 
say prophecies work out their own fulfillment” (I.398).  Subsequently, Keats includes 
fifty-six lines of verse which describe a small child’s daring grasp of a flaming lyre, 
an act that symbolizes the first ardor with poetry and the courageous initial step 
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toward the artist’s life (I.398-99).  After the child seizes the instruments and touches 
its strings, Keats celebrates:  “Bard art thou completely” (48, I.399). 
     This passage puts us in mind of what Hermione de Almeida calls Keats’s 
“declared and lifelong commitment” to the myth of the Greek god Apollo, whose 
“legendary energy [. . .] has always extended broad and tutelary sway over the 
parallel domains of poetry and medicine, music and disease, prophecy and prognosis” 
(17).4   From the first, Keats adopts the patron of healers and seers as a guiding 
principle:  for example, the “Ode to Apollo,” composed in 1815, presents the classical 
deity as “the great God of Bards” (47) as well.5   In this early poem, Keats’s reader 
finds Milton, Shakespeare, and Spenser at song in Apollo’s “western halls of gold” 
(1), by all appearances permanent guests at the god’s court.  Throughout his writing, 
Keats invokes Apollo with striking consistency, although, as Vincent Newey argues, 
he recasts the god’s image to accord with the changing circumstances of his life.6  
     The recurrence of the Apollo figure in Keats’s body of work, long noted and 
thoroughly discussed, helps to show that Keats, from the outset of his brief poetic 
career, significantly vexes Wittreich’s ideas regarding the English vatic tradition as 
the younger Romantics receive and engage it.  If Keats seems a conundrum, it is 
essentially because he synthesizes a fairly conventional perspective on English 
literary history with a non-Christian understanding of prophecy and an abiding, 
assertive intellectual radicalism which is frequently political and invariably 
materialistic.  Thus Keats, like Mary Shelley, disrupts Wittreich’s theoretical model, 
anchored as it is by the idea that English visionary writers necessarily emulate their  
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scriptural predecessors as part of the traditional vatic project.  To describe the poet’s 
relationship with his biblical progenitors, we may borrow Stillinger’s contention that 
“Keats was one of the least anxious writers in English literature” (“Wordsworth and 
Keats” 176).7   The next section of this chapter examines the ways in which Keats 
complicates Wittreich’s theories. 
* * * 
     In his writing on the English Romantics, Wittreich confesses that Keats proves a 
sticky wicket because he “is the poet least rooted in prophetic tradition; yet he is also 
the poet who gathers into sharpest focus the turns and counterturns of Romantic 
poetry, its fleeing from and then flying back into vision, as well as the perennial 
problem of whether the poet speaks oracularly or merely gives vent to his dreams” 
(“Prophecy” 45).  For Wittreich, Keats’s Ode to a Nightingale (1820) neatly 
illustrates the conflict between transcendent visionary experience, a type of 
essentialism, and the realities of human life as lived in the material world.   
     In this familiar piece, the poem’s speaker hears the nightingale’s “high requiem” 
(60) and strives at once to make sense of the song’s mystery.  This endeavor causes 
the speaker serious misgivings regarding his personal state and, by extension, the 
shared lot of humankind.  Although the nightingale’s music offers historical 
transcendence—“The voice I hear this passing night was heard / In ancient days by 
emperor and clown” (63-4)—the speaker finally cannot acquiesce in the freedom 
from immediate circumstances that the nightingale’s song and flight represent.  The 
poem closes without a decisive resolution: 
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          Forlorn! the very word is like a bell 
              To toll me back from thee to my sole self! 
          Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well 
              As she is fam’d to do, deceiving elf. 
          Adieu! adieu! thy plaintive anthem fades 
              Past the near meadows, over the still stream, 
                  Up the hill-side; and now ‘tis buried deep 
                        In the next valley-glades: 
                Was it a vision, or a waking dream? 
                    Fled is that music:—Do I wake or sleep?  (71-80) 
     In his poem’s conclusion, Keats plays out a basic conflict between ideal and 
reality, that is to say, between the desire to stand outside of history and humankind’s 
ineluctable implication within history.  The former offers a way past historical 
circumstance and accident, but at the cost of what makes us human; the latter offers a 
place within the shared fate of humankind, but at the cost of heaven and the release 
from time, place, and suffering.8   With both the Nightingale ode and The Fall of 
Hyperion (written 1819) in mind, Wittreich claims:  “What gnaws at Keats clearly is 
that those who fly after their visions may also be flying from social and political 
responsibility” (“Prophecy” 45).   Wittreich casts this apparent tension within the 
scope of Romantic prophecy as a whole:  “In the very act of making such distinctions, 
Keats opens a gulf between poets and visionaries, between poetry and prophecy, that 
the other Romantics had sought to bridge.  Coleridge called any distinction between 
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the artist and the visionary a cold-blooded hypothesis; and Shelley wrote his Defence 
of Poetry, in part, to argue for the interconnectedness of poetry and prophecy” 
(“Prophecy” 45).   
     Wittreich concludes that Keats, like the other major Romantics whose interests 
and writings place them within the English vatic tradition, is “impelled to scrutinize 
prophecy, to examine its limitations” in accordance with the seer-poet’s subversive 
function (“Prophecy” 45).  Thus Keats studies and then rewrites the Lake Poets and 
the Satanic School, just as William Blake studied and then rewrote Milton and the 
Bible years before Keats took up poetry.  Accordingly, if Keats’s uneasiness with the 
transcendent dimension of Romantic prophecy fosters a “critique of the visionary 
ideology in which prophecy itself had established its moorings” (“Prophecy” 49), this 
discomfort, for Wittreich, suggests that Keats is in fact devoted to asking the 
questions that a seer-poet must ask in order to summon historical change. 
     By interpreting Keats in this way, Wittreich offers an analysis that puts one in 
mind of Marilyn Butler, who reads The Fall of Hyperion as a purposeful engagement 
with Romantic visionary convention and its principal architects:  “By relocating the 
action [of the poem] in the consciousness of a modern poet, Keats takes up a topic 
more familiar in the work of Shelley and Peacock—contemplation of the role of the 
writer, especially in the light of the religious, vatic stance urged by the living older 
poets” (152).  She adds that the work “begins with some observations unsympathetic 
to privacy, spirituality, primitive or fundamentalist insights, the various strands which 
go to make up the seer-poet recently sketched by the Lakists” (152).  Butler thus  
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reads Keats’s piece as a confrontation with literary history and its makers, recent and 
remote alike—although it is worth noting that she identifies Dante, rather than 
Milton, as the foremost influence on the second Hyperion fragment and determines 
that Coleridge, rather than Wordsworth or Southey, is the main target of the poem’s 
more vituperative passages.9   All the same, Butler’s interpretation of Keats as a critic 
of the Romantic visionary mode is in consonance with Wittreich’s argument, to the 
effect that Keats appears, strangely enough, to fall in line with both the Lake Poets 
and the Byron-Shelley literary circle because he calls their respective aesthetic creeds 
into questions. 
     Wittreich’s view of Keats, though correct in some particulars, mistakenly counts 
him among the Romantic seer-poets simply because he presents his critique of 
contemporary visionary poetics in a manner resembling the poet-prophet’s 
intervention into his forbears’ work.  If Wittreich’s analysis seems insufficient, its 
insufficiency owes to the fact that Keats is far more than the student-critic of 
Romantic prophecy for whom Wittreich is theoretically prepared.  Rather, Keats 
enters the visionary tradition as a poet less interested in revising his poetic teachers 
than in revising the notion that poetic vision can be taught or learned at all.  In this 
sense, Keats asserts that vision, unless proved upon our pulses, always runs the risk of 
being merely an aesthetic phenomenon and so for the most part unreal. 
     In light of these contentions, we may better understand Nicholas Roe’s point that 
“to aspire to a perfected existence—through the use of medicine, by means of 
political revolution, or in achieving unity with ‘divine immortal essence’—is to  
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know oneself already forlorn,” a complex truth which persuades Keats to consider 
that “the only course open for humankind may be to live in and through negative 
capability, aware that our welfare depends upon the interdependence [. . .] of self, 
humankind, and the natural world” (201).  For Keats, the vatic stance endangers this 
awareness of our connectedness to others and to Nature by replacing the material 
realities of history and life with airy illusions, such as those which seduce Keats’s 
knight at arms in “La Belle Dame sans Merci:  A Ballad” (1820) and leave him 
“alone and palely loitering” (2; 46) in a waste forest where “no birds sing” (4; 48).        
     Certainly, Keats’s thoughts on poetic vision and material reality clash with 
Romantic prophecy’s emphasis on the possibility of transcendence.  His ideas of 
human sympathy, crystallized in the concept of negative capability, also set Keats at 
odds with contemporaries such as Shelley, who, in works such as Prometheus 
Unbound (1820), presents human perfectibility and all-pervasive Love as an 
attainable vision of hope.  As Greg Kucich points out, negative capability—“when 
man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable 
reaching after fact & reason” (I.193)—is more than a celebration of Shakespeare’s 
imagination; for Keats, it is both a theory of past literary achievement and an ideal for 
his own art and life (Kucich 193).10   Moreover, the concept bears “associations with 
the reform politics that Keats endorsed” (Kucich 193); partly influenced by Hazlitt’s 
radicalism, Keats eventually recognized in his negative capability idea a principle 
upon which “communal sympathies and egalitarian politics” could be founded 
(Kucich 193).  In short, Keats expresses a belief in the power of art and artists to  
171 
catalyze change without recourse to a poetics of idealism or transcendence.  Thus he 
engages the English visionary tradition from an intensely materialist position that 
reflects both his maturing political altruism (“I would jump down Ætna for any great 
Public good,” Keats tells J. H. Reynolds in a 9 April 1818 letter) (I.267) and his 
intellectual self-assertiveness.   
     Keats makes this position clear in “Dear Reynolds, as last night I lay in bed,” a 
poem he composed as he worked on his adaptation of Boccaccio, entitled Isabella; or 
The Pot of Basil, and which he sent in a letter to Reynolds in March, 1818.11   After 
inventorying the phantasmagoric images that he witnessed while falling asleep the 
evening before, including “two witch’s eyes above a cherub’s mouth” (6), “Voltaire 
with casque and shield and habergeon” (7), “Old Socrates a-tying his cravat” (8) and 
“Hazlitt playing with Miss Edgeworth’s cat” (10), the speaker longs for a type of 
vision in harmony with the world of circumstance: 
            O that our dreamings all of sleep or wake 
          Would all their colours from the sunset take: 
           From something of material sublime, 
           Rather than shadow our own soul’s daytime 
           In the dark void of night.  (67-71) 
The speaker warns against the “imagination brought / Beyond its proper bound, yet 
still confined” (78-9) by its privileging of vision over reality:  “It is a flaw / In 
happiness to see beyond our bourn” (82-3) because this foreknowing “forces us in 
summer skies to mourn” (84) and “spoils the singing of the nightingale” (85). 
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     As this poem shows, Keats’s thoughts on visionary art are far more complex than 
Wittreich allows.  Wittreich casts Keats as belonging to the Romantic continuum of 
authors whose work, taken collectively, recalls the vatic aesthetics and performances 
of authors such as Chaucer, Spenser, and of course Milton.  Yet Keats, if not 
precisely a destroyer, is scarcely the preserver who Wittreich wants him to be.  The 
truth lies somewhere between the two extremes.   
* * * 
     Keats’s posthumously published sonnet, “Before he went to live with owls and 
bats” (circa 1817), unlike “Written on the Day That Mr. Leigh Hunt Left Prison” 
(composed 2 February 1815), “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” (published 
1 December 1816), or “To Kosciusko” (published 16 February 1817), has received 
little formal attention from Romanticists, despite recent discussions by John Kandl 
and Susan J. Wolfson regarding Keats and the sonnet tradition.12   The poem’s 
marginalization owes partly to difficulties in classifying it.  For example, Lawrence 
John Zillman, in his 1939 book on Keats’s sonnets, presents a table of “principal 
themes” (84) in which he places “Before he went” with the political sonnets but 
includes a bracketed question mark (of the sixty-six sonnets Zillman lists, only one 
other, “How fever’d is the man,” is similarly designated) (84).  In this section, I want 
to argue that the poem, notwithstanding the critics’ general silence, superbly 
illustrates Keats’s materialism and political liberalism in relation to both traditional 
and late-Regency visionary poetics.  Through the sonnet, Keats intensifies the 
dynamic between the possible and the actual, the essential and the material, the time- 
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less and the timely to such an extent that he renders chimerical any notion of a 
visionary poetry that does not bear the freight of precise political, social, and 
economic problems. 
     Although it is one of Keats’s least familiar pieces, the sonnet invokes one of the 
best known scriptural prophetic books, namely, the Book of Daniel.  Among the 
Romantics, the Book of Daniel was a favorite source of images, characters, and 
incidents:  William Blake, for example, draws from the Book to create his famous 
1795 depiction of the monarch Nebuchadnezzar (a piece housed today in the Tate 
Gallery, London); and Byron includes in Hebrew Melodies (1815) a poem entitled 
“Vision of Belshazzar.”13   John J. Collins’s analysis helps to clarify the Book’s 
appeal to Romantic poets such as Blake, Byron, and Keats.  For Collins, there is an 
“essential bond between the wisdom of the visionary and his political stance” (224), 
and the Book of Daniel reminds us that the visionary’s “interest in and allegiance to 
the heavenly world serves to sharpen his confrontation with the kingdoms of the 
earth” (223).  Therefore, the Book’s “relevance is greatest in times of change and 
uncertainty when the beasts of chaos seem again to rise from the sea” (223).  
Although he cites William Butler Yeats and the period of the two World Wars, 
Collins could just as easily reference the period of the Hanoverian reign, the French 
Revolution, and the Napoleonic Wars when he notes that “Daniel speaks most 
eloquently to situations where a radical change is required” (224). 
     Keats looks to the earlier chapters of the Book of Daniel, particularly chapters two 
and four.  In the former, Daniel interprets Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of “a great  
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image” (2.31) composed of gold, silver, brass, iron, and clay (2.32-3); in the latter, 
Nebuchadnezzar himself recounts his seven years “with the beasts of the field” (4.32) 
after “a voice from heaven” (4.31) confirms that Daniel has interpreted another of the 
king’s dreams correctly.  This dream, in which “a watcher and an holy one from 
heaven” (4.23) commands the monarch to fell a majestic tree while leaving the stump 
and roots undisturbed, transforms the king by humbling him before God:  “And at the 
end of the days I Nebuchadnezzar lifted up mine eyes unto heaven, and mine 
understanding returned unto me, and I blessed the most High, and I praised and 
honoured him that liveth for ever, whose dominion is an everlasting dominion, and 
his kingdom is from generation to generation” (4.34).  This important scriptural 
instance of renewal and self-renovation tempts us to see the fourth chapter of the 
Book of Daniel in the intellectual background of the fourth part of Coleridge’s The 
Rime of the Ancient Mariner, a poem first published in Lyrical Ballads (1798) and 
revised significantly between 1800 and 1834.14   But if Coleridge uses this particular 
biblical material to represent the Ancient Mariner’s self-effacement before the natural 
world, then Keats takes the reinterpretation of the Book of Daniel much further by 
adapting the scriptural text to his critique of late-Regency politics and visionary art. 
     In its opening quatrain, “Before he went,” as John Barnard notes, invokes “the 
Peace celebrations of 1814” (612) through reference to the staged naval battles 
presented in England after Napoleon’s first abdication:  “Nebuchadnezzar had an ugly 
dream, / Worse than a housewife’s, when she thinks her cream / Made a naumachia 
for mice and rats” (2-4).  The grand spectacle of the “naumachia” (4) interweaves  
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with an image of domestic life that itself suggests, if not squalor, then at least some 
serious limitedness of, and danger to, resources and provisions.  This startling 
commingling of images hints at any number of intriguing contrasts, among which we 
may count juxtapositions between public and private life, excess and economy, the 
international and the parochial, and even between a presumably patriarchal show of 
martial force and a specifically matriarchal regard for the continuation of life and 
well-being.  The quatrain also democratizes the visionary experience:  in a prelude to 
the emperor and clown who hear the melody of Keats’s nightingale, Nebuchadnezzar 
and the housewife—types of the king and the commoner—are equals at the level of 
dreams. 
     Just as the act of dreaming levels the boundaries separating sovereigns and 
subjects, the art of interpreting dreams vexes political and social codifications.  As we 
may infer from the sonnet’s second quatrain, Keats offers the prophet Daniel, who is 
among the best-known dream-readers in the Judeo-Christian heritage, as a voice of 
political opposition.  Although its allusions to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
(III.i.76) and to St. Luke’s gospel (6.42)15 perhaps combine to strike an ironic note, 
the quatrain is less critical of Daniel than of the king who summons him: 
          So scared, he sent for that “good king of cats,” 
              Young Daniel, who did straightway pluck the beam 
              From out his eye, and said—“I do not deem 
          Your sceptre worth a straw, your cushions old door mats.”  (5-8) 
Notwithstanding that it is King Darius, rather than Nebuchadnezzar, who unwillingly  
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casts Daniel into the lions’ den (6.16-23), this quatrain registers an idea of monarchy 
consistent with the political radicalism one finds also in the late-Regency works of 
Byron and Shelley, such as the former’s “Vision of Belshazzar” and “To the Prince 
Regent” (1819) and the latter’s “England in 1819” (published by Mary Shelley in 
1839), to cite only a few of myriad possible examples.16   
     By virtue of his strong liberalist disposition, Keats shares much with his principal 
younger Romantic contemporaries.  At the same time, he is too vibrantly 
independent, both intellectually and artistically, to follow either Byron or Shelley like 
a small dog trailing his companion.  Thus while the sonnet’s octave places Keats 
comfortably among the Byron-Shelley literary coterie in principle, the sestet renders a 
formidable attack on the postwar vatic Romanticism best represented by his two well-
born fellow poets: 
          A horrid nightmare, similar somewhat, 
              Of late has haunted a most valiant crew 
                  Of loggerheads and chapmen;—we are told 
          That any Daniel, though he be a sot, 
              Can make their lying lips turn pale of hue, 
                  By drawling out—“Ye are that head of gold!”  (9-14) 
     Taken as a whole, Keats’s poem invites us to read the political figures of England 
in 1817 as its referents.  Ward asserts that Keats’s “cryptic sonnet” (149) reflects the 
poet’s “elation” (149) upon learning, in late December 1817, that William Hone, the 
radical political satirist, was acquitted after his “successful defense of himself at his 
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three well-publicized trials” in December of that year (Dyer 73).  In these trials, Hone 
was prosecuted for publishing three popular parodies, namely John Wilkes’s 
Catechism, The Sinecurist’s Creed, and The Political Litany (all 1817), that critiqued 
the Tory government via satiric “re-writings of Anglican liturgy” (Dyer 75).  Ward 
notes that “twenty thousand Londoners cheered him as he emerged from the 
courtroom” (149).  At a time when “parody was the dominant technique of populist 
radicalism,” as Gary Dyer observes (75), Hone was beloved by liberal intellectuals 
like Keats and reviled by Tory administrators and authorities like Lord Ellenborough, 
who, as Keats wrote to his brothers George and Tom in late December 1817, “has 
been paid in his own coin” by Hone’s acquittal (I.191).17  Barnard follows Ward in 
identifying Keats’s sonnet as a “political satire” of the Tories in which Daniel 
represents Hone, Nebuchadnezzar is King George III, and the “valiant crew” (10) 
“stands for the Tory ministry, who were terrified that the regime, maintained by force, 
might be overthrown by popular revolt” (Barnard 612).18 
     While Barnard and Ward properly focus on the poem’s contemporary political 
relevance, “Before he went” also bitingly critiques Romanticism’s visionary strain, 
particularly through the six closing verses.  The sestet significantly unsettles the 
Romantics’ general recourse to Christian tradition as a source of visionary authority.  
Contrary thus not only to Wittreich’s analysis but also to Robert M. Ryan’s claim 
that, for Keats, “all human thought is presided over and directed by a ‘mighty 
providence’ that raises up prophets and reformers in each age to lead mankind toward 
a purer, more refined religious consciousness” (172), the sonnet, both in part and as a 
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whole, questions the scriptural paradigm for prophetic insight and so, by extension, 
the very basis of Romantic visionary literature. 
     The sonnet’s first quatrain, as I have stated, posits dreams and dreaming as 
democratizing agents that place the housewife on the same plane as the king, and 
such democratization suggests Keats’s political egalitarianism.  Moreover, if dreams 
create a provisional classlessness among human beings, then the interpretation of 
dreams offers a similar leveling of political and social distinctions.  Thus, in the 
second quatrain, the emperor calls for Daniel, who, despite being an alien captive in 
Babylon (Nebuchadnezzar’s kingdom), openly censures the king.  This quatrain 
recreates the sense of the biblical scene without evincing particular fidelity to the 
specifics of the second chapter of the Book of Daniel.  For example, Keats applies a 
Shakespearean phrase appositionally (and anachronistically) to introduce Daniel—the 
“‘Good King of Cats’” (5) is what Mercutio calls Tybalt just before the latter slays 
the former (Romeo and Juliet III.1.76).  Furthermore, Daniel’s association with the 
lions is established in the scriptural text only after Nebuchadnezzar’s death (that is, in 
the sixth chapter).  Such confusions should not be taken as evidence of Keats’s 
unfamiliarity with biblical sources; the poet, in a 31 March 1819 letter, advised his 
sister, Fanny Keats, to study the imagery of Daniel’s second chapter as preparation 
for her Confirmation (II.50).   Rather, Keats purposefully mixes these allusions to 
demystify Daniel and, with an undercurrent of humor, to humble the prophet without 
discrediting his anti-monarchical message.19    Thus Keats’s pastiche of scriptural and 
Shakespearean references serves to uphold equality among housewife, seer, and king.   
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     Unlike the typical Italian sonnet—that is, one styled after the Petrarchan model 
with respect to rhyme scheme and the movement of ideas—“Before he went” does 
not resolve in its sestet the problem that is introduced in its octave.   Instead, the 
poem’s closing verses sharpen the critical tone of the first eight lines as the focus 
shifts from the scriptural past to the Regency present.  Keats thus indicts the art and 
artists of his day, as well as the Tory government, by contemporizing the poem’s 
frame of reference.  What he ultimately condemns is vatic Romanticism itself, a type 
of poetic expression that, when he composed the sonnet in 1817, was evoked most 
recently by Coleridge’s volume Sibylline Leaves (which Keats read shortly after its 
publication) and, later in the year, by Shelley’s long poem Laon and Cythna (which 
he mentions in the “Negative Capability” letter of December 1817) (I.194).20   This 
condemnation, moreover, reflects Keats’s basic distrust of the transcendent idealism 
upon which vatic Romanticism is founded. 
     Ronald A. Sharp, in Keats, Skepticism, and the Religion of Beauty, writes that 
“unlike Blake or Wordsworth or Coleridge, Keats maintained a deep and abiding 
skepticism about the possibility of knowing with certainty any kind of transcendent or 
higher reality” because “the imagination was an exclusively human agency serving 
purely human ends.  Its religious function was not to mediate a holy communion with 
higher reality but to endow human life with beauty, which he regarded as holy not 
because it was part of some grand scheme of things, but simply because it made life 
worth living” (5).  Keats is never oblivious to the dangers of vatic Romanticism.  In 
the early piece, “Sleep and Poetry” (1816), for example, Keats celebrates that poetry  
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shall bear his speaker to “the fair / Visions of all places” (62-3) “if I can bear / The 
o’erwhelming sweets” (61-2).  As his career progresses, Keats reiterates his hesitance 
regarding visionary experience; in The Fall of Hyperion, the poem on which he was 
working at the time of the Perterloo Massacre in August 1819, Keats asserts that 
“Poesy alone can tell her dreams” (I.8) because “the fine spell of words alone can 
save / Imagination from the sable charm / And dumb enchantment” (I.9-11).   
     Vision, therefore, may properly be articulated only by poets and in written art, 
“Since every man whose soul is not a clod / Hath visions” (Fall I.13-14).  Keats’s idea 
of the visionary poet thus recalls the words of Theseus in Shakespeare’s A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream (c. 1594-95): 
          The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, 
          Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
          And as imagination bodies forth 
          The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen 
          Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
          A local habitation and a name.  (5.1.12-17) 
In this way, Theseus distinguishes poets from “lovers and madmen” (5.1.4); similarly, 
Keats, in the Fall, asserts the difference between poets and “fanatics” (I.1).  This 
difference, for Keats, sets the poet apart from both the scriptural Daniel and the 
Daniel of the Regency pub, neither of whom performs the artist’s work.  Without 
such a distinction, the poetic imagination loses its special value as a force for 
political, social, and intellectual change. 
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     Through its skepticism, Keats’s “Before he went” both recapitulates “Sleep and 
Poetry” and anticipates The Fall of Hyperion.  Accordingly, the sonnet serves to 
indicate the poet’s developing thoughts on both Romantic aesthetics and postwar 
political critique.  In his 17-27 September 1819 letter to George and Georgiana, Keats 
sketches out his view of the current political milieu vis-à-vis his take on the history of 
English politics and arrives at the conclusion that English and French liberalism 
“sowed the seed of opposition to [. . .] Tyranny” that inspired the French Revolution 
(II.193).  The Revolution, however, “had an unlucky termination.  It put a stop to the 
rapid progress of free sentiments in England; and gave our Court hopes of turning 
back to the despotism of the 16 century” (II.193).  The Hanoverian regime, in Keats’s 
analysis, from the first exploited the French Revolution “in every way to undermine 
our freedom.  They spread a horrid superstition against all innovation and 
improvement” (II.193).  The poet summarizes by proclaiming that “the present 
struggle of the people is to destroy this superstition” (II.193).   
     For Keats, postwar political repression reflects the anachronistic worldview shared 
by both the crown and the government, a retrogressive perspective that works against 
the “grand march of intellect” (I.282) of which he wrote to J. H. Reynolds on 3 May 
1818.  Given that he employs this phrase to describe the differences between 
Wordsworth and Milton (the former being a superior poet of “the human heart”) 
(I.282), we may infer that Keats aligns, by the time of the St. Peter’s Field Massacre, 
his thought on literary history with his interpretation of contemporary politics.  
“Before he went” reflects this important alignment by criticizing what its author  
182 
deems anachronistic within Romantic visionary poetry itself.  The sonnet offers the 
view that the scriptural inheritance behind Regency-era ideas of prophecy hinders 
rather than helps the development of political critique at a time when such critique is 
crucial.  For Keats, the Bible is “figurative” (LJK II.67), a source of insight into 
worldly human existence, not a revelation of divine truth.  By adopting scriptural 
precedents too seriously and uncritically, poets forfeit their power to speak to human 
beings in the here and now.  As a result, postwar English poetry fails to contribute in 
a real way to intellectual and political progress because it appropriates an idiom, 
identity, and purpose which is not its own. 
     Keats’s sonnet is not an attack on Christianity; although suspicious of the “pious 
frauds of Religion” (LJK II.80), Keats acknowledges, “Yet through all this I see his 
splendour” (LJK II.80).  The poet appreciates Christ Himself as a great philosopher, a 
help to humankind.  At the same time, Keats distinguishes carefully between the 
mysteries of theology and the realities of poetry.  As M. H. Abrams claims, Keats 
ascertained “that a poem, like any other work of art, is a material as well as a 
significant thing,” perhaps “the most intimately human” material art (38).  By nature, 
poetry belongs to the material realm, and its role is defined by the fact:  “Nothing 
ever becomes real,” Keats writes, “till it is experienced—Even a Proverb is no 
proverb to you till your Life has illustrated it” (II.81).  Therefore, when he speculates 
on God, the poet admits that he is “straining at particles of light in the midst of a great 
darkness” (II.80).  Given such distinctions, we better understand that “Before he 
went” criticizes Christianity less than it chastises the prevailing aesthetics of the day.  
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The sonnet warns against the consequences of spiritualizing, even etherealizing 
poetry to meet the requirements of the theological tradition.  The poem thus asserts a 
skepticism toward Romantic visionary poetics that appears throughout Keats’s work 
but bears particular relevance as the poet’s thinking on art and politics matures. 
* * * 
     Keats wrote all of his major poetry by late 1819; between his engagement to 
Fanny Brawne in December of that year and his death in Italy in 1821, he lived only 
fourteen months.  What this fact establishes—and what the arrangement of this 
study’s chapters perhaps conceals—is that Keats’s oeuvre predates the publications of 
Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, Byron’s The Vision of Judgment, and Mary 
Shelley’s The Last Man.  While it is the case that Keats’s body of work 
chronologically precedes these key works of Romantic prophecy, the influence of the 
former on subsequent generations of British writers far surpasses the influence of the 
latter.  This assertion bears a twofold significance:  in the first and more general 
sense, we may claim, with David Bromwich, that Keats exerted “an immense 
influence on the Victorians” by experimenting with both poetic form and subject 
matter (Hazlitt 401); in the second and more particular sense, Keats subverts vatic 
poetics so thoroughly that his canon, together with Mary Shelley’s 1826 novel, 
essentially discontinue the nineteenth-century line of vision. 
     This discontinuation, of course, is neither immediate nor complete.  For example, 
Herbert F. Tucker argues that Alfred Tennyson’s juvenilia, including poems such as 
“Armageddon” (c. 1824-25; later “Timbuctoo,” 1829), register Tennyson’s attempt to  
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craft verse in the Romantic visionary vein (40-1).  But even after Tennyson abandons 
his youthful fascination with Romantic prophecy, he maintains a passionate interest in 
Keats:  “Nothing he ever read moved Tennyson more deeply,” Tucker asserts, “than 
Keats’s renditions of inevitable process in ‘To Autumn,’ Hyperion, and elsewhere” 
(77).  And although he “often denigrated Keats’s poetic style,” Tennyson 
“unswervingly” applauded Keats’s “genius” (Tucker 77).  Tucker’s analysis of the 
young Tennyson provides simply one important illustration, from myriad 
possibilities, of Keats’s lasting influence on the British poets of the early Victorian 
period.  Critical treatments of the subject include George Harry Ford’s classic Keats 
and the Victorians and, more recently, James Najarian’s book-length study entitled 
Victorian Keats.21 
     Keats’s legacy was of importance also to the more literate reformers of the early 
Victorian years.  The Chartist leaders William Lovett and Thomas Cooper, as Richard 
D. Altick notes in The English Common Reader (1957), were especially interested in 
literature’s value as an instrument of political and social reform:  “Chartist meetings 
were unusual in the history of English political agitation in that, when no immediate 
political topic required discussion, Cooper lectured on Milton, Shakespeare, and 
Burns” (207).   Furthermore, “at least one Chartist publication, W. J. Linton’s The 
National:  A Library for the People (1839) printed selections from great English 
authors” whose works engaged the principles and ideals of Chartist populism.  Linton 
included Keats along with Romantic poets such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, 
and Leigh Hunt (Altick 207). 
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     As the examples of Tennyson’s juvenilia and the Chartists’ literary interests 
illustrate, Keats significantly influences the intellectuals who come to prominence in 
the years following the passing of the Great Reform Bill (1832) and the accession of 
Queen Victoria (1837).  In light of this claim, we may better evaluate how his 
challenge to Romantic-era vatic art helps to put a hasty end to the visionary line in 
Victorian England.  Certainly, Keats’s skeptical view of Romantic prophecy reflects 
that the young poet possessed a critical, assertive mind and a preference for material 
realities over metaphysical speculations.  Keats rejects a literature that, whether 
forthrightly or by implication, fosters the hope of transcendence at a moment of 
historical crisis, specifically, the years of the postwar Regency in England.  The 
grounds of this rejection, however, bear relevance beyond the scope of Keats’s 
lifetime because the poet’s skepticism and radical materialism anticipate the artistic 
temperament and intellectual concerns that prevail in the early decades of the 
Victorian period. 
     Within twenty years of Keats’s death, a number of important national reforms 
were enacted, including Catholic Emancipation (1829), the 1833 Factory Act (which 
placed restrictions on child labor), the abolition of slavery throughout the empire 
(1834), and the Municipal Reform Act (1835).22   The Anti-Corn Law League came 
into existence in 1838, as did the radical Chartist movement.  The age was one of 
rapid political and social change, and much of the day’s literature reflects the 
reformist spirit that brought about positive legislation in the 1830s and agitated for 
further improvements well into the troubled 1840s and beyond.  Novelists such as 
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Elizabeth Gaskell, Fanny Trollope, Charles Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, Dinah Maria 
Mulock, and Benjamin Disraeli produced fiction, set either in the contemporary 
moment or recent past, in which various social and political problems receive 
intensive treatment.  Harriet Martineau and Thomas Carlyle, of course, were also 
important social reformers who worked in prose.  And the poets Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning, Caroline Norton, and Thomas Hood, like the prose authors whom I have 
mentioned, addressed political and social wrongs in their works, especially during the 
1830s and 1840s.23     
     Despite the fact that several Romantic poets espouse reformist ideals through their 
visionary texts, the writers of the post-Romantic era—a time distinguished by 
struggles to transform the political organization, social structure, and economic 
realities of the nation—favor a type of materialist realism perhaps more evocative of 
the wit tradition than the line of vision.  This shift in the literary atmosphere of the 
times is partly explained by “the achievement of cultural hegemony by the 
bourgeoisie” during the Romantic period, as Jackie DiSalvo notes (“Blake” 181).24 
The ascendance of middle class ideology and taste in early nineteenth-century 
England reverberates in Victorian literature from the 1830s on.  The Romantic vatic 
stance, although it develops in concurrence with the rise of the bourgeoisie, appears 
by the dawn of the Victorian age to belong to a distinctly separate moment in cultural 
history.  To be sure, the reformist values of Romantic poet-prophets like Blake and 
Shelley endure beyond 1832; but their individual aesthetic codes, their visionary 
poetics, for the most part do not.    
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     Douglas Bush offers an illuminating example of this second point by asserting that 
the Romantic poets “had been both teachers and artists” and, with these writers, 
“however ornate they might be, style remained a means, it did not become an end in 
itself” (201).  In Tennyson, however, discernable changes take place:   
          In The Palace of Art, for instance, Tennyson poses much the same question 
          that had troubled Shelley and Keats:  can the individual live in an intellectual 
          and artistic world of his own, or does he need the nourishment of ordinary  
          human life and sympathy with the common lot?  In spite of the artistic faults of 
          Alastor and Endymion, no one can doubt that Shelley and Keats are stirred to 
          their depths by the problem they try to solve.  Tennyson is more palpably 
          didactic [. . .] he is not struggling toward a glimpse of the truth, he has  
          apparently always known it.  (201-2) 
     Tennyson’s poem, as Bush interprets it, embodies aesthetic preferences which 
reflect the early Victorian bourgeois cast of mind.  These preferences include a stress 
on moral edification, as well as an emphasis on stylistic embellishment.  Both 
considerations, of course, evoke the aesthetics of wit rather than the poetics of vision.  
If we allow Tennyson to represent the early Victorian literary imagination, and if we 
view The Palace of Art as an emblematic product of the 1830s and 1840s, we may 
recognize that both the poet and his poem stand at a remarkable distance from the 
Romantic seer-poets and their vatic art.   
     By virtue of his skepticism and materialist perspective, particularly as these bear 
on his idea of visionary poetry, Keats helps to facilitate the downfall of Romantic  
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prophecy as a viable poetic approach in the era of the Great Reform Bill.  Certainly, 
Keats shares little, either artistically or ideologically, with his Victorian heirs.  At the 
same time, his critique of Romantic prophecy bequeaths to the Victorians a distrust of 
transcendent idealism that, very quickly after his death, becomes a cultural instinct at 
a moment when social reform and political agitation promised to bring what Keats 
hoped to see in his own lifetime, that is, “a continual change for the better” (LJK 
II.193).   
     Of course, the Victorian era saw instances of engagement with the English 
visionary tradition, including shorter pieces such as Gerard Manley Hopkins’s “Spelt 
from Sibyl’s Leaves” (c. 1885-87), longer poems such as Tennyson’s Idylls of the 
King (completed 1888), and novels such as William Morris’s novel News from 
Nowhere (1890).  Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1901) plays on a convention of the 
tradition to frame the title character’s youthful adventures; he is told:  “there will 
come for you a great Red Bull on a green field, and the Colonel riding on his tall 
horse, yes, and [. . .] nine hundred devils” (2).  A survey of such engagements, 
including those rendered with comic irony (the Colonel and devils are soldiers of the 
British Raj), reveals that the visionary idiom so important to the British Romantics 
became marginal, even eccentric, throughout the Victorian period.  Much more 
representatively Victorian is the narrator’s proclamation in George Eliot’s novel, 
Middlemarch (1871-72):  “Among all forms of mistake, prophecy is the most 
gratuitous” (I.x.77).  If Hopkins, the older Tennyson, and Morris recall the Lake Poets 
and Shelley, then Eliot surely evokes Keats and the fled music of Romantic vision. 
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     In light of this assertion, the reader may see that Keats’s placement at the end of 
this study reflects his lastingly significant influence on the Victorians.  Although he 
wrote virtually all of his poetical works before Prometheus Unbound, The Vision of 
Judgment, and The Last Man appeared in print, Keats provides a critique of Romantic 
visionary poetics that echoes throughout the literature of Victorian England.  
Moreover, Keats accomplishes through verse what Mary Shelley achieves through 
prose, namely, the subversion of the visionary mode as a practicable compositional 
technique.  The final effects of this literary sabotage become clear after the age of 
Liverpool and George IV passes.  All the same, its beginnings may be traced back to 
Keats’s earliest postwar work.   
* * * 
     In this study, I have presented a critical narrative that partly counters Joseph 
Wittreich’s description of the Romantic line of vision.  My purpose has not been to 
discredit the theory of an English visionary lineage in which constituent artists share 
aesthetic and ideological codes across generations.  Rather, I have sought to 
reconsider Wittreich’s own critical narrative with a twofold focus on the 
distinctiveness of the younger Romantic poets and the particularity of the post-
Napoleonic historical moment.  By conducting my analysis in this fashion, I have 
endeavored to redraw the sketch of the British Romantics that Wittreich offers, 
thereby demonstrating that the visionary line theory continues to provide a useful 
framework through which to study the Romantics, their works, and their relations to 
the literary past.  My hope is that this discussion reveals the model’s adaptability and 
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contemporary relevance to the study of frequently neglected writers such as Anne 
Bannerman, Louisa Costello, Mary Tighe, Margaret Chalmers, and Anna Seward, to 
cite only a few examples.  Further interventions into Wittreich’s work may help to 
amplify the scope of the scholar’s incisive theories while sharpening their historical 
specificity.  In this light, the case of the second generation British Romantics, as I 
have presented it, suggests not the end of the English visionary tradition but rather a 
new critical beginning.                       
                
 
 
       
                             
        
                  
       
       
       
              
      
                         
                          
 
           
Notes 
Introduction 
     
1
 Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine (New York:  AMS 
Press, 1967) IV: 36. 
     
2 I use the adjectives wartime and postwar to describe the first and second 
generations of British Romantic writers, respectively.  The former, at times also 
referred to in this study as the older or early Romantic generation, includes artists 
such as William Blake, Mary Robinson, Anna Letitia Barbauld, Joanna Baillie, Sir 
Walter Scott, and the Lake Poets, namely, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and Robert Southey.  The latter, also referred to as the younger or later 
Romantic generation, includes Byron, the Shelleys, and Keats, as well as artists such 
as John Clare and Felicia Dorothea Hemans.  Although most of these authors wrote 
during the Regency period, the older Romantics produced important work over the 
course of the wartime period (1793-1815), before most of the younger Romantics 
reached maturity.  
     
3   Throughout this study, I employ words and phrases from Wittreich’s critical 
vocabulary, including visionary poetics, line of wit, and line of vision.  Generally, the 
first of these terms refers to a representative code of aesthetics, whereas the second 
and third terms pertain to the ways in which Wittreich theorizes English literary 
history.  In the essay, I use visionary poetics as a singular compound noun.  Also 
throughout the piece, I treat the words prophecy and vision synonymously; moreover,  
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for the sake of variety, I interchange the terms as poet-prophet, seer-poet, visionary, 
and vates to describe writers who work in the Miltonic vein (this point is asserted also 
in chapter one, page eleven).   
     
4 Although I reference William Blake and his work throughout this essay, I wish to 
note that Blake was largely unknown in his own time.  Consequently, the younger 
Romantics, who at times put the reader in mind of Blake, most likely did not have 
Blake in mind when they composed their visionary works. 
     
5 The term visionary poetics is not restricted solely to literature rendered in verse.  
Throughout this study (and in the fourth chapter particularly), the term encompasses 
relevant prose as well as poetry.  Accordingly, I regard Mary Shelley’s The Last Man 
as a work of visionary poetics and interpret the novel as such. 
 
Chapter One 
Visionary Poetics and Regency Romanticism 
     
1 Wittreich heatedly contests Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence in Angel of 
Apocalypse:  Blake’s Idea of Milton (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1975); see 
especially 221-250.  Wittreich refrains generally from remarking on Bate; but James 
Rieger, in his essay “Wordsworth Unalarm’d” from the Wittreich-edited Milton and 
the Line of Vision (Madison:  U of Wisconsin P, 1975), positions his reading of 
Wordsworth against Bate and Bloom alike (and, by extension, Havens; see 185-86 
and n. 3, 186-87).  Tellingly, Lucy Newlyn praises Bate’s “Freudian explanation of 
anxiety” (see Paradise Lost and the Romantic Reader, 14).  Reeves and Fletcher are  
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cited throughout Wittreich’s 1970s corpus.  Wittreich indicts Havens for creating “a 
model of poetic influence which led T. S. Eliot to conclude that Milton had been a 
bad influence—could only be a bad influence—on his successors” (“Preface,” MLV, 
xiii).  Curiously, Robin Jarvis likens Wittreich to Havens; see Wordsworth, Milton 
and the Theory of Poetic Relations, 136.  Wittreich critiques Taylor—a prominent 
source for Sharon L. Jansen’s Political Protest and Prophecy under Henry VIII 
(Woodbridge:  The Boydell Press, 1991)—by claiming that Taylor’s “description of 
prophecy is insufficiently pointed and generally unsophisticated” (Visionary Poetics 
219 n. 6).  He acknowledges that Taylor was one of the first scholars to see prophecy 
“as a clearly defined literary genre” (VP 219 n. 6) but adds that “Taylor’s conclusions 
are extrapolated from non-biblical prophecy [. . .] and the form he describes has but 
one characteristic—obscurity” (VP 219 n. 6).  Jansen writes more approvingly of 
Taylor; see Political Protest and Prophecy, 9-10 and ns. 1 and 2, 9-10.   
     Although he references both Roston’s Prophet and Poet:  The Bible and the 
Growth of Romanticism (Evanston:  Northwestern UP, 1965) and Murray’s The 
Puritan Hope:  A Study in Revival and the Interpretation of Prophecy (London:  
Banner of Truth Trust, 1971), Wittreich rarely engages either critic directly in his 
1970s work.  On the other hand, he takes Kerrigan to task for asserting, in The 
Prophetic Milton (Charlottesville:  UP of Virginia, 1974), “‘the prophetic Milton’ as 
his own discovery” (VP xvii).  Wittreich notes that Kerrigan “does not admit to being 
preempted in the early nineteenth century by William Blake or William Ellery 
Channing [. . .] nor to having been anticipated in his own century” by scholars such  
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as Herbert J. C. Grierson, Charles Roden Buxton, Merritt Y. Hughes, Angus Fletcher, 
and Michael Lieb (VP 218 n. 5).   
     I mention Peter F. Fisher because his study, The Valley of Vision:  Blake as 
Prophet and Revolutionary (Toronto:  U of Toronto P, 1961; reprinted 1971), seems 
to me to be in dialogue with several of Wittreich’s arguments (e.g. Fisher 75-77, 227-
228).  Wittreich does not expressly reference Fisher in any of the major 1970s works 
on the English visionary tradition. 
     
2   Hereafter, I abbreviate Milton and the Line of Vision as MLV in all 
parenthetical citations. 
     
3 As the mention of James Joyce suggests, Wittreich’s idea of visionary poetics 
does not preclude authors whose principal accomplishments are works in prose rather 
than in verse.  This specification is particularly relevant within this study to Mary 
Shelley, whose novel, The Last Man, I consider as a key part of the Romantic 
visionary corpus. 
     
4 Contemporary authors such as Salman Rushdie and Doris Lessing merit 
consideration as post-colonial visionaries, particularly insofar as Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses (1988) and Lessing’s The Four-Gated City (1969) both amplify and 
challenge Wittreich’s theories.  For a discussion of Rushdie in this respect, see 
Christine Cavanaugh, “Auguries of Power:  Prophecy and Violence in The Satanic 
Verses,” Studies in the Novel 36 (2004):  393-404.  For a treatment of Lessing in this 
regard, see Marion Vlastos, “Doris Lessing and R. D. Laing:  Psychopolitics and 
Prophecy,” PMLA:  Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 91  
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(1976):  245-58. 
     
5 For a discussion of William Shakespeare and his role in the English visionary 
tradition, see Wittreich, “Image of that Horror”:  History, Prophecy, and Apocalypse 
in King Lear (San Marino:  Huntington Library, 1984).  Save in this book, Wittreich 
seldom confronts the problems that Shakespeare poses to the visionary continuum 
theory, a somewhat surprising fact given the significance of both Milton and 
Shakespeare to the British Romantics.  For a further discussion of this significance, 
see Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1986). 
     
6
 Barbara Lewalski, in Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric of Literary Forms 
(Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1985), asserts a relevant point:  
              Milton’s assumptions about the prophetic role accord generally with those 
          of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist John Smith, for whom the 
          term encompasses all forms of divine illumination of the mind.  Smith’s lucid 
          summary of Hebrew tradition identified many kinds of prophets:  those of the 
          highest rank who (like Moses) were illuminated by direct impression upon  
          their intellect; those several varieties of “true” prophets who received their 
          revelation through the imagination—in visions or the lower mode of dreams; 
          and those who (like David the Psalmist and other biblical poets) spoke “by the 
          Holy Spirit,” as enlightened but not directly inspired.  Prophets of all kinds  
          were alike, however, in having to devise appropriate conceptual and stylistic 
          forms for the revelations they received in their several ways from God.  (25) 
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7 See Robert M. Ryan’s “Introduction” to The Romantic Reformation:  Religious 
Politics in English Literature, 1789-1824 (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1997), 1-12, 
especially 5-6. 
     
8 Hereafter I abbreviate Wittreich’s Visionary Poetics as VP in all parenthetical 
citations.  Similarly, I shorten the title of Wittreich’s essay, “Opening the Seals:  
Blake’s Epics and the Milton Tradition”, from Blake’s Sublime Allegory:  Essays on 
The Four Zoas, Milton, Jerusalem, edited by Stuart Curran and Wittreich (Madison:  
U of Wisconsin P, 1973), 23-58, to “Seals” in all parenthetical citations. 
     
9 See Stephen C. Behrendt’s “Introduction,” 13-32, to History and Myth:  Essays 
on English Romantic Literature, ed. Behrendt (Detroit:  Wayne State UP, 1990), 
especially 15-18. 
     
10 See William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (1599), 1.2.18-24, and Macbeth (c. 
1606-1607), 1.3.48-78. 
     
11See John Milton, Paradise Lost (1667), Book XI, lines 376-428.  Throughout this 
study, all quotations from Milton’s poetry are drawn from John Milton:  Complete 
Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York:  The Odyssey Press, 
1957). 
     
12 Lewalski, Paradise Lost and the Rhetoric of Literary Forms, 254-55. 
     
13Stuart Curran maintains that Romantic-era authors frequently invoked Milton 
and Paradise Lost simply as a conventional gesture that answered certain readers’ 
basic expectations:  “Milton’s achievement in this culminating section of the poem 
provided the model for a set piece borrowed by his emulators and usable in a variety  
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of situations.  It was so much a set piece for Southey that he removed ‘The Vision of 
the Maid of Orleans’ from Joan of Arc and printed it separately.  There is a fictive 
prophetic vision in Gebir, and, as a concluding book, in Cottle’s Messiah and Richard 
Payne Knight’s Alfred” (171).  See Curran’s Poetic Form and British Romanticism 
(New York and Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1986). 
     
14 See Newlyn, Paradise Lost and the Romantic Reader (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1993), 15-17. 
     
15Anne Bannerman (1765-1829) is best known for Tales of Superstition and 
Chivalry (1802); Louisa Stuart Costello (1799-1870) published The Maid of Cyprus 
Isle and Other Poems in 1815. 
     
16By giving DiSalvo the primary position in this generation, I do not wish to 
suggest that the other three critics should be defined or measured against her.  My use 
of her surname in the phrase DiSalvo generation simply acknowledges that she was 
the first of these fine scholars, to my knowledge, to publish on the English visionary 
tradition (specifically, in 1975, with her essay, “Blake Encountering Milton:  Politics 
and the Family in Paradise Lost and The Four Zoas,” 143-84, in Milton and the Line 
of Vision). 
     
17 The two Hill works most important to my study are The World Turned Upside 
Down:  Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (1972; London:  Penguin, 1991) 
and Milton and the English Revolution (New York:  Viking, 1977).  In parenthetical 
references, the former is abbreviated as World and the latter as Milton.  
     
18 Also see Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, 164. 
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     19Hill elaborates his perspective on this point in “A Nation of Prophets,” the sixth 
chapter of The World Turned Upside Down, 87-106; see especially 90-6. 
     
20Anne Janowitz, in Lyric and Labour in the Romantic Tradition (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1998), makes a comment on Chartist literature that touches upon the 
discussion at hand:  “For in an important sense, in the late 1830s a confident 
bourgeois literary culture was only shaping itself and gathering strength as an aspect 
of what would become the liberal, political, and intellectual hegemony later in the 
century.  Chartist poetry quite interestingly exhibits the strains of a struggle to define 
itself literarily in a context in which the working class was also just coming into being 
as a coherent force.  Chartist poetry and literary culture took on the task of wresting 
away the middle class’s own claim to universality by providing its own alternative, 
though equally purposive genealogy” (144).  Quoting from an 11 July, 1840 piece 
that appeared in the Chartist Circular, Janowitz suggests that the Chartists sought to 
align themselves with poets such as Burns, Byron, and Percy Shelley as a means to 
establish class identity:  “the Chartist poetic notion of popular sovereignty aimed to 
define a nation, and the nation would be born not from pure Painite and rationalist 
first principles, but out of and in relation to an inherited tradition, a tradition linked to 
the land, a tradition named and diffused through first- and second-generation 
Spenceans, and finding form again in the Chartist Land Plan of the later 1840s” (144-
45). 
     
21Tannenbaum treats each poem in a separate chapter:  he discusses America in 
chapter v., 124-51; Europe in chapter vi., 152-84; The Song of Los in chapter vii.,  
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185-200; The Book of Urizen in chapter viii., 201-24; The Book of Ahania in chapter 
ix., 225-50; and The Book of Los in chapter x., 251-81. 
     
22Tannenbaum also states that “Blake later abandons this project, as he becomes 
more interested in fusing biblical prophecy with the epic mode, casting the entire 
vision of the Bible in a single work” (7), and he mentions three works, namely The 
Four Zoas, Milton, and Jerusalem, through which Blake pursues this ambition.  For a 
discussion of the relationship between epic and prophecy, see Wittreich, Visionary 
Poetics, 26. 
     
23See Hoagwood, Prophecy and the Philosophy of Mind:  Traditions of Blake and 
Shelley (University:  U of Alabama P, 1985), 11-58. 
     
24All quotes from Byron’s poetry are drawn from Jerome J. McGann’s seven-
volume The Complete Poetical Works (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1980-93).  Note 
that McGann co-edits volume six with Barry Weller.   
     
25For her views on Harold Bloom, see Newlyn, Paradise Lost and the Romantic 
Reader, 14-15. 
     
26 See A. D. Harvey, “Hyperion’s Cousin’s:  Epic Poetry in the Style of Milton c. 
1818,” The Keats-Shelley Review 19 (2005), 32-8. 
     
27See Peter J. Kitson’s essay, “Milton:  The Romantics and After,” 463-80, in A 
Companion to Milton, ed. Thomas N. Corns (Oxford:  Blackwell, 2001).   
     
28See Stuart Woolf, “The Construction of a European World-View in the 
Revolutionary-Napoleonic Years,” Past and Present 137 (1992), 72-101, especially  
75-6.  I cite Vancouver and Park as representative, not exclusive, examples of early 
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29 All references to Southey’s A Vision of Judgment are to Byron and Southey:  
Vision of Judgment, edited by E. M. Earl and James Hogg (Salzburg:  University of 
Salzburg, 1998). 
     
30See Charles E. Robinson, Shelley and Byron:  The Snake and Eagle Wreathed in 
Fight (Baltimore and London:  The Johns Hopkins UP, 1976), 1-13. 
     
31For representative commentary on this point, see Maurice Hindle’s introduction 
to Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (London:  Penguin, 1992), xix-xxxv. 
     
32I draw here on Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People?:  England 
1783-1846 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 2006), 235-51. 
     
33For specifics on Blake’s trial for sedition, refer to Peter Ackroyd, Blake (New 
York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 244-53.   
     
34See Keats’s 25-27 June 1818 letter to Tom Keats in The Letters of John Keats, 
1814-1821, volume 1, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard UP, 
1958), 298-301.  Although I refer at this moment in the study to John Mee’s 
introduction to Keats’s Selected Letters, ed. Robert Gittings and revised by Mee 
(Oxford:  Oxford UP, 2002), all quotations of Keats’s letters are drawn from Rollins’s 
two-volume edition. 
     
35All quotations of Percy Bysshe Shelley, unless otherwise specified, are drawn 
from Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 2nd ed., ed. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat 
(New York and London:  Norton, 2002). 
     
36See The Early Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth (1787-1805), ed. 
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Ernest de Selincourt (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1935), 119-25.   
     
37 See Butler, Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries:  English Literature and its 
Background 1760-1830 (New York and Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1982), 83. 
     
38All quotations of William Wordsworth’s The Prelude are drawn from The 
Prelude 1799, 1805, 1850, ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, and Stephen 
Gill (New York and London:  Norton, 1979). 
     
39See Brenda Banks, “Rhetorical Missiles and Double-Talk:  Napoleon, 
Wordsworth, and the Invasion Scare of 1804,” Romanticism, Radicalism, and the 
Press, ed. Stephen C. Behrendt (Detroit:  Wayne State UP, 1997), 103-119. 
 
Chapter Two 
“A light like a green star”: 
Love’s Prophetic Reformation in Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound 
     
1All quotations of Shelley, unless otherwise specified, are drawn from Reiman and 
Fraistat, eds., Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 2nd edition (New York and London:  
Norton, 2002).   
     
2See Shelley’s note seven to Hellas in Reiman and Fraistat, 463-4. 
     
3See Shelley’s note seven to Hellas in Reiman and Fraistat, 463-4. 
     
4My definition here draws on The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and 
Literary Theory, J. A. Cuddon, revised by C. E. Preston (London:  Penguin, 1999), 
142. 
     
5Wittreich’s essay appears in The Age of William Wordsworth:  Critical Essays on 
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the Romantic Tradition, ed. Kenneth R. Johnston and Gene W. Ruoff (New 
Brunswick and London:  Rutgers UP, 1987), 39-61.  In all subsequent parenthetical 
citations, the piece is shortened to “Prophecy.” 
     
6Amanda M. Ellis, Rebels and Conservatives:  Dorothy and William Wordsworth 
and Their Circle (Bloomington and London:  Indiana UP, 1967), 33. 
     
7As indicated earlier, quotes from The Prelude are drawn from the Wordsworth, 
Abrams, and Gill edition. 
     
8 For the text of Shelley’s essay, “On Love,” see Reiman and Fraistat, 503-4. 
     
9 See Valerie P. Zimbaro, Encyclopedia of Apocalyptic Literature (Santa Barbara:  
ABC-CLIO, 1996), 272-74. 
     
10 For the text of “Prometheus,” see McGann, The Complete Poetical Works IV, 
31-33.  
     
11I base this statement on evidence drawn from Charles Grosvenor Osgood, A 
Concordance to the Poems of Edmund Spenser (Gloucester, MA:  P. Smith, 1963) 
and John Bradshaw, A Concordance to the Poetical Works of John Milton (1894; 
Hamden, CT:  Archon Books, 1965).  Milton, however, does reference the story of 
the Titans in Paradise Lost I.510-21. 
     
12For a twentieth-century use of the Prometheus myth, see Albert Camus’s 1947 
essay, “Prometheus in the Underworld,” in Lyrical and Critical Essays (New York:  
Vintage, 1970), 138-42. 
     
13See also Stuart Curran’s “The Political Prometheus” in Spirits of Fire:  English 
Romantic Writers and Contemporary Historical Methods, ed. G. A. Rosso and Daniel  
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P. Watkins (Rutherford:  Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 1990), 260-84. 
     
14For Laon and Cythna, see The Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. 
Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck (New York:  Gordian, 1965), vol. I, 235-410.   
     
15All quotations of Coleridge’s verse in this study are drawn from J. C. C. Mays’s 
edition of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Princeton:  Princeton 
UP, 2001).  The Rime of the Ancient Mariner appears in 16.1.1, 365-419. 
     
16 Note that throughout this study I use the Authorized King James Version of the 
Bible, as introduced and annotated by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford:  
Oxford UP, 1997). 
     
17 Sperry draws here on the speech of the First Fury, who says “We are the 
ministers of pain and fear / And disappointment and mistrust and hate.”  See 
Prometheus Unbound I.452-53. 
     
18 Consider also McNiece’s note, informed by Jean Charles Lacretelle’s account, 
that “the more violent and fanatical women of the French Revolution were often 
called the Furies” and that “the [anonymous] author of The Female Revolutionary 
Plutarch had a chapter entitled ‘Furies of the Guillotine.’  It described the activities of 
an organization so named by Robespierre” (fn.2, 28).  McNiece argues that 
Lacretelle, “who completed in a quite different spirit the history of the Revolution 
which Rabaut St. Étienne had begun” (31), “was interested in causes and motives” 
(31): 
          He shows how the Constituent Assembly paved the way for August 10 and 
          what he called the triumph of savagery and mediocrity.  He analyzes the defects 
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          of policy and temperament of the Girondists.  He explains how the approach 
          of the foreign armies and the civil war in the Vendée brought about the 
          September Massacres.  He describes how the seat of power shifted from the 
          Assembly to the Jacobins and the Commune, how attempts to stop the progress 
          of tyranny merely redoubled the violence.  After reading this dramatic account  
          of the fear, hatred, and anarchy of the Terror, Shelley must have understood 
          better Napoleon’s rise and his role in the Revolution.  (31-32) 
     McNiece deems The Female Revolutionary Plutarch “mainly a gossip book, both 
antirevolutionary and anti-Napoleonic, and it is inscribed to the revered memory of 
Marie Antoinette” (28).  He adds that the work offers a warning to “Englishmen who 
might nourish hope for reform” by highlighting the fact that “18, 613 French citizens, 
reformers and reformed, died at the guillotine” (29).  See McNiece, Shelley and the 
Revolutionary Idea (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard UP, 1969), 28-32. 
     
19See Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, Volume II:  Purgatory, trans. Mark 
Musa (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1985).  Note also the concluding lines of Dante’s 
Inferno (“I saw the lovely things the heavens hold, / and we came out to see once 
more the stars”), XXXIV.138-39, and the final verses of Paradise (“My will and my 
desire were turned by love, / The love that moves the sun and other stars”), 
XXXIII.144-45.  For the former, see The Divine Comedy, Volume I:  Inferno, trans. 
Mark Musa (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1984); for the latter, see The Divine 
Comedy, Volume III:  Paradise, trans. Dorothy L. Sayers and Barbara Reynolds 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1988). 
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20See Jennifer Ford, Coleridge on Dreaming:  Romanticism, Dreams and the 
Medical Imagination (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1998), especially 203-206. 
     
21For the text of Manfred, see The Complete Poetical Works, IV, 51-102. 
     
22 See Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene IV.ii.47, and John Milton, Paradise 
Lost II.964-5.  The text of Spenser’s poem that I use in this study is the Thomas P. 
Roche, Jr., edition (London:  Penguin, 1978). 
     
23See Timothy Webb, Shelley:  A Voice Not Understood (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:  
Humanities Press, 1977), 148; for the text of “Mont Blanc,” see Reiman and Fraistat, 
Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 96-101. 
    
 24For Wittreich’s view on The Cenci, see “Prophecy,” 57. 
     
25For the text of Shelley’s essay, see Reiman and Fraistat, Shelley’s Poetry and 
Prose, 509-35. 
     
26For Shelley on the sister arts, see “A Defence of Poetry,” Reiman and Fraistat, 
513. 
     
27As Christopher Harvie notes, “legal campaigns helped to end the serfdom of 
Scots colliers and salt-workers in 1799, and the British Empire’s slave trade in 1807” 
(423).  Slavery was finally abolished throughout the British Empire in 1833; the same 
year saw “the regulation of children’s work in textile factories by the Factory 
Inspectorate” (Harvie 441).  See Harvie’s essay, “Revolution and the Rule of Law 
(1789-1851),” 419-62, in The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain, ed. Kenneth O. 
Morgan (Oxford and New York:  Oxford UP, 1995). 
     
28 I borrow the Latin phrase from Wittreich, Visionary Poetics, 75.  
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29For the source of the quote from Thomas Goodwin, see Wittreich, Visionary 
Poetics, 232, fn. 102. 
    
 30Mary Shelley’s novel, Frankenstein, was adapted for the stage by Richard 
Brinsley Peake in 1823 as Presumption; or, The Fate of Frankenstein. 
     
31For a discussion of the Book of Revelation as a visionary drama, see Wittreich, 
Visionary Poetics, 39-40. 
     
32See “Percy Bysshe Shelley:  A Chronology” in Reiman and Fraistat, 769-73. 
     
33For the date of completion for act four, refer to Reiman and Fraistat, 202. 
     
34On Utopian Socialism, see Charles Breunig, The Age of Revolution and 
Reaction, 1789-1850, 2nd edition (New York:  Norton, 1977), 175-6, 178-9, and 203.  
See also J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 
1963), 96-100. 
     
35I take this information from David Perkins, ed., English Romantic Writers (Fort 
Worth:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967), 386-87. 
     
36Nicholas M. Williams, Ideology and Utopia in the Poetry of William Blake 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1998). 
     
37See Mary Anne Perkins, “Coleridge, Language and History,” in Coleridge’s 
Visionary Languages:  Essays in Honour of J. B. Beer, ed. Tim Fulford and Morton 
D. Paley (Cambridge:  D. S. Brewer, 1993), 181-94. 
     
38I borrow here from Susan Bruce’s introduction to Three Early Modern Utopias:  
Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines (Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1999), xxi.   
    
 39See Robert Sayre and Michael Löwy, “Figures of Romantic Anticapitalism,” in 
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Spirits of Fire, 23-68, especially 54. 
     
40 All quotations of Blake’s work in this study are drawn from The Complete 
Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David V. Erdman (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  
U of California P, 1982).  
     
41For example, see Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, IV.143 and IV.153-58. 
 
Chapter Three 
The Privilege of Southey’s Damnation: 
Visionary Poetry and the Devil Scripture in Lord Byron’s The Vision of Judgment 
     
1See Byron, The Complete Poetical Works, Vol. III, 358-75. 
     
2McGann discusses these facts in some detail in his notes to the poem, 667-78, 
especially 671-72, in The Complete Poetical Works, Vol. VI, ed. McGann and Barry 
Weller (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1991).  For the text of the poem, see 309-45. 
     
3The reference to the Book of Tobit (specifically, Tobit 11.7-15) was in part 
suggested by Paul Turner’s introduction to his translation of Utopia (Harmondsworth:  
Penguin, 1961), 8. 
     
4Again see The Complete Poetical Works, Vol. VI, 671-72. 
     
5See Tom Stoppard, Arcadia (London and Boston:  Faber and Faber, 1993), 7. 
     
6
 All quotations of Byron’s letters are drawn from Leslie Marchand, Byron’s 
Letters and Journals (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1973-82).  
The edition is abbreviated as BLJ in parenthetical citations.   
     
7See both McGann’s commentary, The Complete Poetical Works, Vol. VI, 672,  
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and Byron’s Letters and Journals, Vol. 9, 95-100. 
    
 8Byron’s Letters and Journals, Vol. 9, 102 and fn. 1, and 116-118. 
     
9See McGann, The Beauty of Inflections:  Literary Investigations in Historical 
Method and Theory (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1985), 277. 
     
10McGann’s Don Juan in Context (Chicago and London:  U of Chicago P, 1976) is 
cited as DjiC in parenthetical references. 
     
11As McGann notes, “Byron made friends with some of the people he attacked in 
his first satire, like [Thomas] Moore and Lord Holland” (DJiC 17).  The Cambridge 
Companion to Byron states that “on 12 March [1812],” Byron composed a “letter to 
Walter Scott apologising for English Bards” (xvi).  See The Cambridge Companion 
to Byron, ed. Drummond Bone (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2004). 
     
12Byron’s Letters and Journals, Vol. 4, 285 fn. 2, 286. 
     
13Byron’s Letters and Journals, Vol. 4, 285 fn. 1. 
     
14The Vision of Judgment is shortened to TVJ in all parenthetical citations. 
     
15Bainbridge adds:  “There is no evidence to suggest that Byron had read The 
Poet’s Pilgrimage before writing Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage III.  Yet it is tempting 
to suggest that he would have been aware of this latest example of ‘cant’ ‘political’ 
and ‘poetical’, particularly as it had provocatively usurped his own notion of 
‘Pilgrimage’ and yoked it to a poem which sought to legitimize not only the social 
and political establishments of restoration Europe, but the writer’s own position as 
Poet Laureate” (177).  For further discussion of Byron’s take on Waterloo and its 
aftermath, see Bainbridge, Napoleon and English Romanticism (Cambridge:   
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Cambridge UP, 1995), 177-82. 
     
16See Complete Poetical Works, II, for the text of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage. 
     
17Cain is the central protagonist of Cain, A Mystery (1821); Alp and Hugo are 
Byronic heroes who appear in the Eastern romances The Siege of Corinth and 
Parisina, respectively (both 1816). 
     
18The moment commands some interest as a Romantic-era precursor to the mise en 
abyme technique employed in the twentieth century by writers such as André Gide 
and Italo Calvino.  See The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary 
Theory, 513. 
     
19Hill’s Milton and the English Revolution is cited as MER in parenthetical 
citations throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
     
20For Kern on Henry Fielding, see Dramatic Satire in the Age of Walpole 1720-
1750 (Ames:  Iowa State UP, 1976), especially 45. 
     
21For the text of “Churchill’s Grave,” see Complete Poetical Works, Vol. IV, 1-2; 
for commentary, see 447-48. 
     
22 Liu argues that “Wordsworth had to create a new convention of irony:  what the 
1798 Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads calls an ‘experimental’ poetry” (289).  See 
Wordsworth:  The Sense of History (Stanford:  Stanford UP, 1989). 
     
23See Reiman and Fraistat, Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 337-38. 
     
24Gary Dyer, British Satire and the Politics of Style, 1789-1832 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1997). 
     
25By 26 April, 1821, Byron had read Shelley’s The Cenci but not Prometheus  
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Unbound.  See Byron’s Letters and Journals, Vol. 8, 103-4. 
     
26See also Wolf Z. Hirst’s essay, “Byron’s Revisionary Struggle with the Bible,” 
in Byron, the Bible, and Religion:  Essays from the Twelfth International Byron 
Seminar, ed. Hirst (Newark:  U of Delaware P, 1991), especially 87.  In this essay, 
Hirst discusses Byron’s disinclination to accept the idea of sinners’ everlasting 
suffering.  Warren Stevenson’s “Hebraism and Hellenism in the Poetry of Byron” 
also appears in this collection. 
     
27Regina Hewitt, “Romanticism and the Law:  A Selective Introduction,” 
European Romantic Review 18 (2007):  299-315. 
     
28Peter Cochran, “Byron’s Influence on European Romanticism,” A Companion to 
European Romanticism, ed. Michael Ferber (Malden:  Blackwell, 2005), 67-85. 
     
29See Cochran, “Byron’s Influence,” 76-83. 
     
30See Peterfreund, “The Politics of ‘Neutral Space’ in Byron’s Vision of 
Judgment,” Modern Language Quarterly 40 (1979):  275-91; cited in Complete 
Poetical Works, Vol. VI., 672. 
     
31For speculation on Junuius’s identity, see Collected Poetical Works, Vol. VI., 
676-7. 
     
32To this point, see Edward T. Duffy, “Byron Representing Himself against 
Southey,” History and Myth, 188-201, especially 192. 
     
33As a point of reference, see Paul Langford’s essay, “The Eighteenth Century 
(1688-1789),” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain, 352-418. 
     
34See The Vision of Judgment, stanzas 72 and 73, ll. 569-584.   
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35Peter Vassallo, Byron:  the Italian Literary Influence (New York:  St. Martin’s 
Press, 1984).   
    
 36
 Richard Lansdown and Dosia Reichardt, “‘Almost as far as Petersburg’:  Byron 
and the Russians,” Keats-Shelley Journal LVI (2007):  52-77.  Lansdown and 
Reichardt quote Beppo, 47-49, ll. 369-92, on 71. 
     
37 See Beth Lau, “Jane Austen and John Keats:  Negative Capability, Romance and 
Reality,” Keats-Shelley Journal LV (2006):  81-110.   
 
Chapter Four 
Time and the Sibyl in Mary Shelley’s The Last Man 
     
1All quotations of Shelley’s novel are drawn from Anne McWhir’s edition of The 
Last Man (Peterborough:  Broadview, 1996). 
    
 2On the concept of deep time—that is, geological rather than artificial clock 
time—see John Wyatt, Wordsworth and the Geologists (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 
1995), 150-68, particularly 155-58. 
     
3Lynch contends that Scott’s Waverley, for example, exhibits a “political 
quietism” in certain of its “image[s]” representing history:  “Scott’s determinism 
closes down the political possibilities that republican historiographers such as 
Godwin and [J. C. L. Simonde de] Sismondi were attempting to keep open” (139).  
Lynch states also that “beneath William Godwin’s interest in seventeenth-century 
English republicanism and Shelley’s friend Sismondi’s research on Italy’s medieval 
city-states lay the belief that, by studying the past, one would not only discover the  
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inner mechanism of historical change, but would by that means demonstrate that the 
forward progress of liberty was only temporarily halted” (138).  See Lynch’s essay in 
The Cambridge Companion to Mary Shelley (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2003):  
135-150. 
     
4 The actress and poet Mary Robinson, of course, was known as Perdita, after her 
most famous stage role.  It is unclear whether Shelley had Robinson in mind when 
naming this character.  It is also uncertain whether she chose her protagonist’s 
surname to reflect some connection with Sir Edmund Verney, a royalist who fell at 
the Battle of Edgehill, or with any other member of the Verney family.  On Sir 
Edmund, see Ian Gentles’s “The Civil Wars in England” in The Civil Wars:  A 
Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660, ed. John Kenyon and 
Jane Ohlmeyer (Oxford and New York:  Oxford UP, 1998), 133.  On the Verney 
family, see Adrian Tinniswood, The Verneys (New York:  Penguin Group, 2007). 
     
5For a discussion of Verney’s somewhat conflicted use of political rhetoric 
(including his generous citations of Edmund Burke, startling enough given that 
Shelley was Mary Wollstonecraft’s daughter), see McWhir’s introduction to The Last 
Man, xxxiii-xxxiv. 
     
6See Karen Hadley, “The Commodification of Time in Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern 
Abbey,’” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 42 (2002):  693-706, and 
Christopher R. Miller (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2006). 
     
7 For an interesting discussion of the museum during the Romantic period, see 
Laurie Kane Lew, “Collection and Recollection:  William Hazlitt and the Poetics of 
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Memory,” Studies in Romanticism 36 (1997):  349-89. 
     
8See Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. Vere Chappell 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1999). 
     
9The information here is drawn from the “Chronological Tables:  1772-1834” 
section of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 16.1.1., lxxii. 
     
10See Wittreich, “Prophecy,” 47-48. 
     
11The passage reads:  “‘Nam Sibyllam quidem Cumis ego ipse oculis meis vidi in 
ampulla pendere, et cum illi pueri dicerent:  Σίβνλλα τί θέλεις; respondebat illa:  
άpiοθανειν θέλω.’”  See T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in Selected Poems:  The 
Centenary Edition (San Diego:  Harcourt Brace, 1988), 49.     
    
 12Note Shelley’s description of the prophetess Beatrice in Valperga:  “Sometimes 
he thought of poor Beatrice, her form, beaming with beauty, and alive with the spirit 
of the sybil” (210-11).  See Mary Shelley, Valperga, ed. Michael Rossington (Oxford:  
Oxford UP, 2000). 
     
13For a discussion of this subject, see Samuel Lyndon Gladden, “Mary Shelley’s 
Editions of The Collected Poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley:  The Editor as Subject,” 
Studies in Romanticism 44 (2005):  181-205. 
     
14For the incident to which Paley refers, see The Journals of Mary Shelley, 1814-
1844, ed. Paula R. Feldman and Diana Scott-Kilvert (Baltimore and London:  The 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1987), 242. 
     
15See Audrey A. Fisch, “Plaguing Politics:  AIDS, Deconstruction, and The Last 
Man,” The Other Mary Shelley:  Beyond Frankenstein, especially 267-86.   
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16See Paley, “The Last Man:  Apocalypse Without Millennium,” The Other Mary 
Shelley:  Beyond Frankenstein, 107-23, especially 114-15. 
     
17See Bewell, Romanticism and Colonial Disease (Baltimore and London:  The 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 296-314.  See also Pamela Clemit, The Godwinian Novel:  
The Rational Fictions of Godwin, Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1993), 193. 
     
18Charles E. Robinson, Shelley and Byron:  The Snake and Eagle Wreathed in 
Fight (Baltimore and London:  The Johns Hopkins UP, 1976). 
     
19Jane Spencer describes her book, Aphra Behn’s Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2000), in Literary Relations:  Kinship and the Canon 1660-1830 (Oxford:  Oxford 
UP, 2005), 11 and fn. 15. 
     
20See Barbara Jane O’Sullivan, “Beatrice in Valperga:  A New Cassandra,” in The 
Other Mary Shelley, 140-158.  The Wolf piece that O’Sullivan references is the 1982 
work, Cassandra:  A Novel and Four Essays (142; 157, fn. 4).  Although she focuses 
on Shelley’s second published novel, O’Sullivan offers through her argument a way 
of looking at Shelley’s The Last Man that benefits the present analysis. 
     
21See “The Study of Poetry,” in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, 
Vol. IX, ed. R. H. Super (Ann Arbor:  U of Michigan P, 1973), 161-88. 
     
22See The Journals of Mary Shelley, 1814-1844, ed. Feldman and Scott-Kilvert, 
162. 
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Chapter Five 
“Fled is that music”:  John Keats’s Challenge to Romantic Vision 
     
1All quotations of Keats’s letters are drawn from Hyder E. Rollins, The Letters of 
John Keats 1814-1821, 2 volumes (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard UP, 1958). 
    
 2Parenthetical references to Stillinger’s The Hoodwinking of Madeline and Other 
Essays on Keats’s Poems (Urbana:  U of Illinois P, 1971) are hereafter shortened to 
Madeline. 
     
3Aileen Ward reproduces parts of and comments on the 14-31 October 1818 letter 
in her work, John Keats:  The Making of a Poet (New York:  Viking, 1963), 224-226. 
     
4 De Almeida states also that, “through the figure of Apollo, Western mythology 
has connected poetry and the making of music with the creation of medicine and that 
power of life and death inherent in the practice of physic; in Apollo’s legendary 
foresight amid his arts it has allied, furthermore, the physician’s tasks of diagnosis 
and prognostication with the basic powers of divination and prophecy” (17).  For 
further discussion of Keats’s idea of Apollo, see de Almeida, Romantic Medicine and 
John Keats (New York and Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1991), 39-42, 276. 
     
5 All quotations of Keats’s poetry are drawn from The Poems of John Keats, ed. 
Jack Stillinger (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1978).   
    
 6Newey addresses the depiction of Apollo in Hyperion (Fall 1818 to April 1819) 
and in The Fall of Hyperion.  A Dream (July to September 1819) and concludes that 
Saturn, the sovereign god displaced by the Olympians (of whom Apollo is one), 
resembles not only “fallen dynasts [like] Napoleon and Lear,” but suggests “also a  
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poetic figure, a personification of Wordsworth in the aspect in which Keats did not 
warm to him” (77).  Newey adds that “Keats implicitly displaces the poetic titans of 
his own age [. . .] through his deification of Apollo” (77).  See Newey’s essay, 
“Hyperion, The Fall of Hyperion, and Keats’s Epic Ambitions,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Keats, ed. Susan J. Wolfson (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2001), 69-
85. 
     
7 See Jack Stillinger, “Wordsworth and Keats,” in The Age of William 
Wordsworth:  Critical Essays on the Romantic Tradition, ed. Kenneth R. Johnston 
and Gene W. Ruoff (New Brunswick and London:  Rutgers UP, 1987), 173-95. 
     
8An interesting analogy may be made to Albert Camus’s remarks in a journal entry 
for December, 1938: 
          Faust the other way around.  The young man asks the devil for the goods of 
          this world.  The devil [. . .] gently replies:  “But you already have the goods of 
          the world.  You must ask God for what you lack—if you really do think that 
          you do lack anything.  You can strike a bargain with God, and in exchange for 
          the goods of the next world you can sell him your body.” 
              After a pause, the devil lights an English cigarette and says:  “And that will 
          be your eternal punishment.”  (113-14) 
     In his journal for late October, 1949, Camus quotes, in French, from Keats’s 
letters.  For the 1938 quotation, see Camus’s Notebooks 1935-1942, trans. Philip 
Thody (New York:  Paragon House, 1991); for the 1949 material, see Notebooks 
1942-1951, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York:  Paragon House, 1991), 223 and fn. 8. 
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9 See Butler, Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries:  English Literature and its 
Background 1760-1830 (New York and Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1981), 152. 
     
10Keats casts the theory of Negative Capability with express reference to 
Shakespeare; see The Letters of John Keats I.191-94, especially 193.  I include 
Kucich’s name in the parenthetical reference, despite mentioning his name 
beforehand, to distinguish his page numbers from those for Keats’s letter. 
     
11See The Letters of John Keats, I.259-63.  
    
 12Hereafter, I shorten the title of Keats’s sonnet to “Before he went.”  Although 
Ward, among others, refers to the sonnet as “Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream” (149), I 
adopt the title that Stillinger employs in his critical edition of Keats’s verse.  For 
further discussion of Keats’s sonnets in general, both in terms of content and style, 
see John Kandl’s “The Politics of Keats’s Early Poetry,” especially 3-8 and 13-17, 
and Susan J. Wolfson’s “Late Lyrics,” especially 104-12, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Keats, ed. Susan J. Wolfson (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2001). 
    
 13The image is so recognizable among Romanticists that Pickering and Chatto 
Publishers employ it for the cover of a 2008 catalogue of titles in Romanticism. 
     
14For the text of the “Rime,” see The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, 16.1.1., ed. J. C. C. Mays (Princeton:  Princeton UP, 2001), 365-419. 
     
15These citations are provided by John Barnard in his annotations to the sonnet 
(which he entitles “Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream,” as Ward does) in John Keats, The 
Complete Poems (Harmondsworth:  Penguin, 1988), 612. 
     
16For Byron’s “Vision of Belshazzar” and “To the Prince Regent,” see The  
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Complete Poetical Works, III.303-4 and IV.242, respectively.  For Shelley’s 
“England in 1819,” see Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 326-27 and fn. 1. 
     
17See The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821 I. 191-2, fn. 6. 
     
18Barnard notes that “Keats also uses the image of the downfall of Babylon to 
prophesy the end of Tory tyranny in Endymion III, 18-21” (The Collected Poems 
612).  See also Ward, John Keats:  The Making of a Poet, 149. 
     
19For a discussion of Keats’s sense of humor, see Jack Stillinger, “Multiple 
Readers, Multiple Texts, Multiple Keats,” in The Persistence of Poetry:  Bicentennial 
Essays on Keats, ed. Robert M. Ryan and Ronald A. Sharp (Amherst:  U of 
Massachusetts Press, 1998), 10-35. 
     
20
 Keats mentions Coleridge’s volume of poems in a November 1817 letter to 
William Dilkes and his wife.  See The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821 I.183. 
     
21See George Harry Ford, Keats and the Victorians (Hamden:  Archon, 1962), and 
James Najarian, Victorian Keats:  Manliness, Sexuality, and Desire (New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
     
22The dates here are drawn from the “Chronology” section of The Oxford 
Illustrated History of Britain, ed. Kenneth O. Morgan (Oxford and New York:  
Oxford UP, 1995), 617. 
     
23See Shirley Foster’s introduction to Elizabeth Gaskell, Mary Barton (Oxford:  
Oxford UP), x-xii. 
     
24See Jackie DiSalvo, “Blake Encountering Milton:  Politics and the Family in 
Paradise Lost and The Four Zoas,” in Milton and the Line of Vision, ed. Joseph  
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Anthony Wittreich, Jr. (Madison:  U of Wisconsin P, 1975), 181.  DiSalvo references 
both G. Rattray Taylor and E. P. Thompson. 
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